scholarly journals Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ewens ◽  
Kairong Xiao ◽  
Ting Xu
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Costs ◽  
Public Evidence

scholarly journals Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ewens ◽  
Kairong Xiao ◽  
Ting Xu
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Costs ◽  
Public Evidence

scholarly journals Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ewens ◽  
Kairong Xiao ◽  
Ting Xu
Keyword(s):  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Compliance Cost ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Estimation Strategy ◽  
Regulatory Costs ◽  
Public Firm ◽  
Public Evidence ◽  
Total Compliance

Many disclosure and internal governance regulations for U.S. public firms trigger when a firm’s public float exceeds a threshold. Consistent with firms seeking to avoid costly regulation, we document significant bunching around multiple regulatory thresholds introduced from 1992 to 2012. We present a revealed preference estimation strategy that uses this behavior to quantify regulatory costs. Our estimates show that various disclosure and internal governance rules leads to a total compliance cost of 4.3% of the market capitalization for a median U.S. public firm. We apply the estimated costs to firms’ public-private choice and show that regulatory costs significantly impact private firms’ decisions to go public, while have limited effects on public firms’ decisions to go private.

Chapter XII Farmers: a rule: an exception

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Hardy
Keyword(s):  
Public Evidence

The first public evidence of Bathsheba’s decision to be a farmer in her own person and by proxy no more was her appearance the following market day in the corn-market at Casterbridge. The low though extensive hall supported by beams and pillars and latterly dignified...

scholarly journals Enhancing Singapore's Competitiveness: Some Fundamental Rethinking

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 165-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tan Khee Giap ◽  
Chen Kang
Keyword(s):  
Multinational Corporations ◽  
Structural Changes ◽  
Cost Structure ◽  
Policy Recommendations ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Total Cost ◽  
The Past ◽  
Regulatory Costs ◽  
Regional Competition

Singapore's economy faces some major concerns resulting from intensified regional competition and the transformation from being investment-driven to innovation-driven. This paper examines (1) the accumulation and utilization of huge government surpluses in the past 40 years; (2) the country's total cost structure (e.g., land, wages, and regulatory costs); (3) the relationships among small and medium-sized enterprises, government-linked companies, and multinational corporations; and (4) the product and market diversification that is needed to mitigate the impacts on unemployment resulting from structural changes and the transition from manufacturing to services. Singapore's comparative and competitive advantages as a strategic hub of economic activities in Asia are examined and policy recommendations are put forward.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The New U.S. Regulatory Budgeting Rules in Light of the International Experience

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-304
Author(s):  
Andrea Renda
Keyword(s):  
The United States ◽  
Direct Costs ◽  
International Experience ◽  
Executive Order ◽  
Benefit Cost Analysis ◽  
Regulatory Costs ◽  
One Step ◽  
Benefit Cost ◽  
The U.S

Executive Order (EO) 13771 on “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” introduces a new regulatory budgeting system in the U.S. federal rulemaking process. International experience suggests that the new rule, aimed both at reducing the number of regulations and the volume of regulatory costs, will focus on a subset of regulatory impacts, most certainly the direct costs imposed by regulation on businesses, or even a subset thereof. The paper discusses possible ways to make sense of the new rule, without undermining the soundness of benefit-cost analysis mandated by EO12866. The paper concludes that the new system, while potentially promoting more retrospective regulatory reviews, will risk fundamentally affecting the quality of regulation in the United States, generating frictions and inefficiencies throughout the administration, to the detriment of social welfare.

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