Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives

1961 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 345 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas A. Masters
1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Peabody

Long periods of one-party domination, increased average tenure in office for Representatives, and the institutionalization of patterns of succession to the Speakership, have all contributed to a tendency toward leadership stability in the 20th-century House of Representatives. The election of Sam Rayburn (D., Texas) and John McCormack (D., Mass.) to the offices of Speaker and Majority Leader in 1940, of Joseph Martin (R., Mass.) to the office of Minority Leader in 1939, and of Leslie Arends (R., Ill.) to the position of Republican Whip in 1943, mark the beginnings of the longest tenures in these four positions for any incumbents in the history of Congress. When changes in top leadership occur—as with the overthrow of Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck by Republican Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., in 1965, or the succession of Majority Leader McCormack to the office of the Speaker in 1962 following the death of Rayburn—the consequences are considerable. In the case of revolt, individual careers are made and broken. The organization and policy orientations of a congressional party may be extensively altered. While orderly succession has less dramatic impact, it too has a significant effect on “who gets what, when and how.” Some members move closer to the seats of power and others fall out of favor. Key committee assignments, and hence the development of entire legislative careers, are likely to ride or fall on the outcomes.


2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-307 ◽  
Author(s):  
Collin Paschall ◽  
Tracy Sulkin ◽  
William Bernhard

We explore the consequences of involvement in scandal for members of Congress’ (MCs) success within the House of Representatives. Our analyses target all MCs who served in the 101st to 112th Congresses (1989–2012). Across this time period, we identify 253 discrete member-term observations of professional or personal scandal. Our results demonstrate that scandal stalls the upward trajectory of MCs’ careers in the chamber, affecting their levels of legislative effectiveness, their centrality to the congressional network, and their likelihood of gaining or losing prestigious committee assignments and leadership positions. Importantly, these effects can linger beyond the term following scandal, shaping MCs’ behavior into the future. Our findings demonstrate that in addition to negative electoral repercussions, scandals can have important legislative consequences for members.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 889-905 ◽  
Author(s):  
David W. Rohde ◽  
Kenneth A. Shepsle

This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of which alternative is most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals. We argue that the allocation of committee assignments affects the goals of all the participants in the process, and thus we consider the choices of actors in the process in terms of their goals; specifically the goals of re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy.After first considering the process from the point of view of the member making requests, we show that the member's requests are related to the type of district he represents, and that the number of requests he makes is related to such considerations as whether he is a freshman, whether he faces competition from a member from his state, and whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee.The process is also considered from the point of view of the members making the assignments. Decisions on assignments are found to be affected by seniority (where success in getting requested committees is inversely related to seniority), margin of election (where members from marginal districts are more successful), and region (where southerners are less successful than members from other regions).


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 755-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Francis ◽  
Brittany Bramlett

We explore the impact that precongressional careers have on the behavior of new members in the U.S. House of Representatives. Does a former doctor act differently in the House than a former state legislator, lawyer, or businesswoman? Is the former doctor more productive as a new member if assigned to a committee that utilizes his or her perceived and actual experiences in the medical field? We posit that new members who are assigned to committees that align with their career experiences are more active legislators and obtain legislative expertise more quickly than other new members of Congress (MCs), with implications for their future political ambition. To explore these claims, we collected an extensive dataset of the precongressional career experiences of first and second term MCs from the 101st-113th Congresses (1989-2014), their committee assignments, legislative activity, and political ambition. We find that MCs with career-committee congruence have a legislative advantage compared with other new MCs, influencing their transition and trajectory in Congress. Many MCs matched with the right committee are more likely to introduce legislation in their policy area. In addition, we provide some evidence that MCs obtain committee leadership positions more often than their peers without the same early advantage.


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