The Effectiveness of U.S. Economic Sanctions on North-Korea: Focusing on the Strategic Choice of Actors

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 275-288
Author(s):  
Juhee Lee
2021 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-492
Author(s):  
Sung Hyun Son ◽  
Joonmo Cho

This study analyzes the effects of the economic sanctions against North Korea since 2016 on the economic well-being of North Korean cities. As a proxy for economic well-being, we use nighttime light (NTL), which we estimate from 1992 to 2019 through an inter-calibration process for DMSP/OLS and SNPP/VIIRS. We found that NTL in North Korea was getting brighter up until 2009, but that the growth rate of total NTL in 25 major North Korean cities began to decrease from 2016. The decline in the NTL growth rate of Pyongyang, the capital city, as well as in cities bordering China and in self-regenerating cities, was relatively slight. By contrast, the declines in the NTL growth rate of coal-mining cities and inland cities without sufficient production bases were greater than those in other cities, and some cities experienced negative growth in 2019. Cities in regions relying on coal mining have traditionally accounted for a large portion of North Korea's exports, and since these cities have been heavily affected by sanctions, coal mining could become a vulnerable sector, which would threaten North Korea's economic well-being.


2018 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bob Carbaugh ◽  
Koushik Ghosh

The United States has enacted economic sanctions against North Korea since the early 1950s when North Korea attacked South Korea. Can North Korea be pressured into giving up its nuclear weapons? This article discusses the role of economic sanctions as a tool of international diplomacy with North Korea. Using concepts and tools taught in undergraduate economics classes, the article discusses the operation of sanctions and then it applies this analysis to the case of North Korea. The article examines the success that sanctions have achieved in bringing Kim Jong Un to the bargaining table and the difficulties that sanctions encounter in promoting a lasting resolution of the conflict between North Korea and the United States. The article is written for a broad audience of economics students. JEL Classifications: F0, F1


Significance It will almost certainly be Moon Jae-in of the centre-left main opposition Minjoo (Democrat) Party. This will mean a sharp break, after a decade of two right-wing leaders: Lee Myung-bak (2008-13) and the impeached and now imprisoned Park Geun-hye (2013-16), whose criminal trial on 18 counts of malfeasance began yesterday. Impacts Moon, armed with a mandate, may challenge US policy and force Trump to clarify his posturing. Relations with China would ease if Moon reverses deployment of new US missile defence systems, though this looks unlikely. If Moon restores inter-Korean trade, Pyongyang would become less vulnerable to Chinese economic sanctions. Seoul's ties with Tokyo will continue to fester, over both North Korea policy and historical issues.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 37-48
Author(s):  
Min-Hua CHIANG

With negative growth of 3.5% in 2017, North Korea’s economy suffered its worst setback in a decade due to the effects of international economic sanctions. The Trump—Kim meeting on 12 June 2018 in Singapore raised hopes of lifting sanctions on North Korea and of bolstering North Korea’s economy. However, North Korea’s disagreement with the United States over its denuclearisation process and China—US competition in geopolitical interests in the Korean peninsula may overshadow its economic outlook.


2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962097133
Author(s):  
Min-hyung Kim

This article seeks to provide a theoretically compelling account for North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and explores its implications for East Asian security. Its main research question is as follows: despite the obvious risks of going nuclear, what makes North Korea so desperate in its pursuit of nuclear capabilities? Contrary to the extant accounts that only emphasize either nonsecurity variables or an “external security” factor, this article conceptualizes North Korea’s security considerations as “regime survival” and explains its strategic choice from it. The central thesis of this article is that North Korea’s decision to go nuclear is a strategic choice, of which the purpose is to achieve its goals of safeguarding independence from external powers as well as ensuring regime security. North Korea pursues nuclear weapons because they not only protect Pyongyang’s regime from foreign aggressions but also help to consolidate Kim Jong-un’s domestic power. North Korea also seeks nuclear weapons in order to safeguard its independence and autonomy from China because the removal of China’s influence is critical to ensuring its regime survival in the long run. North Korea’s strategic choice to go nuclear and its emergence as a de facto nuclear power have significant implications for East Asian security.


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