Prevention and Deterrence of Bid Rigging: A Look from the 2011 Proposal for a New EU Directive on Public Procurement

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Sánchez Graells
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
Bid Rigging

Bid rigging in public procurement market according to the decisions of the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Konrad RÓŻOWICZ
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Consumer Protection ◽  
Design Research ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Appeal Chamber ◽  
Interesting Issue ◽  
Market Control ◽  
The Public ◽  
Bid Rigging

Aim: In the practice of awarding public contracts, sometimes the behavior of market actors, instead of competing with other entities, are aimed at illegal cooperation, including bid rigging. The above shows that healthy competition is not possible without efficient market control. In public procurement market this control is, primarily, carried out by public procurement entities: the President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) and the National Appeal Chamber (KIO), and furthermore by President od the Office of Competition (Prezes UOKiK) and Consumer Protection and the Court od Competition and Consumer Protection. and Consumer Protection (SOKiK). The interesting issue is how the activities of the President of Office of Competition and Consumer Protection targeted  to contend with bid rigging affects on the activities of President of the Public Procurement Office (Prezes UZP) or the National Appeal Chamber (KIO). Design / Research methods: analysis and comparison decisions/ judgment issued by the President of the Public Procurement Office, National Appeal Chamber, the President of  the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Court of Competition and Consumer Protection. Conclusions: The analysis has shown that the existence of specificities in the activities of the decision-making bodies and the judgments examined. However, in keeping with the specificity of the forms and objectives of control, these entities should cooperate, to a greater extent than before. Expanding the scope of cooperation would make it possible to better contend with bid rigging without changing the competition protection model. The introduction of institutionalized instruments for cooperation between the authorities seems to be valuable in terms of system solutions. Value of the article: The main value of the article is the comparison of selectively selected decisions and judgments representative of the problem under consideration and their comparative analysis in order to achieve the research objectives. The article deals with issues relevant to both public procurement practitioners and the state bodies dealing with procurement matters.

Collusion between public procurers and suppliers in the context of japan’s public procurement: The role of the risks of “unsuccessful procurement”

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Satoru Tanaka ◽  
Shuya Hayashi
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
Theoretical Treatment ◽  
Public Official ◽  
Experience Goods ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
Bid Rigging

This paper examines the economic forces which may lead to government-assisted or -facilitated bid-rigging (kansei-dango) in public procurement in Japan, and considers their implications. A public official may often worry about situations where his/her procurement project will not be successfully implemented. Based on a simplified theoretical treatment and on case studies of kansei-dango, it is argued that the desire to avert the risk of unsuccessful procurement resulting from the "experience goods" status of procured goods and/or services may be one reason for bid-rigging. Based on this understanding of kansei-dango, we discuss some implications for policies to restrain this type of corruption.

European Union Public Procurement Remedies Regimes

2012 ◽  
pp. 162-184
Author(s):  
Kai Krüger
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
European Economic Area ◽  
European Economic ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Economic Area ◽  
Set Up ◽  
The Eu

The chapter explores the Nordic statutory EU-based remedy regimes. Due to the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement, the EU commitments do not vary between EU member states, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden and (non-members) Norway and Iceland. The legislation on procurement remedies is assumed to be EU/EEA compliant. There are however material differences in the set up for handling disputes and complaints—also subsequent to the 2010-2012 Nordic adaptation of EU Directive 2007/66/EC on enhanced procurement remedies. The pending issue is whether the EU “sufficiently serious breach” principle on treaty infringements applies on liability for procurement flaws. Loss of contract damage has been awarded in all Nordic countries, whereas cases on negative interest (costs in preparing futile tender bids) seem more favorable to plaintiffs. Per mid-2012, there are no Nordic rulings on the effect of the recent somewhat ambiguous EU Court of Justice Strabag and Spijkers 2010 rulings.

OP166 How Responsive Is Industry To Value Based Procurement?

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (S1) ◽  
pp. 60-61
Author(s):  
Gabriela Restovic ◽  
Nuria Cuenca ◽  
Ferran Rodriguez ◽  
Yves Verboven ◽  
Laura Sampietro-Colom
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Real Life ◽  
High Volume ◽  
University Hospital ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Transcatheter Aortic Valve ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
Value Propositions ◽  
Hospital Teams ◽  
Valve Implantation

Introduction:The European Union (EU) directive (2014/24) on public procurement strives to stimulate innovation and seeks for methodologies to implement a quality/cost based approach to search for the most economically advantageous tendering (MEAT). MedTech Europe launched the MEAT value-based-procurement (VBP) framework and tool which considers product's value from different perspectives/dimensions. Results from the first EU pilot, testing the feasibility to use the MEAT framework at a university hospital, are presented.Methods:The framework and tool were tested using two types of technologies: high volume (underpads, diapers) and highly specialized (transcatheter aortic valve implantation). Companies were invited to participate following standard procurement rules. For each dimension, criteria, metrics and weights were defined, using multidisciplinary hospital teams. In parallel, companies were asked to do the same. Product performance scores were obtained from companies’ information. Challenges to implement MEAT in real life were identified through face-to-face meetings.Results:The process was well perceived by companies and hospital. Nevertheless, the level of information provided by companies was heterogeneous (quantity and quality). A match in the cost and outcome criteria was observed between hospital and companies; but relative weights assigned differed. Value propositions and robustness of information provided by companies varied across technologies and size of companies. Implementing the MEAT VBP framework and tool need extra time and knowledge.Conclusions:MEAT VBP value technologies ahead of price, leading to the most economic advantageous purchasing. Nevertheless its implementation in real life is limited.

scholarly journals Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Clark ◽  
Decio Coviello ◽  
Jean-Fran�ois Gauthier ◽  
Art Shneyerov
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Entry Deterrence ◽  
Bid Rigging

Contracting Authorities Inability to Fight Bid Rigging in Public Procurement: Reasons and Remedies

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Lopez Mino ◽  
Patricia Valcarcel Fernandez
Keyword(s):  
Public Procurement ◽  
Bid Rigging

scholarly journals Legislative framework of in-house procurement

2019 ◽  
Vol 68 ◽  
pp. 01026
Author(s):  
Anatolijs Krivins
Keyword(s):  
Adam Smith ◽  
Public Procurement ◽  
John Maynard Keynes ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Eu Directive ◽  
Legislative Framework ◽  
Eu Directives ◽  
Main Ideas ◽  
David Ricardo ◽  
The Eu

The article “Legislative Framework of In-house Procurement” examines the importance of the concept of the in-house transactions in Public Procurement. The purpose of the work is to analyse the Legislative Framework from the perspective of the principle of free competition. The study of free competition is based on works and the main ideas of the following authors: Adam Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, David Ricardo, Thomas Robert Malthus, John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, Friedrich August von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Having done the analysis of the EU directives and regulations concerning In-house Procurement (Directive 2014/24/EU; Directive 2014/25/EU; Directive 2013/34/EU; Case C-107/98, Case C-26/03, Case C-84/03, Case C-295/05, Case C-480/06, Case C-324/07, Case C-573/07, Case C-196/08, Case C182/11 and C183/11), as well as normative regulations of several countries, the author made a conclusion, that In-house Procurement contains considerable threats to the principle of free competition in Public Procurement. In-house Procurement contains considerable threats to the principle of free competition in Public Procurement. The data obtained confirm this hypothesis. The results obtained allow us to develop recommendations for the Legislative Framework of In-house Procurement. The results of the research can be used by procurement theoreticians and practitioners.

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