Determinants of Returns of Acquiring Firms Around Public Tender Offer Announcements: The Evidence Related to French Control-Oriented and Parent-Subsidiary Offers

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara S. Picherot Petitt ◽  
Pascal Dumontier
Keyword(s):  

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.





2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomi Fyrqvist ◽  
Elias Henrikki Rantapuska ◽  
Sami Torstila
Keyword(s):  




2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (7) ◽  
pp. 334
Author(s):  
Ye Cai ◽  
Hersh Shefrin

We estimate how an acquiring firm’s risk changes depending on whether the market initially judges the acquisition to be neutral, strongly negative, or strongly positive for the shareholders of the acquiring firm. We found that for an average neutral acquisition, the annualized standard deviation of an acquiring firm’s total return declines by 5%. In contrast, acquisitions judged negatively by the market result in a 5% increase in total risk, while acquisitions judged positively by the market feature a 30-basis-point increase in total risk. We found the median acquisition to be value creating, not value destructive. Value destruction tends to be concentrated among large firms and to be associated with extreme negative outliers. Acquiring firms with longholder CEOs are more prone to undertake acquisitions and more prone to take on risk, but are less prone to engage in value-destructive acquisitions than acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs. In this respect, acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs are more apt to undertake risky bad acquisitions, especially when their prior returns lie above the industry average. In addition, acquiring firms with non-longholder CEOs are less prone to take on good acquisitions that are high in risk. As a general matter, firms with longholder CEOs are less risk sensitive to changes in prior returns than firms with non-longholder CEOs.



2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (7) ◽  
pp. 2086-2119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Serguey Braguinsky ◽  
Atsushi Ohyama ◽  
Tetsuji Okazaki ◽  
Chad Syverson

We explore how changes in ownership affect the productivity and profitability of producers. Using detailed data from the Japanese cotton spinning industry at the turn of the last century, we find that acquired firms' production facilities were not on average less physically productive than the plants of the acquiring firms before acquisition. They were much less profitable, however, due to higher inventory levels and lower capacity utilization—differences that reflected problems in managing the uncertainties of demand. After acquisitions, less profitable acquired plants saw drops in inventories and gains in capacity utilization that raised both their productivity and profitability levels. (JEL D24, G32, G34, L11, L25, L66, N65)





1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-295
Author(s):  
Robert S. Harris


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