scholarly journals The Great Game in Front and Central Asia in the XIX century: historiography of the question

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 431-445
Author(s):  
Georgy Vadimovich Ibrayymov

The purpose of the article is to study the events of the big game, their reflection and comparison in Russian and English historiography. For its implementation, considerable amounts of materials related both to the time of these events and to modern authors were used. Since the research concerns the topic of political rivalry between the two states, the observation of a subjective attitude in some works is not unexpected. However, the works presented in the article generally stand up to historical objectivity. The Big Game is an important event in terms of what is essentially a forerunner of subsequent global conflicts, primarily the cold war.

1994 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 291-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Jon Rudelson

With the end of the Cold War, the Great Game in Central Asia has heated up once again. Once more, Central Asia has become a place for international rivalry. But this time the Great Game is not between Britain and Russia. In this second half of the Great Game, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Israel are all vying for influence. China, the key player, however, is left out of the game in most accounts and is overlooked as a Central Asian power. Moreover, it is forgotten that China won the first half of the Great Game, at least as far as Xinjiang is concerned. It is my contention that China will catch everyone by surprise once again and win the second half of the Great Game in Central Asia; the Uighurs of Xinjiang will play a predominant role in this victory.


Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Lene Hansen

International security studies (ISS) has significantly evolved from its founding core of “golden age” strategic studies. From the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s through to the 1970s, strategic studies virtually was ISS, and remains a very large part of it. The fact that it continues to stand as the “mainstream” attacked by widening/deepening approaches further speaks to its status as a “core.” This core consists of those literatures whose principal concern is external military threats to the state, and the whole agenda of the use of force which arises from that. This core was originally focused on nuclear weapons and the military-political rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, but has since adapted its focus to changes in the salience and nature of military threats caused by the end of the Cold War and 9/11. It includes literatures on deterrence, arms racing, arms control and disarmament, grand strategy, wars (and “new wars”), the use of force, nuclear proliferation, military technology, and terrorism. Debates within ISS are structured, either implicitly or explicitly, by five questions: (1) which referent object to adopt, (2) whether to understand security as internally or externally driven, (3) whether to limit it to the military sector or to expand it, (4) what fundamental thinking about (international) politics to adopt, and (5) which epistemology and methodology to choose.


Author(s):  
Y. V. Borovsky

Since the late 1940s Western countries have regularly used sanctions, embargoes and other similar instruments to counter the development of the Soviet and, after 1991, the Russian energy industry. The author tries to answer two research questions: what provokes such a policy of the West: political rivalry or economic competition? Has the West changed its attitude to the Russian energy industry after the end of the Cold war? The first part of the study covers the years of the Cold war; the second part is devoted to the period following the collapse of the USSR. The article deals with generic approaches of Western countries to the Soviet and Russian energy industry, as well as their stances on major oil and gas pipelines, including the «Druzhba» (or the «Friendship») oil pipeline, the Soyuz gas pipeline, The «Urengoy – Pomary – Uzhhorod» (or the West-Siberian) gas pipeline, the Nord Stream 1,2 gas pipelines. The author came to the following conclusions. The main inspirer of sanctions and other restrictive measures of the West against the Soviet and Russian energy industry has always been the United States of America. The core motive of such behavior has been political rivalry, although in certain periods (for example, in the 1950s-1960s, 2010-ies) the United States may also be driven by economic competition or the desire to ensure the interests of its energy companies. Western European countries have often been in solidarity with the American actions against the Soviet or Russian energy complex. However, when their strategic interests are affected (for example, in case of construction of the Urengoy – Pomary – Uzhgorod and Nord stream 2 gas pipelines), they can resist the dictates of Washington. This is due both to pressure from Western European business interested in cooperation with the USSR or Russia in the energy field, and a strong desire of Western European countries to diversify oil and gas supplies from the Middle East and to solve some other energy problems, for instance, to mitigate transit risks associated with Ukraine. Overall, the end of the Cold war has not radically changed the policy of the West towards the Russian energy industry.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miroslav Jenča

The century-old concept of preventive diplomacy has grown in prominence since the end of the Cold War, and was strengthened by the failures of the international community to prevent the violence in places such as Rwanda and Yugoslavia. The United Nations has undertaken a range of preventive activities in Central Asia, including in partnership with relevant regional actors. This paper considers the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) in terms of transboundary threats, domestic developments in Kyrgyzstan, and the management of common resources.


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