Expected Payoffs and Rent Dissipation in a Contest with Contender Externality - Focusing on Positive Externality -

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (5) ◽  
pp. 1789-1799
Author(s):  
Chang-Beom Kim ◽  
Sung-Hoon Park
Keyword(s):  
Rent Dissipation ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Expected Payoffs

scholarly journals A Virtuous Circle of Governance Contests with Externalities

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (14) ◽  
pp. 7766
Author(s):  
Sung-Hoon Park ◽  
Jason F. Shogren
Keyword(s):  
Relative Efficiency ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Key Factors ◽  
Rent Dissipation ◽  
Dissipation Rates ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
The Impact

Governments create contests to allocate resources to stakeholders, e.g., grants, contracts. The actions of these stakeholders can generate a positive externality for themselves—the contest winner can attract additional outside funding and donations from third-parties who want to jump on the winner’s bandwagon. Herein we examine the externalities arising from these contests created by governance and their impact on a virtuous circle of governance contests. Among various conditions that make governance virtuous, we focus on the equilibrium expected payoffs of stakeholders, the difference in them, and the rent-dissipation rates. Our study shows that the impact of externalities on the efficiency of governance depends on two key factors: (i) the choice of governance contests, the player-externality and the winner-externality, and (ii) the relative efficiency of stakeholders’ efforts.

Using Epidemiological Data to Value the Positive Externality of Vaccination

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Cook ◽  
Donald Lauria ◽  
Brian Maskery ◽  
Marc Jeuland ◽  
Dale Whittington
Keyword(s):  
Epidemiological Data ◽  
Positive Externality

On a Fallacy in the Coase Theorem and the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution

2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven N. S. Cheung
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Costs ◽  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Coase Theorem ◽  
Economic Institutions ◽  
General Version ◽  
Historical Account ◽  
Rent Dissipation

AbstractThis paper first presents a historical account of the origin of the Coase Theorem. It then elaborates its significance in explaining the working of economic institutions. After expounding the concepts of transaction cost and rent dissipation, it points out an error in the Coase Theorem. Lastly, the paper propounds the Theorem of Transaction Costs Substitution as an extended and general version of the Coase Theorem.

The benefits of international cooperation under climate uncertainty: a dynamic game analysis

2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 452-477
Author(s):  
Xiao-Bing Zhang ◽  
Magnus Hennlock
Keyword(s):  
Global Warming ◽  
International Cooperation ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Climate Uncertainty ◽  
Expected Payoffs

AbstractThis paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.

Restricted capacity and rent dissipation in a regulated open access fishery

2011 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 366-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert T. Deacon ◽  
David Finnoff ◽  
John Tschirhart
Keyword(s):  
Open Access ◽  
Rent Dissipation

scholarly journals Evolution of social learning when high expected payoffs are associated with high risk of failure

2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (64) ◽  
pp. 1604-1615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michal Arbilly ◽  
Uzi Motro ◽  
Marcus W. Feldman ◽  
Arnon Lotem
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Social Learning ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Individual Experience ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Risk Of Failure ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
Maladaptive Behaviours ◽  
Optimal Behaviour

In an environment where the availability of resources sought by a forager varies greatly, individual foraging is likely to be associated with a high risk of failure. Foragers that learn where the best sources of food are located are likely to develop risk aversion, causing them to avoid the patches that are in fact the best; the result is sub-optimal behaviour. Yet, foragers living in a group may not only learn by themselves, but also by observing others. Using evolutionary agent-based computer simulations of a social foraging game, we show that in an environment where the most productive resources occur with the lowest probability, socially acquired information is strongly favoured over individual experience. While social learning is usually regarded as beneficial because it filters out maladaptive behaviours, the advantage of social learning in a risky environment stems from the fact that it allows risk aversion to be circumvented and the best food source to be revisited despite repeated failures. Our results demonstrate that the consequences of individual risk aversion may be better understood within a social context and suggest one possible explanation for the strong preference for social information over individual experience often observed in both humans and animals.

Standard minimi di qualitŕ: un approccio teorico

2012 ◽  
pp. 29-41
Author(s):  
Grassi Iacopo
Keyword(s):  
High Standard ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Quality Standard ◽  
Average Quality ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Positive Externality ◽  
Experience Good ◽  
The Government ◽  
Minimum Quality

At least since Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information in the case of experience goods has been a central issue in the economic literature. This paper studies regulation in markets where the quality of the experience good is never completely verifiable by consumers even after purchase. In the proposed model firms can decide the quality of the good: always producing a high quality good creates a positive externality in the market, but it causes an incentive to the firms to deviate and produce low quality goods. The main policy instrument for the government, in order to maximize Social Welfare, is to fix a minimum quality standard, but imposing a too high standard might, in some cases, lower the average quality of the good in the market.

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