Investor Perceptions of Government Deregulation: Evidence from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Litigation Risk ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Fraud Risk ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.

Controls, Security, and Audit in Online Digital Accounting

2011 ◽  
pp. 318-383
Author(s):  
Ashutosh Deshmukh
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Control Structure ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
The Public ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

Internal controls have existed since the dawn of business activities. Internal controls are basically systems of checks and balances. The purpose is to keep the organization moving along desired lines as per the wishes of the owners and to protect assets of the business. Internal controls have received attention from auditors, managers, accountants, fraud examiners and legislatures. Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 now requires the annual report of a public company to contain a statement of management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and management’s assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting. Section 404 of the Act also requires the auditor to attest to and report on management’s assessment of effectiveness of the internal controls in accordance with standards established by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

scholarly journals The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

2007 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
John C Coates
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Public Institution ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
The Public ◽  
Corporate Scandals ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Public Company

The primary goal of the SarbanesOxley Act was to fix auditing of U.S. public companies, consistent with its full, official name: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. By consensus, auditing had been working poorly, and increasingly so. The most important, and most promising, part of SarbanesOxley was the creation of a unique, quasi-public institution to oversee and regulate auditing, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In controversial section 404, the law also created new disclosure-based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls, above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. In exchange for these higher costs, which have already fallen substantially, SarbanesOxley promises a variety of long-term benefits. Investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft, and benefit from more reliable financial reporting, greater transparency, and accountability. Public companies will pay a lower cost of capital, and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth. SarbanesOxley remains a work in progress -- section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively - but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation, by PCAOB, rather than for repeal of the legislation itself.

SOX Section 404 Material Weakness Disclosures and Audit Fees

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
K. Raghunandan ◽  
Dasaratha V. Rama
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Control Material ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
The Mean

Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB 2004) require management and the auditor to report on internal controls over financial reporting. Section 404 is arguably the most controversial element of SOX, and much of the debate around the costs of implementing section 404 has focused on auditors' fees (Ernst & Young 2005). In this paper, we examine the association between audit fees and internal control disclosures made pursuant to section 404. Our sample includes 660 manufacturing firms that have a December 31, 2004 fiscal year-end and filed the section 404 report by May 15, 2005. We find that the mean (median) audit fees for the firms in our sample for fiscal 2004 is 86 (128) percent higher than the corresponding fees for fiscal 2003. Audit fees for fiscal 2004 are 43 percent higher for clients with a material weakness disclosure compared to clients without such disclosure; however, audit fees for fiscal 2003 are not associated with an internal control material weakness disclosure (in the 10-K filed following fiscal 2004). We also find that the association between audit fees and the presence of a material weakness disclosure does not vary depending on the type of material weakness (systemic or non-systemic).

The Persistence in the Association between Section 404 Material Weaknesses and Financial Reporting Quality

2013 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma-Riikka Myllymäki
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Material Weakness ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
History Of

SUMMARY This study examines whether Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Section 404 material weakness (MW404) disclosures are predictive of future financial reporting quality. I find evidence that for companies with a history of MW404s, the likelihood of misstatements in financial information continues to be significantly higher for two years after the last MW404 report compared to companies without a history of reported MW404s. The magnitude of the effect decreases non-linearly with decreasing speed. The findings further imply that the reason for the misstatement incidences is the unacknowledged pervasiveness of control problems. In particular, it appears that in many cases, the future misstatements are unrelated to the MW types disclosed in the last MW404 report, suggesting that some MW types are unacknowledged and, hence, control problems are even more pervasive than what was identified. Overall, the findings of this study highlight the importance of discovering and disclosing material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting.

scholarly journals Internal Control Weakness and Managerial Myopia: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Ji
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Managerial Myopia ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
The Impact

Problem/ Relevance: Managerial myopia is an important issue of interests to academics, practitioners, and regulators as managers have been condemned for their obsession with short-term earnings and myopic investment decisions that sacrifice firms’ long term value for shareholders. This article contributes by examining whether the quality of firms’ internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) is associated with managerial myopia. Research Objective/ Questions: The purpose of this study is to examine whether managers in firms reporting material internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 engage in myopic behaviors more than those in firms without reporting ICW. Methodology: The study uses the logit regression model to investigate a sample obtained from Compustat for the period of 2005-2013. Major Findings: The study finds a positive association between internal control weaknesses reported by auditors under Section 404 of the SOX and managerial short-termism which is measured by the probability of cutting R&D expenses in the current year from the previous year. Implications: Whereas prior studies mostly examine the impact of internal controls on accounting quality, this study demonstrates the implication of internal controls beyond financial reporting quality by showing an association between internal control quality and managerial myopia. Future research may further investigate the association between firms’ financial reporting quality and managerial investment decisions.

An Analysis and Taxonomy of Disclosure Controls and Procedures Effectiveness

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. A28-A37
Author(s):  
Thomas R. Weirich ◽  
Lori Olsen
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Research Issues ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Section 302

SUMMARY With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there has been much discussion and analysis of Section 404 dealing with management's and the external auditor's evaluation of internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR). However, Section 302 of the Act requires management to evaluate their disclosure controls and procedures (DC&P) and report on the effectiveness of such controls in their 10-Q and 10-K filings. This paper explains the SEC's differentiation of ICFR and DC&P and attempts to report on the effectiveness of DC&P utilizing the Audit Analytics database. The data show that DC&P have been ineffective, as reported by management in their 10-K filings, ranging from a low of 13.75 percent to a high of 33.91 percent of observations over the 11-year period from 2004 through 2014. The paper concludes with potential research issues related to DC&P.

Section 404 Compliance and Financial Reporting Quality

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Small Companies ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley

SYNOPSIS: This study examines whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 (S404) compliance efforts lead to higher quality financial reports. An objective of S404 is to encourage companies to devote adequate resources and attention to their internal control systems, which should lead to more reliable financial statements. A natural laboratory of S404 compliance and noncompliance companies exists because the Securities and Exchange Commission has deferred the S404 compliance date for small companies (nonaccelerated filers). A logistic regression model is estimated using a sample of companies surrounding the S404 compliance threshold to measure the S404 compliance effect on the likelihood of issuing materially misstated financial statements. The results show a significant and negative relation between S404 compliance and issuance of materially misstated financial statements, and suggest that the S404 regulation is meeting its objective of improving the quality of financial reports.

The impact of high insider ownership on SOX 404 internal controls

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 106-122
Author(s):  
Lucy Uche Diala ◽  
Robert Houmes
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Probit Regression ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Insider Ownership ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This study aims to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls over financial reporting. In particular, it examines how high insider ownership affects the likelihood of an adverse Sarbanes–Oxley Act Section (SOX Section 404) opinion and its subsequent remediation. Design/methodology/approach Tests of hypotheses use ineffective controls and remediation models. The initial tests in this study use ineffective internal controls over financial reporting probit regression models to investigate how high insider ownership affects the ex-post likelihood of an adverse 404 opinion. Two remediation models – a multinominal probit regression and probit regression model – are used to investigate the effect of high insider ownership on the likelihood of successfully remediating an adverse 404 opinion. Findings Results show that while the ex-ante likelihood of an adverse SOX Section 404 auditor’s internal control opinion increases with high insider ownership, high insider ownership firms are more likely to remediate ineffective 404 controls. This study rationalizes these diverse findings by asserting that prior to an adverse 404 opinion, entrenched managers avoid internal control financial reporting oversight and monitoring. After an adverse opinion, however, and within the context of an imminent and explicit value reducing 404 opinion, powerful high insider owner managers are motivated to remedy ineffective controls. Originality/value This research synthesizes existing streams of literature on insider ownership and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting quality to provide new information on the effects of high insider ownership on firms’ internal controls.

Detection and Severity Classifications of Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Internal Control Deficiencies

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (3) ◽  
pp. 825-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean C. Bedard ◽  
Lynford Graham
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Objective Evidence ◽  
Control Failure ◽  
Judgment Process ◽  
Internal Control Deficiencies

ABSTRACT: We examine detection and severity classification of internal control deficiencies (ICD) identified under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. While the cost/benefit balance of auditor testing of internal controls is highly controversial, prior research has not examined auditor versus client detection of ICD, nor has it examined factors auditors consider in judging ICD severity. We find that auditors detect about three-fourths of unremediated ICD, usually though control testing. This finding contrasts with extant research inferring control deficiency detection effectiveness from publicly available data, underscoring the value of Section 404 auditor testing in improving financial reporting quality. Auditors judge greater severity when a misstatement has already occurred. In the absence of a misstatement, severity is contingent on client and ICD characteristics, implying a more complex and nuanced judgment process without objective evidence of control failure. We also find that clients often underestimate ICD severity, but this tendency is lower among well-controlled companies with a well-designed Section 404 process.

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