scholarly journals Negotiating Socially Optimal Allocations of Resources

2006 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 315-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
U. Endriss ◽  
N. Maudet ◽  
F. Sadri ◽  
F. Toni
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Multiagent System ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Allocation Of Resources ◽  
Artificial Society ◽  
The Social ◽  
Optimal Allocations

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this paper, we study an abstract negotiation framework where agents can agree on multilateral deals to exchange bundles of indivisible resources. We then analyse how these deals affect social welfare for different instances of the basic framework and different interpretations of the concept of social welfare itself. In particular, we show how certain classes of deals are both sufficient and necessary to guarantee that a socially optimal allocation of resources will be reached eventually.

scholarly journals The Death of Welfare Economics

2019 ◽  
Vol 51 (5) ◽  
pp. 827-865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herrade Igersheim
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Social Welfare Function ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Impossibility Result ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Individual Values ◽  
The Social

The death of welfare economics has been declared several times. One of the reasons cited for these plural obituaries is that Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, as set out in his pathbreaking Social Choice and Individual Values in 1951, has shown that the social welfare function—one of the main concepts of the new welfare economics as defined by Abram Bergson (Burk) in 1938 and clarified by Paul Samuelson in the Foundations of Economic Analysis—does not exist under reasonable conditions. Indeed, from the very start, Arrow kept asserting that his famous impossibility result has direct and devastating consequences for the Berg-son-Samuelson social welfare function, though he seemed to soften his position in the early eighties. On his side, especially from the seventies on, Samuelson remained active on this issue and continued to defend the concept he had devised with Bergson, tooth and nail, against Arrow’s attacks. The aim of this article is precisely to examine this rather strange controversy, which is almost unknown in the scientific community, even though it lasted more than fifty years and involved a conflict between two economic giants, Arrow and Samuelson, and, behind them, two distinct communities—welfare economics, which was on the wane, against the emerging social choice theory—representing two conflicting ways of dealing with mathematical tools in welfare economics and two different conceptions of social welfare.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

Bargaining in Legislatures

1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 1181-1206 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron ◽  
John A. Ferejohn
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Structure ◽  
The Social ◽  
Free Model ◽  
Sequential Nature ◽  
Choice Literature ◽  
Formal Rules

Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

John Roemer’s Economic Philosophy and the Perils of Formalism

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 267-279
Author(s):  
Drew Christie
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Recent Work ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
Means Of Production

John Roemer’s recent work uses the mathematics of Social Choice Theory to examine the structure of socialist ideals. One striking conclusion is that the social ownership of the means of production entails the strict equalization of ‘utility.’1 The conclusion is surprising. While of course opposing many existing inequalities, socialists (as opposed to their critics) have not traditionally understood socialism to require strict equalization. Marx, for example, is scathing in his criticism of levelling, which he sees as a form of ‘crude’ communism.2This paper is both exposition and critique. By way of exposition, I show with less than full mathematical rigor what several of Roemer’s axioms of social ownership mean and why they entail the equality of utility.

The Possibility of Self-Government

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (3) ◽  
pp. 563-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Bird
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The People ◽  
The Social ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Intuitive Concept ◽  
The Common

Many have suggested that the findings of social choice theory demonstrate that there can be no “will of the people.” This has subversive implications for our intuitive concept of self-government. I explore the relation between the notion of a “social will,” that of self-government, and the impossibility theorems of social choice theory. I conclude that although the concept of the social will is essential to that of self-government, the findings of social choice theory do not cast doubt upon the possibility of either. Unlike many attempts to respond to the threat posed by social choice theory, my argument does not require any appeal to the problematic notion of the common good.

scholarly journals Multicriteria ABC Inventory Classification Using the Social Choice Theory

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
Fan Liu ◽  
Ning Ma
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Correlation Method ◽  
Classification Problem ◽  
Inventory Cost ◽  
The Social ◽  
Criteria Importance ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Substantial Degree

The multicriteria ABC inventory classification has been widely adopted by organizations for the purpose of specifying, monitoring, and controlling inventory efficiently. It categorizes the items into three groups based on some certain criteria, such as inventory cost, part criticality, lead time, and commonality. There has been extensive research on such a problem, but few have considered that the judgments about criteria’s importance order usually exhibit a substantial degree of variability. In light of this, we propose a new methodology for handling the multicriteria ABC inventory classification problem using the social choice theory. Specifically, the pessimistic and optimistic results for all possible individual judgments are obtained in a closed-form manner, which are then balanced by the Hurwicz criterion with a “coefficient of optimism”. The CRITIC (Criteria Importance Through Intercriteria Correlation) method is used to aggregate the individual judgments into a collective choice, according to which the items are classified into Groups A, B, and C. Through a numerical experiment, we show that the proposed methodology not only considers all possible preferences among the criteria, but also generates flexible classification schemes.

Measuring social welfare: application of social choice theory

2003 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Clarke ◽  
Sardar M.N Islam
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory

scholarly journals Social Welfare Model of Rural Development

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Bharat Prasad Badal
Keyword(s):  
Rural Development ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Human Right ◽  
The People ◽  
Unlimited Supply ◽  
Welfare Model

After analyzing the balanced growth unbalanced growth, unlimited supply of laborer, transformation of traditional agriculture and social choice theories as well as Gandhian model of rural development, US market model economy, Chinese socialist’s economy, Korean model of rural development (Saemual Undong), mix welfare model of Sweden, this paper emphasizes that people’s participation is inevitable to achieve desired development goals. However, all these doctrines, theories or model have identified active participation of the people in development process but still those doctrines are silent about how to emancipate and mobilize people. Here is why, this paper has designed and developed social welfare model of Rural Development (SWMRD) based on Sen’s social choice theory, Gandhian model of rural development and doctrine of factors of production of economics. According to the model people have to make plan of their resources for sustainable economic return and its implementation. Government has to assure freedom, human right, motivation and protection. Hence, SWMRD model will be applicable on development studies and useful to development policy makers.Nepalese Journal of Development and Rural StudiesVol. 14 (Joint issue) (1&2), 2017, Page: 1-11

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