scholarly journals Family Feud, or Realpolitik?

2021 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 71-89
Author(s):  
Fernando Ursine Braga Silva

In this contribution, I use the breakup – just short of the 2017 General Election – of Japan’s former second biggest political party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), as a case study so as to assess the practical implications of splits and realignments in the most relevant party split in Japan since the DPJ was ousted from government in 2012. First, I examine DPJ’s origin as an umbrella for ideologically diverse groups that opposed the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – the government party in Japan throughout most of its post-war history, its tendency to factionalism, and the oftentimes damaging role the factional dynamics played in the party’s decision-making process throughout the years. In the case study, it is understood that the creation of the Party of Hope – a split from the LDP, and the salience of constitutional issues were exogenous factors particular to that election, which helped causing the DPJ split.

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Reed

In the 1993 general election the Liberal Democratic Party lost power for the first time since it was founded in 1955. The coalition government that followed enacted the most far-reaching political reforms Japan has experienced since the American Occupation. The country has now experienced two elections since these reforms so we can begin to analyze trends and dynamics. It is now possible to make a preliminary evaluation of the effects of these reforms. I evaluate the reforms under three headings: (1) reducing the cost of elections and levels of corruption; (2) replacing candidate-centered with party-centered campaigns; and (3) moving toward a two-party system which would produce alternation in power between the parties of the government and the parties of the opposition. In conclude that, with some notable exceptions, the reforms are working well, about as well as should have been expected.


Subject Kremlin strategy for the 2018 presidential election. Significance With one year to go before the 2018 presidential election, the Kremlin strategy that will frame the process is starting to take shape. The nature of Vladimir Putin’s campaign has a bearing on his fourth term, during which he must either identify a successor or engineer an extension of his tenure beyond 2024. Impacts Putin will rally populist sentiment on the back of foreign policy successes in Crimea and Syria. A possible rapprochement with the United States would restrict the national narrative of ‘Russia encircled’. The Liberal Democratic Party and the Communist candidates will criticise the government but will not run opposition campaigns.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Osamu Ryoichi

The prime minister of Japan (日本国内閣総理大臣, Nihon-koku naikaku sōridaijin, or shushō (首相)) (informally referred to as the PMOJ) is head of the government of Japan, the chief executive of the National Cabinet and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Japan; he is appointed by the emperor of Japan after being designated by the National Diet and must enjoy the confidence of the House of Representatives to remain in office. He is the head of the Cabinet and appoints and dismisses the other ministers of state. The literal translation of the Japanese name for the office is Minister for the Comprehensive Administration of (or the Presidency over) the Cabinet. The current prime minister of Japan is Yoshihide Suga. On 14 September 2020, he was elected to the presidency of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). After being confirmed in the Diet, he received an invitation from Emperor Naruhito to form a government as the new prime minister, and took office on 16 September 2020.  Japan's parliament has elected Yoshihide Suga as the country's new prime minister, following the surprise resignation of Shinzo Abe. After winning the leadership of the governing party earlier this week, Wednesday's vote confirms the former chief cabinet secretary's new position. It happened because the needed of political interest for Japan.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 212-230
Author(s):  
E. V. Balatsky ◽  
◽  
N. A. Ekimova ◽  
◽  

The study tests the hypothesis that Russia’s transition from flat to progressive income taxation will produce revenue that would be sufficient for the advancement of high-tech industries. To test this hypothesis, we considered two scenarios of the reform – the two-tiered system, which has been implemented since 2021, and the project of a four-tiered system proposed by the Liberal Democratic Party. To estimate the effects of the tax reform, we calculated the revenues from taxing high-income taxpayer groups and subgroups at specific tax rates. As a result, it was found that the reform could produce 187 billion Rubles in extra revenue, which means that there is a vast discrepancy between the calculated estimates and the government’s expectations (60 billion Rubles). In other words, the Russian government significantly underestimates the potential of the income tax. According to the second scenario, which aims to build a more sophisticated income tax system, the revenue would be 1.1 trillion Rubles. Thus, a well-designed scale of the personal income tax will enable the government to considerably enhance this tool’s fiscal efficiency. The calculations of the extra revenue generated by the reform relied on the statistics of the World Inequality Database (WID) for 2019. To test the relevance of the input and output data, we conducted a comparative analysis at the micro-level by looking at the wage levels in Russian, American and European space corporations. We found that the micro-economic data are closer to the WID statistics rather than to Rosstat, which confirmed the accuracy of our results. Our calculations have confirmed the general hypothesis and showed that the extra revenue from the reform will enable the government to fully modernize microelectronics and the geothermal industry in Russia.


Author(s):  
Ethan Scheiner ◽  
Michael F. Thies

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party has controlled the country’s government for most of its existence since coming to power in 1955. Put simply, opposition parties in Japan have failed at an alarming rate for more than half a century. This chapter examines the changing patterns and causes of this opposition party failure over time. It highlights three distinct periods: (1) opposition as protest (1955–1989), (2) opposition as alternative government (1989–2012), and (3) opposition as irrelevance (2012–present). The chapter suggests that until midway through the second period, core structural conditions created massive disadvantages for the opposition, thus harming its ability to take down the LDP. However, significant changes altered these conditions and helped the opposition gain control of the government in 2009. Surprisingly, just a few years later, for reasons that were very different from before, the opposition returned to a state of near irrelevance.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 770-787 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Leiserson

In constitutional form and in practice, the Japanese national government is parliamentary. Authority is centered in the Diet, and power is held by the parties in the Diet. Unlike the pre-war system, for example, the Diet parties really do choose the Prime Ministers.The post-war party system changed fundamentally in 1955, when the non-socialist parties combined and formed the mammoth Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Since its formation in 1955, the LDP has always had a safe majority in both Houses of the Diet. But, from its beginning as a union of several political streams to the present, the LDP has been made up of several rather stable factions. These factions are the key actors in the biennial election of the party president, who naturally becomes the Prime Minister. As a general rule, votes in a party presidential election are on straight lines. So a Prime Minister is chosen by a coalition of LDP factions which controls a majority of votes at the party convention. Furthermore, the factions present nominees for Cabinet posts, and Ministers are chosen from among these nominees. Cabinet posts become rewards for the factions which voted for the Prime Minister, inducements to opposing factions to enter the Prime Minister's coalition, and buffers to soften or weaken the opposition of hostile factions. In short, the struggle over top political leadership in Japan—the president and the top officials of the ruling party, the Prime Minister, and other Cabinet members—is waged by the LDP factions. (The struggle over policy, on the other hand, is waged by other actors, within the framework established by the outcome of the factions' struggle over leadership.) And because of the wide range of opinion within the LDP, the outcomes of the factions' struggle over top political leadership are very important for Japan. A switch from an Ishibashi to a Kishi, or from a Kishi to an Ikeda, is certainly as significant as, say, the replacement of a Laniel by a Mendès-France.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Saito

By examining party-switching decisions among members of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), this article shows how distributive policy programs exclusively available to the governing party attract incumbents to the party in power. In a stable electoral environment where the government party is likely to stay in power, legislators elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies are effectively tied to the party. However, when the party's electoral prospects are uncertain, legislators behave more sincerely and switch parties to match their policy preferences. It is also found that defectors elected from infrastructure-poor constituencies tended to return to the LDP once the party installed a stable surplus coalition.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Mitchell

Despite widespread public opinion against many of his policies, Abe Shinzo’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is not only maintaining its electoral success but expanding on it. Furthermore the LDP has been in almost continual power since 1955, making Japan in the eyes of some a de facto one-party state. This paper will explore the question of legitimacy in Japan’s political system, especially the ones raised by Karel van Wolferen the 1980s, and whether the current power structure can be considered to hold it. Through using Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory, in particular his concept of political legitimacy, it will be shown that while electoral reforms in 1994 addressed most of the systemic legitimacy issues in Japan’s political system, a potential deficit in the government/opposition coding remains.


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