scholarly journals Unemployment Spell and Vertical Skills Mismatches: The Case of Macedonia's Youth

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktorija Atanasovska ◽  
Tijana Angjelkovska ◽  
Jorge DDvalos
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Spell

The Distribution of Unemployment Spells: Canada, 1978–82

ILR Review ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 254-267
Author(s):  
Charles M. Beach ◽  
S. F. Kaliski
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Work Experience ◽  
The United States ◽  
Micro Data ◽  
Lorenz Curves ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Data Source ◽  
Unemployment Spells ◽  
Severe Recession

This paper empirically examines entire distributions of unemployment spells according to a novel duration-share approach based on decile shares and Lorenz curves of unemployment. The approach is applied to a Canadian micro-data source akin to the Work Experience Surveys for the United States. The major empirical findings are that long-term unemployment accounts for a very substantial proportion of total weeks of unemployment, despite the short duration of the average spell of unemployment. The structure of unemployment spell distribution differs significantly by gender, age, education, and region; and significant cyclical effects on the distribution of unemployment spells are associated with the severe recession in 1982.

Public Employment Agencies and Unemployment Spells: Reconciling the Experimental and Nonexperimental Evidence

ILR Review ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Positive Relationship ◽  
Public Employment ◽  
Job Seekers ◽  
Search Methods ◽  
Employment Agency ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Econometric Evidence ◽  
Unemployment Spells ◽  
Employment Agencies

Econometric evidence strongly suggests that unemployed job-seekers who use the services of a Public Employment Agency (PEA) have longer unemployment spells than those choosing alternative search methods. Yet, in some well-designed U.S. experiments, increased use of PEA services has been associated with faster transitions into jobs. The author argues that the nonexperimental studies may be biased toward finding a positive relationship between unemployment spell duration and PEA use because they ignore the possibility that PEAs are chosen by many job-seekers only after other search methods have been tried unsuccessfully and a period of unemployment has elapsed. An analysis of U.K. survey data with information on the timing of PEA use in 1987–88 supports that hypothesis.

scholarly journals Unemployment duration tables

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (325) ◽  
Author(s):  
Beata Bieszk-Stolorz ◽  
Iwona Markowicz
Keyword(s):  
Parametric Model ◽  
Unemployment Duration ◽  
Individual Data ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The One ◽  
Mortality Table ◽  
Non Parametric

The purpose of the article is to construct the registered unemployment duration table. The table is a non-parametric model (also called a tabular model) showing the duration of a given phenomenon. In demography it is most often used as a life (or mortality) table. We will construct the cohort tables on the basis of individual data provided by the Poviat Labour Office in Szczecin. The cohort will consist of unemployed individuals registered in 2012 and observed by the end of 2013. The event regarded as the one ending the unemployment spell will be the moment of an individual’s de-registration from the PLO due to finding employment. The remaining data have been considered censored. One of the elements of the table is hazard intensity. We will compare the intensities of unemployment exits in the cohort subgroups.

scholarly journals Should unemployment benefits decrease with the unemployment spell?

2000 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Cahuc ◽  
Etienne Lehmann
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Unemployment Spell

The Wealth of the Unemployed

ILR Review ◽  
2001 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Gruber
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Financial Assets ◽  
Income Loss ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Unemployment Spells ◽  
The Unemployed

Many studies have investigated the adequacy of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits as a form of income replacement, but few have looked at other resources with which the unemployed can finance their unemployment spells. This paper focuses on one form of resources, own wealth holdings. The author finds that the median worker's financial assets can cover roughly two-thirds of the income loss from an unemployment spell. Wealth holdings vary tremendously, however, and almost one-third of workers are unable to replace even 10% of their income loss. Moreover, predicted wealth holdings decline precipitously with realized unemployment durations, both absolutely and (especially) relative to actual income loss. This finding, together with the finding that individuals who are eligible for more generous UI draw down their wealth more slowly than do others during unemployment spells, suggests that UI benefit adequacy could be increased if the benefits were targeted to those with longer unemployment spells.

Factoring in Unemployment Including Unemployment Spell in a DSGE or its Enhanced Version

2015 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 539
Author(s):  
Abhishek Saurabh
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Spell

Duration Dependence and Labor Market Conditions: Evidence from a Field Experiment*

2013 ◽  
Vol 128 (3) ◽  
pp. 1123-1167 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kory Kroft ◽  
Fabian Lange ◽  
Matthew J. Notowidigdo
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Broad Class ◽  
Duration Dependence ◽  
Local Labor Market ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Labor Market Conditions ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Job Postings ◽  
Spell Length

Abstract This article studies the role of employer behavior in generating “negative duration dependence”—the adverse effect of a longer unemployment spell—by sending fictitious résumés to real job postings in 100 U.S. cities. Our results indicate that the likelihood of receiving a callback for an interview significantly decreases with the length of a worker’s unemployment spell, with the majority of this decline occurring during the first eight months. We explore how this effect varies with local labor market conditions and find that duration dependence is stronger when the local labor market is tighter. This result is consistent with the prediction of a broad class of screening models in which employers use the unemployment spell length as a signal of unobserved productivity and recognize that this signal is less informative in weak labor markets.

Erratum

ILR Review ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-533
Author(s):  
John M. Barron ◽  
Otis W. Gilley
Keyword(s):  
Unemployment Insurance ◽  
Job Search ◽  
Search Process ◽  
Unemployment Benefits ◽  
Insurance Benefits ◽  
Search Intensity ◽  
Unemployment Spell ◽  
Disincentive Effect ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Job Search Intensity

The Impact of Unemployment Insurance on the Search Process A SERIOUS coding error in the data used in our recent article published in the April 1979 Review has been pointed out by Joe Stone of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our paper proposed a test of Mortensen's hy-pothesis that both future expected unem- ployment insurance benefits and benefits re-ceived during a current unemployment spell affect an individual's search intensity. Regression 1, which remains unchanged, still provides no support for Mortensen's proposed effect of unemployment insurance benefits to be received during the subse- quent unemployment spell on the current job-search intensity of the unemployed. Regression 3, which remains unchanged, still indicates a distortion in the search process-in particular in the methods of search chosen-for current recipients of unem- ployment insurance benefits and the un- employed who are eligible and have applied for these benefits. The error affects the results of the estimnation of Equation 2. It occurred because unemployed individuals who were eligible and had applied for benefits were assigned zero weeks left to receive these benefits rather than the maximum allowable duration of benefits according to the individual's state of residence. As a result, the value of unem- ployment insurance benefits for these individuals was inadvertently set equal to zero. Yet these individuals, other things equal, were shown in our original study to have a measured job-search intensity 74 percent higher than individuals currently receiving unemployment insurance, a difference related to the time involved in the ap- plication process rather than to actual job- search efforts. Reestimation of Equation 2 controlling for this effect and correcting for the measure- ment error in the value of unemployment benefits results in one important change. The coefficient on the value of unemployment insurance benefits, though still negative, is riot different from zero for standard significance levels. A serious consequence is that the traditional disincentive effect of unemployment insurance on search in- tensity is not supported by our test. One explanation for this finding may be that individuals with larger values of unemployment benefits have a greater incentive to overstate search intensity since such benefits are dependent on search activity.

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