The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools

1963 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 73
Author(s):  
Derrick Bell

Yale Law School Professor Alexander Bickel was a major consti­tutional scholar of his time. When, in 1970, he questioned the long-term viability of the Brown decision in a highly praised book, civil rights lawyers and liberal scholars were annoyed. Few of us at that time had any doubts that we would eventually prevail in eradicating segrega­tion “root and branch” from the public schools. Now, more than three decades later, Professor Bickel’s prediction, heavily criticized at the time, has become an unhappy but all too accurate reality. In this chapter I will examine the resistance by whites and the rigidity by civil rights lawyers and leaders that combined to transform Bickel’s prediction into prophesy. Even the optimists among us had continuing reasons to regret the “all deliberate speed” standard for implementing Brown I. The Supreme Court insisted in Brown II that its unique-compliance formula was intended to do no more than allow time for the necessary adminis­trative changes that transformation to a desegregated school system required. After a decade of experience with the standard, Judge Robert L. Carter, former NAACP General Counsel, surmised that the formula actually permitted movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept.1 Until Brown II, Carter said, constitutional rights had been defined as personal and present, but under the guise of judicial statesmanship, “the Warren Court sacri­ficed individual and immediate vindication of the newly discovered right of blacks to a desegregated education in favor of a remedy more palatable to whites.” Carter suggests that the Court failed to realize the depth or nature of the problem, and by attempting to regulate the pace of desegrega­tion so as to convey a show of compassion and understanding for the white South, it not only failed to develop a willingness to comply, but instead aroused the hope that resistance to the constitutional imper­ative would succeed. As had happened so frequently before, southern politicians began waving the Confederate flag and equating the Brown decision with a Supreme Court-led attack on states’ rights. Highway billboards called for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren, and candidates were elected to office on campaigns based on little more than shouting “Never.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-17
Author(s):  
Justin Driver

Although, at one time, many observers believed that the courts and the schools should have little to do with each other, Justin Driver argues that the public school has, in recent decades, served as the single most significant site of constitutional interpretation in the nation’s history. He traces four reasons for this growing intersection between schools and the courts. First, public schools touch a larger number of Americans than any other government institution. Second, decisions related to public schools present a lens through which to view American history. Third, cases involving schools frequently highlight contentious legal doctrines. And, fourth, the Supreme Court itself has highlighted the schools’ role in how Americans understand the Constitution.


1963 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 865-882
Author(s):  
William W. Van Alstyne

This clause of the First Amendment, recently applied by the Supreme Court to invalidate certain religious practices in the public schools, has called down a new storm over the Supreme Court. The storm has not consisted merely of the political bombast of predictable critics. Rather, it has included Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School who perceived in the first school prayer case an unyielding and unwarranted absolutism in the position of the Court. It includes also highly regarded church figures, such as Episcopal Bishop Pike, who has called for a constitutional amendment to alter the Court's mandates. It has percolated within the law schools, and within the Court itself where lengthy separate opinions were composed to clarify what has and what has not been done. Yet, even within the Court, as within the larger academic and public forums, wide disagreement remains as to the applied meaning of the opaque language of the religion clause.This article cannot quiet the storm over the Supreme Court, but it can make clear which parts of the storm are entitled to be taken seriously and which are merely bluster. Beyond this, there are more significant purposes to be served. The first of these is to make sense of existing cases in terms of some coherent doctrine, responsive to the First Amendment and possessing substantial predictive value: to describe the standard of church-state separation which the Supreme Court applies in fact. The second is to demonstrate that a number of open questions remain to be answered before a more precise boundary of church-state separation can be known.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Charles J. Russo

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was a watershed moment involving the First Amendment free speech rights of students in American public schools. In Tinker, the Supreme Court affirmed that absent a reasonable forecast of material and substantial disruption, educators could not discipline students who wore black arm bands to school protesting American military action in Viet Nam. Not surprisingly, litigation continues on the boundaries of student speech, coupled with the extent to which educators can limit expression on the internet, especially social media. As the Justices finally entered the fray over cyber speech, this three-part article begins by reviewing Tinker and other Supreme Court precedent on student expressive activity plus illustrative lower court cases before examining Levy v. Mahanoy Area School District. In Levy, the Court will consider whether educators could discipline a cheerleader, a student engaged in an extracurricular activity, who violated team rules by posting inappropriate off-campus messages on Snapchat. The article then offers policy suggestions for lawyers and educators when working with speech codes applicable to student use of the internet and social media by pupils involved in extracurricular activities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 63 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-119
Author(s):  
Dennis L. Weisman

The issue of stolen valor concerns the act of trading on false claims of being awarded valorous military service medals. The Supreme Court overturned the 2005 Stolen Valor Act, largely on First Amendment grounds, ruling that even false speech deserves some protection. Misrepresentation that devalues the reputation of medals for valor may not violate the revised statute despite reducing the expected wage premium associated with being awarded the medal for valor and discouraging investment in military effort. Hence, the law and economics of stolen valor are in some conflict. JEL Classifications: D82, H1, K23


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