Trashing Customary International Law

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D’Amato
Keyword(s):  
General Practice ◽  
International Law ◽  
Law Students ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Career Opportunity ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The World ◽  
Argumentative Structure

Central to the World Court’s mission is the determination of international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” Students of the Court’s jurisprudence have long been aware that the Court has been better at applying customary law than defining it. Yet until Nicaragua v. United States, little harm was done. For in the sharply contested cases prior to Nicaragua, the Court managed to elicit commonalities in argumentative structure that gravitated its rulings toward the customary norms implicit in state practice. The Court’s lack of theoretical explicitness simply meant that a career opportunity arose for some observers like me to attempt to supply the missing theory of custom.

Customary International Law

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre-Marie Dupuy ◽  
Keyword(s):  
General Practice ◽  
International Law ◽  
Complex Relationship ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Progressive Development ◽  
The World ◽  
International Law Commission ◽  
Law Commission

International custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, is considered one of the two main sources of international law as it primarily derives from the conduct of sovereign States, but is also closely connected with the role of the international judge when identifying the applicable customary rule, a function it shares with the bodies in charge of its codification (and progressive development), starting with the International Law Commission. Though mainly considered to be general international law, international custom has a complex relationship with many specific fields of law and specific regions of the world. The editor provides comprehensive research published in the last seven decades, invaluable to everyone interested in the field of customary international law.

The Function of Opinio Juris in Customary International Law

2012 ◽  
Vol 81 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Dahlman
Keyword(s):  
General Practice ◽  
International Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Customary International Law

This article claims that the requirement of opinio juris in the formation of customary international law means that a general practice must be generally accepted among states to become customary law. The article argues that opinio juris serves an important function. It prevents generally unwanted general practice from becoming customary law.

Introduction The customary law of human rights is hiding in plain sight

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
William A. Schabas
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Regional Systems ◽  
Second World

Many areas of international law developed first as custom and were only subsequently, generally in the course of the twentieth century, subject to codification. Human rights law was different. It was viewed as quintessentially a matter of domestic concern, a subject shrouded in State sovereignty. Only following the Second World War was international human rights law recognised as a source of binding obligations, mainly through the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments of the United Nations as well as the regional systems. Later, jurists began contending that the norms in these instruments might also be customary in nature. They struggled with identifying the two classic elements in the determination of custom, opinio juris and State practice. Most analysis of the content of customary international law was rather perfunctory and also quite conservative, confining itself largely to civil and political rights.

Thoughts on Domestic Adjudication and the Identification and Formation of Customary International Law

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-149
Author(s):  
Cameron Miles
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Courts ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Domestic Courts ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The Icj ◽  
International Adjudication

Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute provides that “judicial decisions” may serve as a subsidiary means for the determination of customary international law. The absence of a qualifying adjective to the term “judicial decisions” confirms that, at least ex facie, there is no priority to be given to international over domestic judgments in this respect. And yet – as the International Law Commission’s Draft Conclusions on Formation and Identification of Customary International Law confirms – the reality of international adjudication is one in which domestic judicial decisions are often side-lined. In this paper, I question the ILC’s assertion that this is due to the relative expertise of international versus domestic courts, and instead posit a model based on the shifting architectonics of international adjudication. Two related developments are key: (1) the florescence of international adjudicative bodies in the post-1945 era, and (2) the tendency for international courts and tribunals to see domestic judicial decisions as evidence of state practice and opinio juris under Article 38(1)(b), rather than as subsidiary means for the determination of custom – that is, as factual rather than legal precedents.

scholarly journals The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1976 New York Sessions

1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
United Nations ◽  
International Law ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Law Of The Sea ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Third ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
State Practice ◽  
The Law

The law of the sea has changed, for good or for ill. The Revised Single Negotiating Text (hereinafter RSNT) issued in the spring of 1976 may prove to be the single most important document regarding the law of the sea since the 1958 Geneva Conventions in terms of its influence on state practice, whether by way of an ultimate treaty or otherwise. Important differences will exist regarding the extent to which portions of the text are declaratory of emerging customary international law and regarding the extent to which the text must be changed to be acceptable as a universal treaty or as customary law. Indeed, difficult questions of implementation of its principles in bilateral and other arrangements are already arising. Positions taken at multilateral conferences may differ from the positions taken in other contexts. But the text will not be ignored.

Part II The Criteria for the Operation of the Persistent Objector Rule, 6 The Timeliness Criterion

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Green James A
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Broad Sense ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Ex Post Facto ◽  
Right Of Withdrawal

This chapter analyses the last criterion for the operation of the persistent objector rule, namely, timeliness. A common feature of all mainstream understandings of the rule is that a state's objections must occur during the period where the embryonic customary law being objected to is still ‘emerging’. The chapter starts by identifying the timeless criterion in the literature and argues that state practice supports it in a broad sense. The chapter then argues that the commonly advanced justifications for the timeless criterion are unsatisfactory. The chapter then examines more pragmatic rationales. It also engages with arguments that have been made by a few commentators in support of an ex post facto right of withdrawal from customary international law. The chapter finally turns to the problems associated with actually applying the timeless criterion.

scholarly journals A Postmodernization of Customary International Law for the First World?

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 293-296
Author(s):  
Jean d'Aspremont
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Socialization Process ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Beliefs And Practices ◽  
The World ◽  
The Common ◽  
First World

In his recent piece in the American Journal of International Law, B.S. Chimni depicts a doctrine of customary international law that has allowed the First World to impose its domination and promote its version of global capitalist justice. From Chimni's perspective, all the gimmicks and sophisticated dichotomies invented by international lawyers to refine international customary law serve a hegemonic socialization process whereby the center imposes its neoliberal ideals on an admiring periphery. But this diagnosis is certainly not the end of the story. In fact, Chimni's dismal image of the world and the role of custom therein is meant to foreground a more central project—i.e., the reinvention of customary international law around “the progressive ideas, beliefs, and practices of the global civil society” and geared towards the promotion of the “common good.” My view is that Chimni's postmodernization of the doctrine of international customary law does not necessarily remedy the charges he levels against custom, let alone redefine the center and the periphery. As much as I share his diagnosis about custom's complicity in hegemonic socialization and the promotion of a global capitalist ethos, I contend that Chimni's postmodernization is at best unavailing and, at worse, rehabilitative of the First World's centrality in norm-setting. Instead of striving to reinvent the doctrine of custom, we must invest in strategies that draw on the malleability and fluidity of the current doctrine and facilitate the types of argumentation that “decenter” the First World, thereby directly empowering international lawyers elsewhere.

From Abundance to Indeterminacy: The Precautionary Principle and Its Two Camps of Custom

2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 323-339
Author(s):  
Ole W. Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Precautionary Principle ◽  
The Other ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
The Precautionary Principle ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Current State ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Indus Waters Treaty

AbstractThe question of what status the precautionary principle enjoys in international law has once again reared its head, most recently in the Indus Waters Treaty dispute between India and Pakistan before the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This article assesses the current state of play in respect of the precautionary principle and its status in international law. It identifies what it terms the two camps of custom – the custom camp and the no-custom camp – which find themselves on opposing sides in the debate. The article argues that the two camps are equally guilty of misunderstanding the precautionary principle and the nature of customary international law, though for different reasons. In so doing, the article shows that one side is guilty of ‘precaution spotting’, whereas the other ignores the implications of the ‘rule v. standard’ dialectic. These two concepts help us to understand the different claims advanced by the two camps. They also alert us to the fact that it is possible to conceptualize customary international law along two separate lines of inquiry: one lending emphasis to state practice and one relying on statements and declarations of rules. In pursuing these arguments, the article compares the precautionary principle with (other) norms of customary law, such as the ‘no-harm rule’ and the rules on cross-border environmental impact assessment, and argues that customary international law is best understood if we come to accept that there are multiple ways of identifying customary international rules.

The Judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Vasiljević Case

2003 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-330
Author(s):  
ELENA MARTÍN SALGADO
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
International Criminal Tribunal ◽  
Trial Chamber ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Former Yugoslavia ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Key Aspects

This case note focuses on two key aspects of the Vasiljević Judgement. The first one is the accused's acquittal of the charge of ‘violence to life and person’ under common Article 3 for the reason that the trial chamber was not satisfied that it constituted a crime under customary international law. The second aspect is the trial chamber's analysis of state practice to identify the definition under customary law of extermination as a crime against humanity.

Customary International Law

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathleen Barrett
Keyword(s):  
General Practice ◽  
International Law ◽  
Legal Requirements ◽  
International Court Of Justice ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
International Court ◽  
Official Statement ◽  
State Practice ◽  
State Consent

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” as the second source of law to be used by the Court. In other words, customary international law (CIL) requires state practice and opinio juris, the belief that the practice is legally required. A basic principle of international law is that sovereign states must consent to be bound by international legal requirements. Therefore, for a norm to become CIL, a widespread group of states must consistently follow the norm and indicate, either explicitly or implicitly, that they consent to the norm. Consistent action is important in two ways: consistent state practice following the norm indicates state consent to be bound by the norm and consistent objection to the norm indicates that the state does not consent to the norm. To avoid being bound by a rule of CIL, a state must persistently object to the rule during and after its formation. Changing CIL requires new state practice and evidence that opinio juris supports the new, not the old, state practice. Debates surrounding state practice include the number of states required to demonstrate “widespread” action, whether the states must be representative of the community of states, and how long consistent practice must occur before CIL is formed. Opinio juris is debated because it is subjective unless there is a specific, official statement that there is a belief that the practice is legally required. Once a state consents, implicitly or explicitly, to a CIL rule, it cannot withdraw that consent. States that gain independence after a CIL rule is established are bound by that rule if the former government was not a persistent objector. This is problematic, particularly for former colonies that were not able to object during the formation of existing CIL rules because they were not considered “sovereign states.” Scholars supporting this perspective argue that, prior to decolonization, CIL was used to control the colonies and, since their independence, it is used by the colonizers to maintain their power and perpetuate inequality.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document