scholarly journals OVERVIEW OF CRITERIA FOR INTERIM WET & DRY STORAGE OF RESEARCH REACTOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Sindelar ◽  
D. Vinson ◽  
N. Iyer ◽  
D. Fisher
MRS Advances ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (19) ◽  
pp. 991-1003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evaristo J. Bonano ◽  
Elena A. Kalinina ◽  
Peter N. Swift

ABSTRACTCurrent practice for commercial spent nuclear fuel management in the United States of America (US) includes storage of spent fuel in both pools and dry storage cask systems at nuclear power plants. Most storage pools are filled to their operational capacity, and management of the approximately 2,200 metric tons of spent fuel newly discharged each year requires transferring older and cooler fuel from pools into dry storage. In the absence of a repository that can accept spent fuel for permanent disposal, projections indicate that the US will have approximately 134,000 metric tons of spent fuel in dry storage by mid-century when the last plants in the current reactor fleet are decommissioned. Current designs for storage systems rely on large dual-purpose (storage and transportation) canisters that are not optimized for disposal. Various options exist in the US for improving integration of management practices across the entire back end of the nuclear fuel cycle.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. Meyer ◽  
Jeremy Renshaw ◽  
Jamie Beard ◽  
Jon Tatman ◽  
Matt Keene ◽  
...  

Abstract This paper describes development and demonstration of remote crawling systems to support periodic examinations of interim dry storage system (DSS) canisters for spent nuclear fuel in the USA. Specifically, this work relates to robotic crawler developments for “canister” based DSS systems, which form the majority population of DSSs in the USA for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. Consideration of potential degradation of the welded stainless-steel canister in these systems is required for continued usage in the period of extended operation (PEO) beyond their initial licensed or certified terms. Challenges with performing the periodic examinations are associated with physical access to the canister surface, which is constrained due to narrow annulus spaces between the canister and the overpack, tortuous entry pathways, and high temperatures and radiation doses that can be damaging to materials and electronics. Motivations for performing periodic examinations and developing robotic crawlers for performing those examinations remotely will be presented, and several activities to demonstrate robotic crawlers for different DSS systems are summarized.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan M. Meyer ◽  
Jeremy Renshaw ◽  
Kenn Hunter ◽  
Mike Orihuela ◽  
Jim Stadler ◽  
...  

Abstract This paper describes development and demonstration of nondestructive examination (NDE) technologies to support periodic examinations of interim dry storage system (DSS) canisters for spent nuclear fuel in the USA to verify continued safe operation and that the canister confinement is intact and performing its intended safety function. Specifically, this work relates to NDE technology development for “canister” based DSS systems, which form the majority population of DSSs in the USA for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. Consideration of potential degradation of the welded stainless-steel canister in these systems is required for continued usage in the period of extended operation (PEO) beyond the initial license or certified term. Physical access to the canister surface is constrained due to narrow annulus spaces between the canister and the overpack, tortuous entry pathways, and high temperatures and radiation doses that can be damaging to materials and electronics related to inspections. Several activities to demonstrate NDE technologies for the inspections of different DSS systems are summarized.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 346-361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lloyd Hackel ◽  
Jon Rankin ◽  
Matt Walter ◽  
C Brent Dane ◽  
William Neuman ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Frantisek Svitak ◽  
Karel Svoboda ◽  
Josef Podlaha

In May 2004, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative agreement was signed by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation. The goal of this initiative is to minimize, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, the existing threat of misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials for terrorist purposes, particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU), fresh and spent nuclear fuel (SNF), and plutonium, which have been stored in a number of countries. Within the framework of the initiative, HEU materials and SNF from research reactors of Russian origin will be transported back to the Russian Federation for reprocessing/liquidation. The program is designated as the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program and is similar to the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program, which is underway for nuclear materials of United States origin. These RRRFR activities are carried out under the responsibilities of the respective ministries (i.e., U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and Russian Federation Rosatom). The Czech Republic and the Nuclear Research Institute Rez, plc (NRI) joined Global Threat Reduction Initiative in 2004. During NRI’s more than 50 years of existence, radioactive and nuclear materials had accumulated and had been safely stored on its grounds. In 1995, the Czech regulatory body, State Office for Nuclear Safety (SONS), instructed NRI that all ecological burdens from its past activities must be addressed and that the SNF from the research reactor LVR-15 had to be transported for reprocessing. At the end of November 2007, all these activities culminated with the unique shipment to the Russian Federation of 527 fuel assemblies of SNF type EK-10 (enrichment 10% U235) and IRT-M (enrichment 36% and 80% U235) and 657 irradiated fuel rods of EK-10 fuel, which were used in LVR-15 reactor.


2017 ◽  
Vol 142 (4) ◽  
pp. 2517-2518
Author(s):  
Kevin Y. Lin ◽  
Wayne E. Prather ◽  
Zhiqu Lu ◽  
Joel Mobley ◽  
Josh R. Gladden

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