The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Hird

In previous studies of distributive politics scholars have investigated legislative influence without accounting for the policies' independent merits. As a result, they have failed to include a plausible explanation of the counterfactual (i.e., which projects would have been funded in the absence of congressional committee influence), which has led to invalid inferences regarding legislative influence. The model of distributive politics is reformulated to account for an assumed efficient and/or equitable project allocation in the absence of legislative influence. Using data from proposed Army Corps of Engineers' projects and the funding recommendations of three institutions, the findings indicate that pork barrel politics indeed exists and imposes significant efficiency costs but that both equity and economic efficiency play prominent roles in the decision-making process as well. Cost-benefit analysis is seen to play a constructive role by improving the efficiency of project choice; and the corps's cost-benefit analysis guidelines are beneficial from the agency's organizational perspective, as well.

2020 ◽  
pp. 148-190
Author(s):  
Theodore M. Porter

This chapter traces the history of cost–benefit analysis in the United States bureaucracy from the 1920s until about 1960. It is not a story of academic research, but of political pressure and administrative conflict. Cost–benefit methods were introduced to promote procedural regularity and to give public evidence of fairness in the selection of water projects. Early in the century, numbers produced by the Army Corps of Engineers were usually accepted on its authority alone, and there was correspondingly little need for standardization of methods. About 1940, however, economic numbers became objects of bitter controversy, as the Corps was challenged by such powerful interests as utility companies and railroads. The really crucial development in this story was the outbreak of intense bureaucratic conflict between the Corps and other government agencies, especially the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Reclamation. The agencies tried to settle their feuds by harmonizing their economic analyses. When negotiation failed as a strategy for achieving uniformity, they were compelled to try to ground their makeshift techniques in economic rationality. On this account, cost–benefit analysis had to be transformed from a collection of local bureaucratic practices into a set of rationalized economic principles.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-263
Author(s):  
Franco van Wyk ◽  
Anahita Khojandi ◽  
Brian Williams ◽  
Don MacMillan ◽  
Robert L. Davis ◽  
...  

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Carmen Álvarez-Vásquez ◽  
Víctor F. Guaranda-Sornoza ◽  
Lilian del Jesús Aguilar-Ponce ◽  
Antonio E. Pinargote-Vásquez ◽  
Diana K. Zambrano-Ponce ◽  
...  

<p style="text-align: justify;">This paper analyses the reasons why Ecuador changed its monetary policy by substituting the national currency Sucre by US Dollar; the benefits and costs of dollarization in Ecuador; examines economic performance by using data collected by the Central Bank and International database available, the period from 1996 to 2007 have been chosen for this study; and uses variables like GDP, Foreign Direct Investment, Debt, Taxes and Inflation.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 56 (3) ◽  
pp. 969-969
Author(s):  
Clive R. Belfield ◽  
Milagros Nores ◽  
Steve Barnett ◽  
Lawrence Schweinhart

2002 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 237-253
Author(s):  
A. Papp

Local governments are responsible for the provision of primary education in Hungary, this being the largest expenditure item in their budget. The segmented structure of Hungarian local government may be a source of inefficiencies, since one of the most important source of inefficiencies is diseconomies of scale. This paper, using data of two counties — Baranya and Békés — presents a cost—benefit calculation with respect to the operational costs of a hypothetical, newly structured primary education system, where only institutions of “optimal (efficient) size” are operated. Two scenarios are presented. According to the first one all schools of inefficient size would be closed down, while according to the second this could happen only if there is at least one additional social/cultural institution in the settlement in question. The results of the simulation, being rough calculations, may provide guidance on what kind of questions might occur and what the approximate magnitudes of expenditures of a new system might be under specific conditions of reorganisation.


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