Extempore Observations on Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement: Towards a Virtuous Circle of Detection, Punishment and Compliance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Nazzini

Author(s):  
Konrad RÓŻOWICZ

Aim: In the practice of awarding public contracts, sometimes the behavior of market actors, instead of competing with other entities, are aimed at illegal cooperation, including bid rigging. The above shows that healthy competition is not possible without efficient market control. In public procurement market this control is, primarily, carried out by public procurement entities: the President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) and the National Appeal Chamber (KIO), and furthermore by President od the Office of Competition (Prezes UOKiK) and Consumer Protection and the Court od Competition and Consumer Protection. and Consumer Protection (SOKiK). The interesting issue is how the activities of the President of Office of Competition and Consumer Protection targeted  to contend with bid rigging affects on the activities of President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) or the National Appeal Chamber (KIO). Design / Research methods: analysis and comparison decisions/ judgment issued by the President of the Public Procurement Office, National Appeal Chamber, the President of  the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection. Conclusions: The analysis has shown that the existence of specificities in the activities of the decision-making bodies and the judgments examined. However, in keeping with the specificity of the forms and objectives of control, these entities should cooperate, to a greater extent than before. Expanding the scope of cooperation would make it possible to better contend with bid rigging without changing the competition protection model. The introduction of institutionalized instruments for cooperation between the authorities seems to be valuable in terms of system solutions. Value of the article: The main value of the article is the comparison of selectively selected decisions and judgments representative of the problem under consideration and their comparative analysis in order to achieve the research objectives. The article deals with issues relevant to both public procurement practitioners and the state bodies dealing with procurement matters.



2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoru Tanaka ◽  
Shuya Hayashi

This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.



2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Clark ◽  
Decio Coviello ◽  
Jean-Fran�ois Gauthier ◽  
Art Shneyerov




2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-186 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garima Bhagat

Public procurement of goods and services accounts for 25–30 percentage of GDP in developing countries. Since this involves public resources, it is important to optimise efficiency of procurement which in turn is positively correlated with the level of competition in the market. Paradoxically, various factors make public procurement especially vulnerable to a host of anti-competitive practices. The article examines various anti-competitive practices that may potentially affect the efficiency of public procurement as well as ‘red flags’ in various stages of the bidding process that could possibly point to bid rigging. However, by properly designing the procurement process, risks of bid rigging can be significantly reduced. Data from various countries show huge savings to public treasuries resulting from implementation of public procurement reforms. The article also attempts to discuss the evolution of competition law in India over the last seven years of operation of the Competition Act, 2002. Apart from the crucial role of the Competition Authorities, the article underlines the need for procurers to be proactive. Effective public procurement reforms in India would require close cooperation among various stakeholders, such as the Department of Expenditure, Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), Competition Commission of India (CCI) as well as procurers.



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