scholarly journals Ill-neoliberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
M. Jouke Huijzer

In a recent contribution Hendrikse (2018) has coined the concept of neo-illiberalism to signify mainstreaming of illiberal doctrines among neoliberal elites, thereby signifying a ‘mutation and restoration of transatlantic neoliberalism’. After a critical appraisal of his concept, this contribution argues that it is too early to claim that neoliberalism is mutated and suggests that the present conjuncture can better be termed ill-neoliberal instead. Following numerous scholars who have argued that we have arrived at an interregnum, I argue, also by applying Gramscian framework, that neoliberalism is increasingly malfunctioning, ‘ill’ or even dying, while something new is yet to be born. Yet in contrast to those who apply a Gramscian approach, I do not regard the rise of Trump or the European far right as ‘morbid symptoms’, but as attempted remedies (or authoritarian restorations) for neoliberalism. Neoliberal elites, somewhat reluctantly, welcome illiberal actors and doctrines in an effort to keep existing hierarchies in place or even restore old ones, now by even more authoritarian means. This transformation in the transatlantic neoliberal heartlands towards more illiberal regimes differs, then, from the emerging (and already) illiberal or authoritarian world powers such as China. If we were to accept the validity of the term ‘neo-illiberalism’ this should be exclusively applied to those regimes that are consistently illiberal, but increasingly rely on an ever-growing private economy (cf. Aiyar. 2016). Yet, whether such powers will be able to install a new (global) order depends foremost on the ability of the transatlantic heartlands to overcome neoliberalism. The article therefore concludes by pointing at some outlooks for the renewal and further contestation of an increasingly malfunctioning neoliberalism.    

2021 ◽  
pp. 2336825X2110529
Author(s):  
Manni Crone

Far-right parties and pundits are often portrayed as parochial nationalists obsessed with the idea of national sovereignty. Opposed to a liberal world order, they prefer a rogue world of nation-states on the loose. This essay seeks to complicate that narrative. It suggests that alongside political parties with a nationalist agenda, an increasing number of voices on the radical Right are now pushing for a re-spiritualized world order in which cultures, civilizations, and empires are to set the scene. This vision of global order echoes Christopher Coker’s recent claim that “we now live in a world in which civilization is fast becoming the currency of international politics.” But, why does this strand of the far-right prefer civilizations to nation-states? To ponder this question, this essay zooms in on the European New Right and more precisely two of its main luminaries, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. It shows how the New Right stretches back to classical geopolitics to imagine a future polycentric world order in which large civilizations are set free from American hegemony. The empires of the future are no longer underpinned by nation-states but by ethnopluralism—a “blossoming variety” of local, ethnic, agrarian polities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 97 (5) ◽  
pp. 1395-1414
Author(s):  
Dorit Geva ◽  
Felipe G Santos

Abstract Figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and former French National Front leader Marion Maréchal are seeking to establish what we call a new globalist illiberal order. The globalist illiberal agenda extends elements of the globalist project while reclaiming a radicalized view of Christian democracy. Europe's far-right views the global order as composed of strong nations who need to defend their sovereignty on ‘cultural’ issues while protecting their common Christian roots. We trace their project by focusing on two new institutions of higher education, Hungary's National University of Public Service Ludovika (Ludovika-UPS) and the Institut de sciences sociales, économiques et politiques (Institute of Social Sciences, Economics and Politics—ISSEP), based in France and Spain. Through these institutions, globalist illiberals aim to cultivate new leaders outside the liberal ‘mainstream’ and redefine the meaning of Christian democracy. We conclude that surging nationalism among mid- to small powers is not resulting in deglobalization but is fostering illiberal globalization, which has no place for those who do not fit in their exclusionary vision of Christian Europe.


Author(s):  
Julian Horton

Sonata deformation theory constitutes possibly the most substantial recent contribution to the analytical literature dealing with the sonata-type repertoire of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This notion, developed by James Hepokoski in relation to the music of Sibelius and Strauss and subsequently elaborated both collaboratively and separately by Warren Darcy and Hepokoski, posits nineteenth-century practice as a critical response to a theorized, normative model of sonata form. The widespread formal experimentation evident in the instrumental and symphonic repertoire from Chopin to Schoenberg arises, by these terms, from a more-or-less conscious distortion of the normative pattern proposed seminally by Anton Reicha, and consolidated in the Formenlehre abstractions of A. B. Marx and Carl Czerny, which in turn evolved as part of the pedagogical reception of Beethoven. This essay offers a critical appraisal of the extent to which deformation theory affords a satisfactory basis for understanding novel sonata procedures in Bruckner’s symphonies. The formal strategies of these works have proved habitually resistant to unproblematic sonata readings. Persistent accusations of formlessness have often been challenged by the detection of forming processes that cut across the perceived requirements of classical formal archetypes. Yet, pace Darcy’s study of deformational procedures in Bruckner (1997), I contend that this concept gives an inadequate rendition of the symphonies’ sonata forms, misrepresenting the nature of the composer’s didactic experience, the relationship of norm and deviation in the music, and the place the symphonies occupy in the general development of the genre after Beethoven.


2008 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ayelet Banai

In left critiques of globalization, it is often argued thatliberal-egalitarian principles are inadequate for thinking about andstruggling for global justice; that they are, in fact, part of the problem.For the case of identity politics as a left alternative, the paper pointsat two fallacies in this notion, regarding two ‘liberal’ elements:individualism and universalism. (1) The paper examines groupidentityclaims in far right conceptions of global injustice, and showsthat cultural diversity of groups does not necessitate or even favourequality and democratic participation. (2) It then examines the leftgroup-based claims in the global justice discourse, showing that theaspirations for equality and freedom assume the liberal notions thathave been often rejected as inadequate. The paper concludes thatthis ambivalent position undermines the democratic and egalitarianaspirations of left critiques of the global order. The analysis is basedon manifestos and publications of political parties and movements inWestern Europe (France, Germany and Austria).


2007 ◽  
Vol 177 (4S) ◽  
pp. 310-310
Author(s):  
Sumit Dave ◽  
Luis H. Braga ◽  
Antoine E. Khoury ◽  
Walid A. Farhat

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