Employment Law. Title VII. Sex Discrimination. Ninth Circuit Holds That Male Coworkers' and Supervisor's Harassment of Male Employee for Failing to Meet Sex Stereotype Constitutes Sex Discrimination. Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001)

2002 ◽  
Vol 115 (7) ◽  
pp. 2074 ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sachin S. Pandya ◽  
Marcia McCormick

This paper reviews the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). There, the Court held that by barring employer discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex,” Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also bars employment discrimination because an individual is gay or transgender. The paper then speculates about how much Bostock will affect how likely lower court judges will read other “sex” discrimination prohibitions in the U.S. Code in the same way, in part based on a canvass of the text of about 150 of those prohibitions. The paper also discusses the religion-based defenses that defendants may raise in response under Title VII itself, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.


Author(s):  
Timothy Feddersen

In September 2014 Leyth Jamal, a transgender woman, filed suit against her employer, luxury retailer Saks Fifth Avenue. Jamal alleged that she experienced harassment from managers and other employees because of her gender identity while employed by Saks, including verbal abuse and threats of violence. At the time she filed suit, no federal, state, or local laws protected transgender employees from discrimination. However, some federal district courts had recently begun to allow such suits on the premise that discrimination based on gender identity was a form of sex discrimination. Other suits and amicus briefs brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) furthered this trend. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with investigating and supporting claims of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, so district and appellate courts watched the EEOC's position on the application of Title VII. Socio-culturally, many Americans supported transgender rights, even as they voiced anxiety about transgender men in women's bathrooms. This case has students assume the role of a trusted member of the executive team of Hudson's Bay Company, which owns Saks Fifth Avenue. One Friday afternoon in late December 2014, the Hudson's Bay CEO sends an email to his executive team notifying them that he has approved corporate counsel's motion to dismiss Jamal's case based on the argument that transgender people are not a protected class according to Title VII. The motion will be filed in federal court on Monday. The CEO shares that he personally believes it is preposterous for anyone to think that Saks Fifth Avenue is anything but a strong advocate for LGBT rights, but he invites executive team members to call him if they have any concerns. Members of the executive team have a responsibility to consider the broader strategic implications for the company, so students must decide if and how to respond to the CEO.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-81
Author(s):  
Kendall D. Isaac

The recent Supreme Court decision in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar has brought exposure to a prevalent problem in employment discrimination and retaliation cases: there is great discrepancy in how plaintiffs have to prove and courts have to assess these claims. Depending on whether the case is based on discrimination or retaliation pursuant to the ADA, ADEA, or Title VII, the standard that needs to be met might be that the plaintiff must prove that discrimination was “the” motivating-factor for the adverse employment action or that it was “a” motivating-factor for the action. Adding even greater confusion is the fact that, if an employee argues that they are the victim of discrimination (such as on the basis of national origin) and retaliation, the employee might have to prove that their national origin was “a” motivating-factor in the discrimination case and “the” motivating-factor in the retaliation aspect of the case. If this sounds confusing to scholars and attorneys, imagine how confusing these various standards within one case can be for potential litigants, judges unfamiliar with employment law, and a member of the jury! This Article delves into these muddy waters and attempts to highlight the issues, spotlight the statutes, and ultimately formulate a working motivating-factor standard that can be infused into all of the various employment discrimination statutes and thus result in a consistency in interpretation and application.


1988 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Scheibal

The recent AFSCME v. Washington comparable worth case attracted significant public attention when plaintiffs won an initial $800 million judgment against the State of Washington, only to see the award overturned on appeal. This paper reviews the legal theories used by the trial court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The current legal status of comparable worth is discussed, with particular emphasis on the applicability and precedential value of the Ninth Circuit's opinion for comparable worth cases in other jurisdictions. Analysis indicates that conflicts between the Ninth Circuit holding and opinions in other circuits provide a continuing opportunity for aggrieved employees to pursue claims under comparable worth or closely related legal theories.


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