SOCIAL ONTOLOGY OF THE MODERN CORPORATION: ITS ROLE IN UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONS

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Veldman
2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 1489-1504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeroen Veldman ◽  
Hugh Willmott

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 305-311
Author(s):  
M. Ashurov ◽  
Yu. Shakirova ◽  
O. Turdibekov

The article discusses some issues of the formation of a multistructure economy in the Republic of Uzbekistan. The authors performed an analysis of the processes of privatization and privatization in the country. The general tendencies of privatization by stages and results are revealed and generalized. The characteristic features of the stages of denationalization are studied. The formation of the private sector and on the basis of this form of joint stock companies. The need for improving the mechanism of corporate governance in a modern corporation is highlighted.


Author(s):  
Abraham A. Singer

This chapter considers the “managerial” approach to the corporation by unpacking Berle and Means’s famous argument about the problems of the modern corporation. This approach is important because it has proven influential in its own right; the “separation of ownership from control” that Berle and Means famously observed, and the resulting power and discretion that managers enjoy, has been an important trope for critics of corporate capitalism. It is also important because it represents precisely the kind of analysis that the Chicago school’s theory of the corporation was meant to counter. The chapter concludes by contextualizing Berle and Means’s account within political theory more generally.


2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (6) ◽  
pp. 817-847
Author(s):  
Sebastian Gardner

AbstractCritics have standardly regarded Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason as an abortive attempt to overcome the subjectivist individualism of his early philosophy, motivated by a recognition that Being and Nothingness lacks ethical and political significance, but derailed by Sartre’s Marxism. In this paper I offer an interpretation of the Critique which, if correct, shows it to offer a coherent and highly original account of social and political reality, which merits attention both in its own right and as a reconstruction of the philosophical foundation of Marxism. The key to Sartre’s theory of collective and historical existence in the Critique is a thesis carried over from Being and Nothingness: intersubjectivity on Sartre’s account is inherently aporetic, and social ontology reproduces in magnified form its limited intelligibility, lack of transparency, and necessary frustration of the demands of freedom. Sartre’s further conjecture – which can be formulated a priori but requires a posteriori verification – is that man’s collective historical existence may be understood as the means by which the antinomy within human freedom, insoluble at the level of the individual, is finally overcome. The Critique provides therefore the ethical theory promised in Being and Nothingness.


2021 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-192
Author(s):  
Nadia Ruiz

Brian Epstein has recently argued that a thoroughly microfoundationalist approach towards economics is unconvincing for metaphysical reasons. Generally, Epstein argues that for an improvement in the methodology of social science we must adopt social ontology as the foundation of social sciences; that is, the standing microfoundationalist debate could be solved by fixing economics’ ontology. However, as I show in this paper, fixing the social ontology prior to the process of model construction is optional instead of necessary and that metaphysical-ontological commitments are often the outcome of model construction, not its starting point. By focusing on the practice of modeling in economics the paper provides a useful inroad into the debate about the role of metaphysics in the natural and social sciences more generally.


Author(s):  
J. K. Swindler

We are social animals in the sense that we spontaneously invent and continuously re-invent the social realm. But, not unlike other artifacts, once real, social relations, practices, institutions, etc., obey prior laws, some of which are moral laws. Hence, with regard to social reality, we ought to be ontological constructivists and moral realists. This is the view sketched here, taking as points of departure Searle's recent work on social ontology and May's on group morality. Moral and social selves are distinguished to acknowledge that social reality is constructed but social morality is not. It is shown how and why moral law requiring respect for the dignity and well being of agents governs a social world comprising roles that are real only because of their occupants' social intentions.


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