Getting to Privacy More Reasonably: A Partial Property Rights Theory of the Fourth Amendment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mailyn Fidler



2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (1) ◽  
pp. 12648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Driffield ◽  
Tomasz Marek Mickiewicz ◽  
Yama Temouri


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheng Hong

Abstract China’s State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) enjoy many special benefits. They do not turn over profits and rents to the state, they pay much less interests than other enterprises in their use of capital, they enjoy monopolistic power in the marketplace, incomes of SOE employees, including managers, are free of policy restrictions. Because these substantial interests are not transferrable to individuals, competition exists for them. Compared with executives of private enterprise, senior managers of SOEs are 94 times more likely of being convicted of a crime. High benefits enjoyed by senior managers of SOEs come with a great risk. Once the illusion of SOEs is punctured, SOE leaders with higher education and long-term visions may become the driving force of SOE reform.





2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
D. Zylbersztajn

Stakeholders are individuals who can substantially affect the decision-making and sharing part of the value created by firms. This paper explains how parties that have not exercised cooperative production efforts, hold decision-making rights and share rights to the value created. The objective of this paper is to present a theoretical explanation for the existence of stakeholder activity, based on the property rights theory. In addition, the paper explores examples of development banks and a system of certification of sustainable forest production, exploring strategic implications. The paper is organized into four parts. Following the introduction, part two presents a selective literature review, part three presents a property rights allocation model and part four presents cases and conclusions.



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