The Baglihar difference and its resolution process - a triumph for the Indus Waters Treaty?

On January 15, 2005, Pakistan approached the World Bank asking the Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert to address a “difference” which had arisen with India under the Indus Waters Treaty. The difference related to the Baglihar hydropower plant which was under construction by India. The Bank appointed a Neutral Expert four months later, following lengthy exchanges with the two parties. On February 12, 2007, about 20 months after his appointment, the Neutral Expert issued his decision on the difference. This article reviews the main provisions of the Treaty, examines the process for the appointment and for the decision of the Neutral Expert, and analyzes the decision.

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Challenges to Indus Waters Treaty and Options for Pakistan

Global Regional Review ◽

10.31703/grr.2019(iv-iv).27 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol IV (IV) ◽

pp. 249-255

Author(s):

Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti ◽

Ghulam Mustafa ◽

Muhammad Waris

Keyword(s):

World Bank ◽

Water Rights ◽

Hydroelectric Power ◽

Indian Government ◽

Jammu And Kashmir ◽

The World Bank ◽

Run Off ◽

The World ◽

Water Treaty ◽

Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus water treaty was signed on 19th September 1960 by India and Pakistan under the aegis of the World Bank. Bilateral principles regarding water apportionment between both states were ensured by the Treaty. As a result, waters of the eastern rivers; Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, were assigned exclusively to India, while Pakistan received exclusive water rights of the western rivers; the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab but India is allowed to irrigate some specific land in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir and to generate hydroelectric power through run-off-the river projects. Following the Uri incident, the Indian government and media are generating ideas to discard the Indus water treaty. This paper focuses on legal and international implications if India attempts to unilaterally revoke the Treaty.

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Indus Waters

Animosity at Bay ◽

10.1093/oso/9780190087579.003.0006 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 117-138

Author(s):

Pallavi Raghavan

Keyword(s):

World Bank ◽

Early Stages ◽

The World Bank ◽

The World ◽

Book Covers ◽

Water Treaty ◽

Canal Networks ◽

Indus Waters Treaty

In this chapter, I wish to offer a pre-history to the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. Since the period that this book covers ends at 1952, and since I wish to situate the discussions around the treaty as a means of implementing the partition, it becomes particularly important to understand the considerations that affected the early stages of the Indus negotiations. I argue that although the Indus Waters Treaty, negotiated under the auspices of the World Bank, was signed only in 1960, over a decade after the partition, many of its clauses had built upon the assumptions that had been formed by 1950. Indeed, by 1951, both the source of the problem—the fear that enough water would not be allowed to flow in to Pakistan from the canals that had been built before the partition—as well as its solution—that new canal networks would have to be developed in a way that would satisfy the separate requirements of both India and Pakistan—were already apparent. The discussions around Indus waters in the years that immediately followed the partition, offer valuable insights into how the implementation of the partition was conceptualized.

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Friends or foes? Brazil, the IMF and the World Bank, 1961–1967

Financial History Review ◽

10.1017/s096856502100007x ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-32

Author(s):

Carlo Edoardo Altamura ◽

Claudia Kedar

Keyword(s):

World Bank ◽

International Monetary Fund ◽

Military Coup ◽

The World Bank ◽

The World ◽

The Difference ◽

The Right ◽

The Military ◽

The International Monetary Fund ◽

The Imf

Between June 1959 and March 1964, the democratic governments of Brazilian presidents Juscelino Kubitschek (January 1956 – January 1961), Janio Quadros (January–August 1961), Ranieri Mazzilli (August–September 1961) and João ‘Jango’ Goulart (September 1961 – April 1964) received no support from the World Bank (WB), which refused to fund even a single new project during this period. During this same period, and, more specifically, between July 1958 and January 1965, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WB's twin institution, granted financial assistance to Brazil only twice: a controversial and highly conditional Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) signed in May 1961; and a non-conditional and automatically approved Compensatory Financial Facility (CFF), granted in May 1963 to compensate Brazil for the decrease in coffee prices on the international market. This attitude towards Brazil changed significantly following the military coup of March 1964. Money flowed into the country and by 1970 Brazil had become the largest receiver of WB funds and a chronic borrower from the IMF, signing two SBAs in 1965, and one per year between 1966 and 1972. We use recently disclosed material from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank archives to analyse the relationship of these two institutions with Brazil and to foster the debate on their political neutrality, arguing that the difference in the IMF's and especially the WB's relations with the military regime reflected, more than anything else, the existence of an ideological affinity between the parties with regards to the ‘right’ economic policy.

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Pakistan’s Indus Diplomacy: From Troubled Waters to a Troubled Treaty

International Negotiation ◽

10.1163/15718069-bja10038 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-17

Author(s):

Muhammad Imran Mehsud

Keyword(s):

World Bank ◽

River System ◽

Functional Approach ◽

Indus River ◽

The World Bank ◽

The World ◽

Water Dispute ◽

Indus Waters Treaty

Abstract This article analyzes six major crises in Pakistan’s Indus diplomacy which shaped Pakistan’s water (in)security vis-à-vis upstream rival India on the Indus river system. These include first, when Pakistan failed to comply with the Standstill Agreement of 1947; second, when it signed the Inter-Dominion Agreement; third, when it acquiesced to the Nehru-Lilienthal-favored functional approach to the Indus water dispute in 1951; fourth, when the World Bank Proposal of 1954 apportioned exclusive use of the Western Rivers to Pakistan and the Eastern Rivers to India, but Pakistan delayed accepting the Proposal; fifth, when India secured rights on the Western Rivers in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960; and sixth, several challenges that have emerged under the Indus Waters Treaty.

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Who is More Accountable? Federal or State Malaysian Statutory Bodies

Indian-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Finance ◽

10.52962/ipjaf.2019.3.2.73 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 3 (2) ◽

pp. 15-26

Author(s):

Nurhidayah Yahya ◽

Jamaliah Said ◽

Nor Balkish Zakaria

Keyword(s):

World Bank ◽

Country Risk ◽

Average Score ◽

Four Dimensions ◽

Governance Indicators ◽

The World Bank ◽

Significant Difference ◽

The World ◽

The Difference ◽

High Level

The World Bank on Governance Indicators in the aspect of ‘Voice and Accountability’ reported accountability for Malaysia had declined to 34% in 2017 from 37% in 2013. Data from the International Country Risk Guide showed a decrease in accountability since 2011 from 4.46 to 4 points out of 6 points in the year 2012. Public sector organisations like statutory bodies might also face issues of accountability. This study aims to evaluate and compare the accountability outcomes of federal and state statutory bodies through a questionnaire. The measurement for accountability based on four dimensions, namely transparency, evaluation, stakeholders' participation and complaint and response. Based on 194 responses received from top management of Malaysian statutory bodies, the overall accountability outcome has shown an above-average score of 5.97 for both federal and state statutory bodies. This shows that Malaysian statutory bodies have delivered a high level of accountability. The test for the difference between the means scores of independent T-tests also shows that there is no significant difference between the accountability level of federal and state statutory bodies. Despite the different level of obligation and legislation, both types of statutory bodies seem to deliver an equally high level of accountability outcomes.

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