A Decision Model for Selecting the Optimum Oil Production Profile Using Multi Criteria Decision Making and Social Choice Theory

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samira Keivanpour ◽  
Hassan Haleh ◽  
Hamed Shakouri Ganjavi
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Oil Field ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Multi Criteria Decision Making ◽  
Statistic Model ◽  
Development Plans ◽  
Decision Making Model

Applying a MCDM model has many benefits for decision makers in the course of oil field master development plans preparation and evaluation. In this study, a multi-criteria decision making model is proposed in order to achieve an optimum production profile. The most important criteria and parameters for selection of best production profile are identified. These parameters are derived by several interviews with Iranian oil Industry’s experts. The candidate alternatives for production profile are ranked using a combination of group decision making approach and social choice theory. The degree of group consensus is evaluated by using a statistic model to confirm the validity of decision making model.

The Unexpected Empirical Consensus Among Consensus Methods

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 629-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Regenwetter ◽  
Aeri Kim ◽  
Arthur Kantor ◽  
Moon-Ho R. Ho
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
American Psychological Association ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Consensus Methods ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Large Numbers ◽  
Choice Procedures ◽  
Multimethod Approach

In economics and political science, the theoretical literature on social choice routinely highlights worst-case scenarios and emphasizes the nonexistence of a universally best voting method. Behavioral social choice is grounded in psychology and tackles consensus methods descriptively and empirically. We analyzed four elections of the American Psychological Association using a state-of-the-art multimodel, multimethod approach. These elections provide rare access to (likely sincere) preferences of large numbers of decision makers over five choice alternatives. We determined the outcomes according to three classical social choice procedures: Condorcet, Borda, and plurality. Although the literature routinely depicts these procedures as irreconcilable, we found strong statistical support for an unexpected degree of empirical consensus among them in these elections. Our empirical findings stand in contrast to two centuries of pessimistic thought experiments and computer simulations in social choice theory and demonstrate the need for more systematic descriptive and empirical research on social choice than exists to date.

An application of social choice theory to U.S.D.A. forest service decision making

1996 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-621 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wade E. Martin ◽  
Deborah J. Shields ◽  
Boleslaw Tolwinski ◽  
Brian Kent
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Forest Service

Social Choice Theory and the Reconstruction of Elections: A Comment on Levesque's Analysis

1983 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 785-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Woolstencroft
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Rule ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Individual Preferences

The import of social choice theory lies in its examination of the various choice rules available for the recording and weighing of preferences in an election and the consequences of those rules for democratic political life. A choice rule is a method for aggregating individual preferences into a collective determination. Choice rules vary in their capacities to maximize (and minimize) various values desired in a system of decision-making. They also vary in their capacities to reveal information about preferences.

The Priority of Democracy and the Burden of Justification

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Knight ◽  
James Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Institutional Arrangement ◽  
Complex Society ◽  
Essential Component ◽  
Vantage Points

This chapter addresses the challenges that social choice theory brings to normative claims about democracy. Social choice theorists commonly critique democratic decision making on the grounds that voting is susceptible to unavoidable pathologies and that insofar as voting is essential to democracy, those pathologies subvert the normative legitimacy of democratic outcomes. Because voting is an essential component of any democratic institutional arrangement in any large, heterogeneous, complex society, the systematic instability and ambiguity that social choice theorists establish raises serious, unavoidable difficulties for some interpretations of democracy. Yet populism and liberalism hardly exhaust the theoretical vantage points from which such findings might be interpreted. Indeed, the chapter offers a reading of social choice theory that suggests an obvious, justifiable response to the putative dilemma fabricated by theorists who insist that the only available options are an impossible populism or an unpalatable liberalism.

In Praise of Manipulation

2007 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
KEITH DOWDING ◽  
MARTIN VAN HEES
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Choice Functions ◽  
Social Choice Functions ◽  
Voting Procedures ◽  
Strategy Proofness

Many theorists believe that the manipulation of voting procedures is a serious problem. Accordingly, much of social choice theory examines the conditions under which strategy-proofness can be ensured, and what kind of procedures do a better job of preventing manipulation. This article argues that democrats should not be worried about manipulation. Two arguments against manipulation are examined: first, the ‘sincerity argument’, according to which manipulation should be rejected because it displays a form of insincere behaviour. This article distinguishes between sincere and non-sincere manipulation and shows that a familiar class of social choice functions is immune to insincere manipulation. Secondly, the ‘transparency’ argument against manipulation is discussed and it is argued that (sincere or insincere) manipulation may indeed lead to non-transparency of the decision-making process, but that, from a democratic perspective, such non-transparency is often a virtue rather than a vice.

The Heresthetics of Coup Making

1991 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
YOUSSEF COHEN
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Regime Change ◽  
Political Change ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Main Argument ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Relationship

Heresthetics is a term coined by Riker to refer to the stratagems used by politicians to manipulate the structure of a decision-making situation. The object of such manipulation is to force one's opponents into a choice of alternatives such that, whichever alternative is chosen, the opponents will lose. The main argument of this article is that military coups and regimes are largely the outcomes of successful heresthetical maneuvers. In this article my argument is applied to the emergence of the Brazilian military regime of 1964. But the argument should apply more widely. At the very least, this preliminary exercise should stimulate more research on the strategic maneuvers that engender military regimes and other forms of political change. By investigating the relationship between heresthetics and regime change this article also shows how social choice theory and game theory can be used to complement and enrich current explanations of political change.

scholarly journals Combining Social Choice Theory and Argumentation: Enabling Collective Decision Making

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-173
Author(s):  
Jordi Ganzer-Ripoll ◽  
Natalia Criado ◽  
Maite Lopez-Sanchez ◽  
Simon Parsons ◽  
Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Collective Decision Making

scholarly journals Individual decision making, group decision making and deliberation

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-167
Author(s):  
Bojana Radovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Group Decision Making ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Group Decision ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Making ◽  
Group Members

Each of us makes a number of decisions, from the less important to those with far-reaching consequences. As members of different groups, we are also actors of group decision making. In order to make a rational decision, a choice-making procedure must satisfy a number of assumptions (conditions) of rationality. In addition, when it comes to group decisions, those procedures should also be ?fair.? However, it is not possible to define a procedure of choice-making that would transform individual orders of alternatives based on preferences of perfectly rational individuals into a single social order and still meet conditions of rationality and ethics. The theory of deliberative democracy appeared in response to the impossibility of Social Choice theory. The basic assumption of deliberative democracy is that individuals adjust their preferences taking into account interests of the community. They are open for discussion with other group members and are willing to change their attitudes in order to achieve common interests. Ideally, group members come to an agreement during public discussion (deliberation). Still, this concept cannot completely over?come all the difficulties posed by the theory of social choice. Specifically, there is no solution for strategic and manipulative behavior of individuals. Also, the concept of deliberative democracy faces certain problems particular to this approach, such as, to name but a few, problems with the establishment of equality of participants in the debate and their motivation, as well as problems with the organization of public hearings.

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