As a result of the oil price shocks, the 1979 revolution, and the eight-year war with Iraq, fundamental changes have taken place in Iran's foreign exchange position as well as in its exchange rate policy. The viable data over the period 1979–1980 to 1988–1989 clearly show that, despite the revolutionary rhetoric, very little has been done to reduce the country's dependence on oil exports as a source of foreign exchange and government revenues. Instead, in the face of falling oil revenues and the country's increasing international isolation, coupled with the regime's unwillingness to incur foreign debt, the government has adopted a severe ‘import compression’ policy through selective tariffs and quotas, strict control of private and government imports by means of import licenses, and the imposition of foreign exchange allocations on government agencies. The result has been an ever-rising premium on the U.S. dollar in the ‘black’ market, a highly overvalued official exchange rate, a substantial increase in rent-seeking activities at the expense of production, a severe misallocation of resources, and loss of output and industrial capacity.
Yemen: Exchange Rate Policy in the Face of Dwindling Oil Exports
