Understanding Legislative-Judicial Relations Under Incomplete Information: Absorption and Vetoes at the German Constitutional Court

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Hoennige ◽  
Thomas Gschwend ◽  
Benjamin G. Engst ◽  
Caroline Wittig
2009 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roland Bieber

German Constitutional Court decision of 30 June 2009 on the compatibility of the Lisbon Treaty with the German Constitution – Continuing sovereignty of member states under the EU Treaty – Extended constitutional limits to European integration (‘eternity clause’) under German Constitution, but these are not violated by Lisbon Treaty – Composition of European Parliament does not satisfy fundamental requirement of democracy but does not violate German Constitution since EU is not a state – Critical assessment of conceptual foundations of decision


2021 ◽  
pp. 201-230
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at Brazilian judicial review. Judicial review in Brazil originated because it was borrowed from the U.S. Constitution. It emerged in amplified form in Brazil’s 1988 Constitution because, by 1988, the normative appeal of judicial review was widely appreciated all over the world. Moreover, the Hybrid Model of judicial review in Brazil, whereby the Supreme Federal Tribunal is both, at the apex of a diffuse system of judicial review, and is also a Constitutional Court, reflects widespread appreciation for the value of a system like the German Constitutional Court in a civil law jurisdiction. The power of such a court to issue rulings with erga omnes effect is especially important in civil law countries like Brazil, which lack systems of stare decisis. First, judicial review emerged in Brazil as the result of borrowing. Second, it emerged as a rights from wrongs reaction to abuses of power during Fascism and during the military dictatorship, which ruled Brazil for 1964 until 1984. Third, judicial review is necessary in Brazil for both federalism and separation of powers umpiring reasons. Fourth, judicial review in Brazil also emerged because the constitution-writing elite wanted to entrench its liberal and socialist values to forestall the emergence of yet another military government in the country. And, fifth, the Brazilian Constitution divides and allocates power among so many federal and state entities that the Supreme Federal Tribunal has the political space it needs to play a really big role in governing the country.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dunne ◽  
Jule Mulder

This Case Note discusses the recent judgment of the German Constitutional Court (1 BvR 2019/16) requiring either the legal recognition of sex categories beyond male or female, or the aboltion of sex registration requirements. The Note considers the Court's decision within the broader constitutional case law on gender identity, and explores both the progressive potential, and the future—perhaps unforeseen—consequences, of the ruling. The Case Note proceeds in three sections. Section A introduces the facts of the constitutional challenge, and sets out both the submissions of the complainant, as well as the reasoning of the Constitutional Court. In Section B, the Case Note explores the domestic law novelty of the decision, placing particular emphasis on the application of a constitutional equality framework to persons who experience intersex variance. Finally, in Section C, the Case Note contextualizes the judgment, situating the reasoning of the Constitutional Court within wider movements for transgender—otherwise known as trans—and intersex rights.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1025-1048 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sven Simon

By its first request for a preliminary ruling, the German Constitutional Court aired its doubts about the lawfulness of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) program. In this article it is argued that the ECB's pledge in the summer of 2012 to do “whatever it takes” to safeguard the monetary policy transmission mechanism in all countries of the euro area by buying government bonds was generally compatible with EU law. However, it is argued that there is some potential for the ECB to infringe the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) while acting according to this announcement. The peculiarity of the situation, the author argues, is that we might be dealing with a “self-fulfilling prophecy” in that the ECB announces a particular policy, which might not be compatible with EU law, but the act announced, will never take place because the political problem would have been resolved by the measure previously announced. The critical question in this scenario refers to how a court should react to such a situation. The author argues that a court in such a situation has to show the legal limits of the particular institution, but neither the ECJ nor the German Constitutional Court may replace the central banks' task to maintain financial stability. Finally, a comment is given on how the German Constitutional Court will react to the ECJ's decision in that case.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-219
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
Bardo Fassbender

Prince of Liechtenstein v. Federal Supreme Court. Case 2 BvR 1981/97. 36 Archiv des Volkerrechts 198 (1998).German Federal Constitutional Court (3d Chamber, 2d Senate), January 28, 1998.On January 28, 1998, a chamber of the German Constitutional Court decided that the Court would not deal with a constitutional complaint brought before it by Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein, Head of State of die Principality of Liechtenstein. In effect, the chamber thus upheld the decisions made by the civil courts rejecting the Prince's attempt to recover a family painting confiscated by Czechoslovakia and currently on loan to a German museum.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document