scholarly journals The Incremental Evolution of National Receivership Law and the Elusive Search for Federal Purpose

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Roderick J Wood

There was a period when provincial legislation that trespassed too deeply into the federal field of bankruptcy and insolvency law was likely to be declared to be ultra vires as an invasion of the exclusive federal power in relation to that field. The five-to-four split in the 1978 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Robinson v Countrywide Factors Ltd was very much a turning point. Thereafter, the constitutionality of provincial legislation was almost invariably determined through the application of the paramountcy principle. Pursuant to this principle, a provincial statute is rendered inoperative to the extent that it conflicts with the federal statute. The Supreme Court of Canada has created a two-branched test for determining the presence of a conflict. Under the first branch, there is an operational conflict when it is impossible to comply with both the federal and the provincial statute. Under the second branch, there is a conflict when the operation of the provincial statute frustrates the purpose of the federal statute. Either type of conflict will render the provincial statute inoperative...

Author(s):  
Brenda Macdougall

It’s been several months since the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) rendered its judgment in Daniels v. Canada (2016), affirming that the term “Indian” in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act (1867) includes Métis and Non-Status Indians. There is a general hope that the decision marks a turning point for Métis and Non-Status Indians within Canada’s colonial structures. I’m not certain this optimism is justified. The judgment was reached based on the types of historical evidence presented and, consequently, there are a couple of statements within the written judgment that give me pause to question how the evidence regarding the histories of Métis and Non-Status Indians were presented to, and then interpreted by, the justices. Bearing in mind that the crux of the case rested on the linguistic meaning and evolution of the term “Indian” in Canadian society through law and policy, evidence was introduced about how the term was used at various points in the past, as well as the context of that usage in order to demonstrate the evolution of a Canadian legal and historical fiction that increasingly restricted the idea of what an Indian was. What the SCC did with the Daniels Decision is reverse that restrictive trend for Indians while constructing new problems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


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