Complements and/or Substitutes? The Competitive Dynamics Between News Publishers and Digital Platforms and What It Means for Competition Policy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damien Geradin
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne

Abstract The proposition that certain digital platforms act as ‘regulators’ within their own business models is a key pillar of the European Commission report on Competition Policy for the Digital Era, and the basis upon which its authors build a wide-ranging duty for dominant platforms to secure competition that is ‘fair, unbiased and pro-users’. This article seeks to shed light on this novel contention, exploring its meaning and the implications for platform operators. It considers the rationale provided within the report and compares the approach with established Article 102 TFEU case law, specifically the ‘special responsibility’ doctrine. Consideration is further given to whether the platforms-as-regulators notion aligns with alternative modes of regulation within the digital sphere. The aim is to explore whether this approach is coherent, and actually useful, as a means by which to frame and direct future enforcement against digital platforms.


Author(s):  
A. G. Atanasian

The realities of digital economy make international competition community to face chal- lenges that require rapid adaptation. Effects of large hi-tech companies’ activity are still too hard to witness and to forecast. It is, however, obvious now that not only informa- tion, but also infringements of antimonopoly legislation are spreading at the speed of sound. This paper observes such important for antimonopoly regulation phenomena, as big data, digital platforms and network effects, sharing economy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 026732312110283
Author(s):  
Stefan Larsson

Anti-competitive notions, it seems, are increasingly informing the critical debate on a data-driven economy organised into scalable digital platforms. Issues of market definitions, how to value personal data on multisided platforms, and how to detect and regulate misuses of dominant positions have become key nomenclature on the battlefield of addressing fairness in our contemporary digital societies. This article looks at the central themes for this special issue on governing trust in European platform societies through the lens of contemporary developments in the field of competition law. Three main questions are addressed: (1) To what extent are the platforms’ own abilities to govern their infrastructures, that is, to be de facto regulators over both human behaviour and market circumstances, a challenge for contemporary competition regulation? (2) In what way is the collection, aggregation, or handling of consumers’ data of relevance for competition? (3) How can the particular European challenges of governing US-based digital platforms more broadly be understood in terms of the relationship between transparency and public trust? Of particular relevance – and challenge – here are the platforms’ abilities to govern their infrastructures, albeit through automated moderation, pricing or scalable data handling. It is argued that this aspect of coded, and possibly autonomously adapting, intra-platform governance, poses significant anti-competitive challenges for supervisory authorities, with possible negative implications for consumer autonomy and wellbeing as well as platform-dependent other companies.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0003603X2199702
Author(s):  
P. L. Beena

This article seeks to analyze the trends and patterns of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) during the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights regime and addresses the antitrust issues related to innovation and competition in the framework of competition policy. Empirical evidence supports the view that enhancing size in terms of corporate control of equity, product market share, and innovation market share could be the motivations for the M&A phenomenon in the sector such as software and pharmaceuticals. These sectors were able to extract relatively more profit margin as compared to the manufacturing sector. This article further observes anticompetitive practices in terms of pricing and abuse of dominance in these two industries. The study argues for introducing regulatory mechanisms in the competition policy which could address the antitrust implications of M&As that are engaged in by knowledge-based firms and start-ups. This is because such acquisitions can reduce the incentives to innovate or change the innovative and competitive dynamics in the relevant market.


Author(s):  
Pawel Popiel

Digital platforms elude legal and regulatory frameworks traditionally used to address market power, speech, and disinformation issues. One of the dominant policy responses to addressing these issues involves reforming competition policy to better manage digital platform markets. This case study examines how stakeholders, including tech giants, their competitors, regulators, and advocacy groups deploy competition policy to address platform power in a series of 2019-2020 U.S. congressional hearings on the subject, with implications for the wider global debate. The article traces the politics underlying these debates, which manifests in variations in stakeholders’ definitions of platform power and their proposed solutions, reflecting tensions over the role of the state in managing markets and in addressing non-economic concerns associated with digital platforms. The article concludes with a consideration of what this politics implies for policy interventions aimed at addressing platform power.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 341-360 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pawel Popiel

Digital platforms elude legal and regulatory frameworks traditionally used to address market power, speech and disinformation issues. One of the dominant policy responses to addressing these issues involves reforming competition policy to better manage digital platform markets. This case study examines how stakeholders, including tech giants, their competitors, regulators and advocacy groups, deploy competition policy to address platform power in a series of 2019‐20 US congressional hearings on the subject, with implications for the wider global debate. The article traces the politics underlying these debates, which manifests in variations in stakeholders’ definitions of platform power and their proposed solutions, reflecting tensions over the role of the state in managing markets and in addressing non-economic concerns associated with digital platforms. The article concludes with a consideration of what this politics implies for policy interventions aimed at addressing platform power.


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