Efficient Price Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasios Dosis
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Efficient Price

A Game-Theoretic Foundation for Competitive Equilibria in the Stiglitz–Weiss Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lutz G. Arnold
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Financial Intermediation ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Selection Model ◽  
Financial Intermediaries ◽  
Competition Models ◽  
Competitive Equilibria ◽  
Game Theoretic

Abstract Financial intermediaries are, by definition, engaged in two-sided competition. Despite the well-known problems of achieving competitive solutions under twosided price competition, models of financial intermediation are commonly solved for competitive equilibria. This article provides a game-theoretic foundation for competitive equilibria in one of the most important models of financial intermediation, the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection model of the credit market with a continuum of borrower types.

INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 1027-1056 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Citanna ◽  
Paolo Siconolfi
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Efficient Price ◽  
Insurance Economies

Incentive Efficient Price Systems in Large Insurance Economies With Adverse Selection

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessandro Citanna ◽  
Paolo Siconolfi
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Efficient Price ◽  
Insurance Economies

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Adverse Selection, Lemon Shocks and Business Cycles

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (361) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Ikeda ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Adverse Selection

Tick Size and Adverse Selection: Spurious Effects Arising from Serial Correlation

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Doran ◽  
Michael A. Goldstein ◽  
Evgenia V. Golubeva ◽  
Eric N. Hughson
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Serial Correlation ◽  
Tick Size
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