State Constitutional Law in 1948–49

1949 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-765
Author(s):  
Foster H. Sherwood

The ever-increasing volume of litigation in state courts has made it necessary to exclude this year all decisions of courts other than those of last resort. In addition, with respect to subjects such as “police power” and “equal protection,” where classification or analysis of the decisions would require space out of all proportion to their importance, only a listing of the subjects involved in the case is attempted. The cases fall generally into the pattern used last year.I. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION1. Special Constitutional Provisions. The effective date of a new constitutional amendment was the subject of two decisions this year. In one, the amendment extending the term of office of county attorneys from two to four years was approved at a general election in which county attorneys were elected. The court held that the officers elected then were elected for the longer term, even though the amendment by its own terms did not become operative until the January following the election. This was so, even though the required local notice of the amendment omitted the effective date, since full state-wide notice was published by the secretary of state. The other case holds that the amendment becomes effective on the date of the canvass of votes rather than on the date of the election. Here, too, there were irregularities in the published notice in that it was not published in all counties on the same days and minor inconsistencies appeared in the printed versions. The court held that the purpose of notice had been substantially served.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 666-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver P. Field

State courts determine, in the absence of constitutional provision to the contrary, whether amendments to state constitutions have been proposed and adopted in the manner provided for these constitutions. Not every minor deviation from the course of action marked out in the constitution for its amendment is deemed sufficient to justify the court in declaring that the amendment has been “unconstitutionally adopted,” but whether these deviations are serious enough to warrant such a declaration is a question to be determined by the courts themselves. Statutes supplementing constitutional provisions on the subject of amendment are valid if not in conflict with the constitutional provisions themselves, and substantial compliance with these rules is also required by the courts. Sometimes the provisions regulating the subject of publication of proposed amendments are constitutional; at other times they are statutory. In either case, publication in the manner provided for, and for the period of time provided for, is necessary to the validity of the amendment. Publication for two weeks, when the period should have been four weeks, was deemed sufficient by the Nebraska court to invalidate the amendment involved.



1935 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 610-630
Author(s):  
Charles G. Haines

Validity of Constitutional Amendments. The courts continue to scan with rather meticulous care the procedure for the adoption of constitutional amendments. Where the sole purpose of a proposed constitutional amendment under the initiative provisions of the constitution was to provide for the levy of a “syncrotax,” or a tax on the basis of gross receipts in lieu of all other state taxes, a petition with a short title reading “initiative measure providing for adoption of gross receipts act” was held fatally defective in view of the requirement that every initiative petition have a short title showing the nature of the petition and the subject to which it relates. But according to the supreme court of Florida, a proposal to amend the constitution need not have a title, need not be read on different days or at different times, and need not be concurred in by the governor. And the dissenting justices protested that the majority failed to uphold the requirement that a proposed amendment shall be entered upon the respective journals of the two houses with the yeas and nays, showing a three-fifths vote in favor of the amendment. There must be, however, a violation of express constitutional requirements for the courts to interfere with the procedure in the adoption of amendments.



2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-92
Author(s):  
Bernd Wieser

The Constitution of Ukraine has been amended several times since its adoption in 1996. The relevant procedure is regulated in Articles 154-159 of the Constitution. In principle, these provisions are characterised by the fact that two different procedures - one is “normal”, while the other is more difficult - are provided for the amendment of constitutional provisions. It can also be deduced from Article 157 of the Constitution that the Ukrainian Constitution also contains so-called unchangeable constitutional law. This system is further superseded by the provision of Article 159 of the Constitution according to which a constitutional amendment project may only be considered by the Verchovna Rada if an opinion of the Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the draft with Articles 157 and 158 of the Constitution is provided; the constitutional amendment is thus connected with an obligatory preventive review of norms. Whether violations of these provisions can also be taken up in a subsequent review procedure is another important aspect of the entire regulatory complex. The Constitutional Court has indeed recognized this competence; of course, the relevant Decision of 30 September 2010 is not without errors and criticisms in legal doctrine. The subject of this article is to examine all these questions and to put them into a system. Also, the article shows the factual constitutional development over the last ten years and on this basis demonstrates the highly complex constitutional situation in which Ukraine finds itself today.







1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 700-732
Author(s):  
Foster H. Sherwood

The oft-heard argument in behalf of federalism that the states furnish important laboratories for social and political experimentation is illustrated by a good many new constitutional provisions interpreted for the first time this year. Two states, Missouri and Georgia, adopted entirely new constitutions in 1945, important sections of which have come before the highest courts for interpretation. One of these, the Georgia constitution of 1945, provides specifically: “Legislative acts in violation of this constitution or the constitution of the United States, are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” Such a provision may very well raise more questions than it settles—for example, what effects can be accorded unconstitutional acts?; can the other agencies of government refuse to perform under statutes they consider unconstitutional?; can the judiciary declare acts of the governor and other officers unconstitutional?; etc. Such questions have not as yet been raised. But there is some evidence that we may be embarking on an era of constitutional revision similar to that which followed the Civil War. If so, the problems of constitutional law now being discussed may furnish a clue to the kind of new documents to be written. This year the emphasis has been on civil rights and methods of adjusting state finances to the rapidly fluctuating value of the dollar—problems which naturally arise out of the intense social and economic conflicts of the past decade.



1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 670-693
Author(s):  
J. A. C. Grant

Constitutional Amendment. The Pennsylvania constitution provides: “Any amendment … may be proposed in [either house]; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each … the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three months before the next general election, in at least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed amendment shall be agreed to … the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published in the manner aforesaid; and … submitted to the qualified electors. …” Herman Tausig, suing as a taxpayer, sought to prevent a popular vote on a number of proposed amendments undertaking, among other things, to repeal provisions thought to forbid the levying of graduated income and inheritance taxes and the appropriation of money for old age pensions. In holding that the action was not premature, the court stated: “The law of this state prohibits inquiry into the validity of the steps preliminary to the adoption of an amendment after it has received the approval of the people.” Reversing, or at least qualifying, certain earlier rulings discussed in the opinion, it demanded strict compliance with the procedure set out above, but ruled: “The framers did not intend the Secretary of the Commonwealth should be responsible for the actual publication; he has no means of accomplishing this. Nor will the submission of a proposed amendment be frustrated by the neglect or refusal of one or more newspapers to publish within the specified time. … All the section commands is that the secretary transmit the advertisements of the proposed amendment to the proper newspapers within sufficient time to enable them to be published … three months or more in advance of the election.”



Author(s):  
Williams Robert F

This chapter discusses the practice — adopted by a number of state courts — of stating that state constitutional rights provisions will be interpreted identically to, or in “lockstep” with, similar or identical federal constitutional rights provision. State courts do this in a variety of ways, ranging from cases where they do not seem to acknowledge the possible difference between state and federal rights protections; to case-by-case adoption of federal constitutional interpretations; to “prospective lockstepping” where they announce that in the future the state and federal rights provisions will be interpreted identically or according to some other similar formulation. The chapter gives examples of these different approaches, as well as variations on them. It includes a specific focus on the wide range of state constitutional equality provisions, which, according to many state courts, are to be interpreted the same way as the federal Equal Protection Clause. These various forms of prospective lockstepping are criticized, on the grounds that they cannot actually represent “holdings” and are therefore not binding on future courts.



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