Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe. By Hans-Georg Betz. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. 200p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper.

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 210-211
Author(s):  
Peter H. Merkl
1995 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 644-644
Author(s):  
Gordon Smith

Fascism ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Copsey

The political science community would have us believe that since the 1980s something entirely detached from historical or neo-fascism has emerged in (Western) Europe - a populist radicalization of mainstream concerns - a novel form of ‘radical right-wing populism.’ Yet the concept of ‘radical right-wing populism’ is deeply problematic because it suggests that (Western) Europe’s contemporary far right has become essentially different from forms of right-wing extremism that preceded it, and from forms of right-wing extremism that continue to exist alongside it. Such an approach, as this First Lecture on Fascism argues, fails to appreciate the critical role that neo-fascism has played, and still plays, in adapting Europe’s contemporary far right to the norms and realities of multi-ethnic, liberal-democratic society. Political scientists should fixate less on novelty and the quest for neat typologies, and instead engage far more seriously with (neo) fascism studies.


1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-686 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Georg Betz

During the past several years, radical right-wing populist parties have made impressive electoral gains in a growing number of West European countries. Their dramatic surge to political prominence has obscured the fact that these parties hardly form a homogeneous party group. Generally, it is possible to distinguish between neo-liberal and national populist parties. Both types of parties are a response to the profound economic, social, and cultural transformation of advanced societies interpreted as a transition from industrial welfare to postindustrial individualized capitalism. National populist parties are primarily working-class parties which espouse a radically xenophobic and authoritarian program. Neoliberal parties appeal to a mixed social constituency and tend to stress the marketoriented, libertarian elements of their program over xenophobic ones. Rather than being mere short-lived protest phenomena, radical right-wing populist parties are a reflection and expression of new political conflicts created by the transition to postindustrial capitalism.


1995 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 142
Author(s):  
William E. Scheuerman ◽  
Hans-Georg Betz

1994 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 172
Author(s):  
Fritz Stern ◽  
Hans-Georg Betz

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Budd

The 2018 Ontario provincial election marked a decisive shift in the political direction of Canada’s most populous province. The election brought an end to the long reign of the Ontario Liberal Party (2003–2018), whose government devolved into a series of scandals that resulted in a third-place finish. The Liberal’s defeat came at the hands of the Progressive Conservative Party led by former Toronto city councillor, Doug Ford. The Progressive Conservative’s victory was propelled on the back of Ford’s deeply populist campaign where he promised to reassert the interests of ‘the people,’ expel the influence of elites and special interests, and clean up government corruption. This campaign discourse led many political opponents and media pundits to accuse Ford of importing the nativist, xenophobic, and divisive rhetoric of other radical right-wing populist leaders. This article advances the argument that rather than representing the importation of ‘Trumpism’ or other types of radical right-wing populism, Ford’s campaign is better understood within the tradition of Canadian populism defined by an overarching ideological commitment to neoliberalism. In appealing to voters, Ford avoided the nativist and xenophobic rhetoric of populist leaders in the United States and Western Europe, offering a conception of ‘the people’ using an economic and anti-cosmopolitan discourse centred upon middle class taxpayers. This article makes a contribution to both the literatures on Canadian elections and populism, demonstrating the lineage of Ford’s ideological commitment to populism within recent Canadian electoral history, as well as Ford’s place within the international genealogy of right-wing populism.


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huib Pellikaan ◽  
Sarah L. de Lange ◽  
Tom W.G. van der Meer

Like many party systems across Western Europe, the Dutch party system has been in flux since 2002 as a result of a series of related developments, including the decline of mainstream parties which coincided with the emergence of radical right-wing populist parties and the concurrent dimensional transformation of the political space. This article analyses how these challenges to mainstream parties fundamentally affected the structure of party competition. On the basis of content analysis of party programmes, we examine the changing configuration of the Dutch party space since 2002 and investigate the impact of these changes on coalition-formation patterns. We conclude that the Dutch party system has become increasingly unstable. It has gradually lost its core through electoral fragmentation and mainstream parties’ positional shifts. The disappearance of a core party that dominates the coalition-formation process initially transformed the direction of party competition from centripetal to centrifugal. However, since 2012 a theoretically novel configuration has emerged in which no party or coherent group of parties dominates competition.


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