scholarly journals Signaling with Private Monitoring

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gonzalo Cisternas ◽  
Aaron Kolb
Keyword(s):  
Private Monitoring

How Effective Is Joint Public and Private Monitoring? The Case of the AICPA Auditor Change Notification Letter

2001 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael L. Ettredge ◽  
David B. Smith ◽  
Mary S. Stone
Keyword(s):  
Public Organization ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Educational Effort ◽  
Private Organization ◽  
Auditor Change ◽  
Client Behavior ◽  
Change Notification ◽  
Disclosure Requirement

The AICPA SEC Practice Section (SECPS) notification rule requires a member firm to notify its former client and the Chief Accountant of the SEC in writing within five business days of the date it determines the client-auditor relationship has ended. The rule is unique because it was developed and is enforced by a private organization (the AICPA) to assist a public organization (the SEC) in fulfilling its charge of ensuring full and timely disclosure. An SECPS educational effort to make members aware of their notification responsibilities recently ended. Our paper evaluates the effectiveness of the SECPS educational effort and the SECPS notification letter. It shows that registrant as well as auditor compliance and timeliness increased during the time the notification rule has been in effect, and that the improved registrant performance is likely due in part to improved auditor performance. One implication of our study is that a disclosure requirement auditors impose upon themselves can be effective in helping the SEC monitor client behavior.

Recall and private monitoring

2015 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 162-170
Author(s):  
Christopher Phelan ◽  
Andrzej Skrzypacz
Keyword(s):  
Private Monitoring

Goodwill Impairment: The Effects of Public Enforcement and Monitoring by Institutional Investors

2018 ◽  
Vol 93 (6) ◽  
pp. 149-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Glaum ◽  
Wayne R. Landsman ◽  
Sven Wyrwa
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Negatively Associated ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Goodwill Impairment

ABSTRACT This study investigates the determinants of goodwill impairment decisions by firms applying IFRS based on a comprehensive sample of stock-listed firms from 21 countries. Multivariate logistical regression findings indicate that goodwill impairment incidence is negatively associated with economic performance, but also related to proxies for managerial and firm-level incentives. In addition, whereas goodwill impairment tends to be timely for firms in high enforcement countries, firms in low enforcement countries tend to be less responsive to declines in the economic value of goodwill; CEO compensation concerns affect the impairment decision for firms in low enforcement; and CEO reputation concerns and management preference for smooth earnings influence goodwill impairment decisions in high, as well as low, enforcement countries. We also find that private monitoring through institutional investors substitutes for public enforcement in the context of goodwill impairment when a country's enforcement regime is relatively weak.

scholarly journals Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

2014 ◽  
Vol 153 ◽  
pp. 191-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard McLean ◽  
Ichiro Obara ◽  
Andrew Postlewaite
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Private Monitoring
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