Which Benchmark is Best at Assessing Fraud Risk When Planning an Audit? The Case for Industry Data

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph F. Brazel ◽  
Keith Lamar Jones ◽  
Qiyang Lian
Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 379-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared Eutsler ◽  
Erin Burrell Nickell ◽  
Sean W. G. Robb

SYNOPSIS Prior research indicates that issuing a going concern opinion to financially stressed clients generally reduces the risk of litigation against the auditor following a bankruptcy (Kaplan and Williams 2013; Carcello and Palmrose 1994). However, we propose that a going concern report may indicate prior knowledge of financial distress, an important fraud risk factor, and this may have repercussions for the auditor if a fraud is subsequently uncovered. Consistent with counterfactual reasoning theory, experimental research suggests that a documented awareness of fraud risk actually increases the likelihood of litigation against the auditor following a fraud (Reffett 2010). This concern has been echoed by the professional community (AICPA 2004; Golden, Skalak, and Clayton 2006) and may be exacerbated by the current outcome-based regulatory environment (Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman 2013). To examine this issue we review Auditing and Accounting Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for alleged financial reporting frauds between 1995 and 2012. Results suggest that going concern report modifications accompanying the last set of fraudulently stated financials are associated with a greater likelihood of enforcement action against the auditor. This finding is consistent with counterfactual reasoning theory and suggests that, from a regulatory perspective, auditors may be penalized for documenting their awareness of fraud risk when financial statements are later determined to be fraudulent.


2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip R. Beaulieu

Client integrity concerns auditors when they plan new audit engagements because it is related to both fraud risk and the source credibility of clients. Auditors may increase audit work and fees when they judge integrity to be below normal. In an experiment, a sample of 63 Canadian audit partners read information about a prospective audit client, including information about the client's CFO. This information was manipulated to support a judgment of either high or low integrity. As hypothesized, judgments of client integrity were negatively related to risk judgments, audit evidence extent recommendations (indirectly through risk judgments), and fee recommendations (indirectly through risk judgments and extent recommendations).


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.


Author(s):  
Ananay Aguilar

This chapter discusses the London Symphony Orchestra’s creation and development of the pioneering orchestra-owned label LSO Live as a response to a classical music industry in crisis. The investigation of the label’s business model is framed within a production of culture perspective that considers six categories: industry structure, organizational structure, occupational careers, law and regulation, technology, and market. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and industry data, this chapter demonstrates how the London Symphony Orchestra increased its artistic and managerial independence and, in doing so, effectively multiplied its local and international reputation. As an example of forward-looking managerial culture and leadership, the LSO Live initiative continues to be imitated around the globe.


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