scholarly journals FORMA CZYNNOŚCI PRAWNEJ W PRAWIE PRYWATNYM MIĘDZYNARODOWYM

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Jadwiga Pazdan

Form of Legal Act in Private International LawSummaryThe form of a legal act in private international law is usually governed by particular conflict rules. Such provisions define the scope of their application. The aim of conflict rules is to indicate territorial application of different legal systems. That function fixes the approach while determining the way of understanding the notion of a „form” in private international law. The appropriate approach is the autonomic qualification. That is why I admit that the form in private international law is nothing else that the way of submission and incorporation of the declaration of will, being a component of a legal act.According to art. 12 of Polish Act on private international law from 1965 (1965 Act), the form of a legal act is governed by the law proper for that act (the first rule), however, it is sufficient to fulfill the conditions of the law of the country where the legal act is undertaken (the second rule).Lex causa, relevant to the form of a legal act (art. 12 section 1 of 1965 Act), may be indicated not only by means of conflict rules based on objective factors of alien, but also by the choice-of-law clause (if a choice of law is not forbidden). Nevertheless, a choice of law regarding solely the form of a legal act is not acceptable. The choice of law for the form of a legal act cannot be justified by the permissibility of a partial choice of law, which is supposed to be a choice relative to that part of legis causae, which is taken into consideration while determining the conditions required for the form of a particular legal act, on the base of art. 12 section 1 1965 Act. Although, there is no fragment of the legis causae applied in the scope of the form, there is complete lex causae or divided into segments (in the case of a complex or simple choice of law). The form cannot constitute such a segment. It has its own status.The second rule is subsidiary to the first one.The mutual relation of these two rules has subsequent consequences: 1 lex loci actus may be applied only when the conditions of lex causae were not fulfilled;2 the answer to the question if the legis loci actus constitutes the proper law for the form of a legal act is dependent on the fact whether during the performance of the legal act the requirements resulting from that law were fulfilled;3 when the conditions regulated by both lex causae as well as lex loci actus were not fulfilled, it is to lex causae to decide about the consequences (sanctions) of non-fulfillment of the requirements relating to the form;4 lex loci actus cannot be replaced by the Polish law by the virtue of art. 7 of 1965 Act, when the content of the law binding on the territory where the legal action was undertaken cannot be determined;5 the transmission and remission, based on the conflict rules binding in that country where the legal act was undertaken, is not allowed;6 the requirements of legis loci actus are also fulfilled when there are no special requirements relating to the form. The legal act will be valid in such a situation although the requirements relating to the form, resulting of lex causae, were not fulfilled.The place where the legal act is performed understood as the factor of alien in art. 12 section 2 of 1965 Act must be interpreted in the light of autonomic qualification. The decisive role should be granted to the place where an event which brought (or should have brought) to the performance of a legal act had happened while the contractual relation has been formed.De lege ferenda, I am opting for the maintenance of both rules in Polish law, however, their position should be equal. In case of discrepancy of the effects the preference should be granted to those more favorable for the legal act (the solution in favorem negotii).

Author(s):  
Hook Maria

This chapter examines the choice of law rules that determine the law applicable to international contracts in New Zealand, comparing them to the Hague Principles. Private international law in New Zealand is still largely a common law subject, and the choice of law rules on international commercial contracts are no exception. The general position, which has been inherited from English common law, is that parties may choose the law applicable to their contract, and that the law with the closest and most real connection applies in the absence of choice. There are currently no plans in New Zealand for legislative reform, so the task of interpreting and developing the choice of law rules continues to fall to the courts. When performing this task, New Zealand courts have traditionally turned to English case law for assistance. But they may be willing, in future, to widen their scope of inquiry, given that the English rules have long since been Europeanized. It is conceivable, in this context, that the Hague Principles may be treated as a source of persuasive authority, provided they are consistent with the general principles or policies underlying the New Zealand rules.


Author(s):  
Girsberger Daniel ◽  
Graziano Thomas Kadner ◽  
Neels Jan L

This chapter presents the General Comparative Report, which addresses, article by article, the Hague (or HCCH) Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts of 2015 (the Hague Principles). The General Comparative Report compares the Hague Principles with the state of the law in over sixty jurisdictions worldwide and with supranational rules and soft law principles. It aims to encourage legislators, courts, practitioners, and academics to further develop their domestic private international law systems and possibly benefit hereby from the Hague Principles by consistently and adequately applying, interpreting, and amending domestic, supranational, and regional private international law (PIL) in the context of party choice of law. The chapter then details the structure of the Report and the questionnaire used to address the issues covered by the Hague Principles. It also provides an introduction and a comparative overview of each of the Articles of the Hague Principles.


Author(s):  
Torremans Paul

This chapter examines the doctrine of renvoi in relation to private international law. It first explains the problem associated with the doctrine of renvoi before discussing three possible solutions: applying the internal rules of ‘the law of the country’ only; applying the doctrine of single renvoi; or applying the doctrine of total renvoi. It then considers three objections to the doctrine. First, the total renvoi doctrine does not necessarily ensure uniform decisions. Second, the total renvoi doctrine signifies the virtual capitulation of the English rules for choice of law. Third, the total renvoi doctrine is difficult to apply. The chapter also analyses some decisions supporting the doctrine of total renvoi and concludes with a review of the scope of the application of renvoi by looking at cases where it is inapplicable and issues to which it may apply.


Author(s):  
Joost Blom

For anyone who is interested in the methodology of choice of law, no field is more rewarding than that of contracts. As domestic laws of contracts develop a progressively more intricate relationship between the principles of social regulation and private autonomy, private international law is led to develop choice of law techniques that will keep an appropriate balance between these principles in interjurisdictional cases. Choice of law rules that underemphasize the interests of the parties, and rely instead on the regulatory concerns of states that are affected by the transaction, may place too many obstacles in the way of persons who should be left to arrange their transaction in the way they think best. At the same time, choice of law rules that give too much weight to the parties’ wishes may interfere unduly with a state’s ability to regulate a transtaction with which it has a legitimate concern. In this respect, balance is more difficult to achieve in contracts than it is elsewhere.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-59
Author(s):  
Prince Obiri-Korang

Generally, under choice of law, the issue of uncertainty associated with the determination of the governing law of international contracts is quite clear. The level of this uncertainty, however, increases when dealing with questions about which law governs the validity of such contracts. Like other areas of private international law, matters concerning validity present several unique challenges both in theory and in practice, making it the most complicated topic in private international law literature. In fact, the uncertainty in this area has led to a situation where different rules are applied by different states, without taking into consideration the link that should exist between the state whose law becomes applicable and the function that the law is expected to serve – determining the validity of a contract. This article attempts to contribute to existing literature on choice of law questions regarding the validity of international contracts and also provides solutions, based on the underlying principles of private international law of contract that effectively address the uncertainty in this area of law. The article submits that the law that governs the validity of an international contract must, at all times, be one that has a legitimate interest in matters concerning the legality or otherwise of such contracts. In this regard, the article strongly opposes the theory that the parties’ intention determines the law that governs the validity of their contract. After a careful examination of literature and landmark judicial decisions in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, the article concludes that the lex loci solutionis is the appropriate law to determine matters relating to the validity of international contracts.


Author(s):  
Reyes Anselmo

This chapter explores Hong Kong perspectives on the Hague Principles. Hong Kong has no enacted code of private international law rules. In relation to contracts dealing with commercial matters, the choice of law principles of Hong Kong law are largely to be found at common law. Decisions of the English court, in particular, are often cited in Hong Kong as exemplifying the law on a given question. To a lesser degree, principles may be found in statute. While Hong Kong judges must look to case law to discern relevant choice of law principles, nothing prevents them from also having regard to the Hague Principles and holding that one or more articles therein accurately reflect Hong Kong law. Indeed, articles of the Hague Principles can be referred to by Hong Kong judges as accurate statements of present day Hong Kong law, as foundations for the refinement of existing common law rules, or as indications of how Hong Kong choice of law principles may be extended to deal with novel situations.


Author(s):  
Þorláksson Eiríkur Elís

This chapter focuses on Icelandic perspectives on the Hague Principles. The constitution of the Republic of Iceland does not contain any provisions on the principles of private international law. Moreover, there is no general act on private international law in force in Iceland. However, legislation on specific aspects of private international law, such as conflicts of the laws of contract and recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions, can be found in Icelandic law. Moreover, individual provisions on recognition and enforcement, jurisdiction, and choice of law can be found throughout Icelandic legislation. The legislative act which applies to contractual obligations in the field of private international law in Iceland is Act No 43/2000 on the law applicable to contractual obligations. There are no other acts that explicitly aim to address choice of law issues other than Act No 43/2000, but individual provisions can be found indicating the choice of law in specific areas of law; otherwise, Icelandic courts will apply general principles to the case at hand. There is currently no revision of Act No 43/2000 under discussion in Iceland.


Author(s):  
V. Kisil ◽  
A. Pashynskyi

This article is about the theoretical and practical aspects of conflict of law regulation of marital property relations under the Law of Ukraine “On Private International Law”. Inter alia, the paper deals with the possibility of the choice of law applicable to prenuptial contracts and marital property relations as well as the conflict of law rules applicable to property consequences of marriage in the event of absence of the choice of law. The author analyses the limitations to applying the principle of autonomy of will in marital property relations, the correlation between legal concepts of “marital property relations” and “legal consequences of marriage” and the possible forms of performing lex voluntatis. With a view to protecting the interests of the child and the weaker party in a marriage, the author proposes amendments to para 1 of Art. 61 of the Law, pursuant to which the law chosen by the parties must not impair the standing of the child or one of the spouses as compared to the law to be applied to property consequences of marriage in the event of absence of a choice of law. The paper also focuses on the overview of relevant Ukrainian court practice regarding the application of the Law during proceedings on marital property relations with a foreign element.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Douglas

Certain kinds of breach of confidence may be characterised as torts, at least for the purposes of Australian private international law, in respect of rules of jurisdiction and choice of law. When a breach of confidence involves a misuse of private information, a tortious characterisation is appropriate. This view is consistent with appellate authority recognising the unique character of equitable jurisdiction. The article begins by considering debates concerning the juridical basis of breach of confidence, and its metamorphosis into the tort of misuse of private information. The very existence of that debate indicates that breach of confidence may intelligibly have more than one character. The substantive principles of breach of confidence inform the way that cross-border problems ought to be resolved in private international law. The remainder of the article considers characterisation in respect of long-arm jurisdictional rules, and then in respect of choice-of-law rules.


Author(s):  
Vorobey Dmytro

This chapter studies Ukrainian perspectives on the Hague Principles. Ukrainian private international law act, or formally the ‘Law of Ukraine “On Private International Law” ’ (PIL), was adopted on June 23, 2005. As per the Preamble to the PIL, it applies to ‘private [legal] relationships which are connected to one or more legal orders other than the Ukrainian legal order’. According to Article 2 of the PIL, it applies to matters of choice of law, procedural standing of foreign citizens, stateless persons and foreign legal entities, jurisdiction of Ukrainian courts in cases involving foreign parties, execution of letters rogatory, and recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgements in Ukraine. The Ukrainian private international law and specifically the PIL were influenced by the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations. Although, considering the relative novelty of the Hague Principles, the authority of the courts to refer to the Hague Principles has not been addressed by the higher Ukrainian courts, the courts have frequently referred to the international codifications of contract law such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.


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