Le Peuple, c’est moi! The World Court and Human Rights

1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón

This essay examines the discussion of human rights and domestic jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Independently of the final verdict about the lawfulness of U.S. help to the contras under principles of either self-defense or humanitarian intervention, the Court’s views on the relationship among human rights, domestic jurisdiction and intervention are wrong in law. Furthermore, the philosophical assumptions of the Judgment are profoundly disturbing. For the reasons set forth below, I submit that the Court’s approach embodies a backward view of international law and justice that was totally unnecessary to the resolution of the case.

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-436
Author(s):  
J. Craig Barker

Abstract One of the most controversial areas of contemporary international law is the interface between immunities and human rights. International immunities have been successfully challenged on human rights grounds in certain jurisdictions. However, to date, no international court tribunal has endorsed such challenges. In its judgment in Germany v. Italy the International Court of Justice re-asserted the conservative approach to the relationship between State immunity and human rights, which rejects the claim that State immunity is “trumped” by hierarchically superior human rights norms. This article examines the Court’s reasoning, before turning to consider the alternative vision of the interface between State immunity and human rights presented by Judge Cinçado Trindade. While persuasive, Trindade’s analysis must ultimately be rejected. The overtly positivist and formalistic approach of the Court, which is itself open to criticism, was, nevertheless, necessitated by the failure of States to provide for a human rights exception in the United Nations Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 2004, signifying a strong opinio juris against the further limitation of State immunity at the present time. Nevertheless, the Court carefully sought to limit the effects of its judgment by limiting its focus to the specific questions before it.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 738-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy Ghandhi

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.


2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-458
Author(s):  
BART DELMARTINO

In 1945 Czechoslovakia confiscated Liechtenstein property as reparation for the damage done by Nazi Germany. Private claims failed before the courts of Czechoslovakia, and international law did not provide Liechtenstein with a means of action against Czechoslovakia. When the property was on loan in Germany, a private case for recovery was declared inadmissible by the German courts, in line with Germany's international obligations. The European Court of Human Rights accepted these decisions. Liechtenstein, on the other hand, considered them to violate its sovereignty. In 2005, the International Court of Justice decided that it lacked temporal jurisdiction to rule on the issue.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marija Đorđeska

Abstract Article 38, para.1, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) defines customary international law as evidence of general practice accepted as law, understood as State practice and opinio juris. However, by identifying certain norms as an international custom without referring to the traditional evidence of State practice and opinio juris, international courts and tribunals are contributing to the formation of customary international law. This paper presents an analysis of how the International Court of Justice contributes to the formation of customary international law by relying on the draft articles of the International Law Commission (ILC). Th e International Court of Justice, in “deciding in accordance with international law”, also authoritatively declares what the current international law is, while the International Law Commission, although constituted of highly qualified publicists from various States, is drafting only non-binding international instruments. By relying on the ILC draft articles and declaring them to be reflecting customary international law-although the draft articles may not be necessary the expression of the States’ practice and their opinio juris, the ICJ creates and generates the creation of customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ tends to rely mostly on ILC draft articles that refer to the jurisprudence of either the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) or the ICJ itself. Th e paper presents research of approximately 70 ICJ decisions and individual opinions that cite to the work of the ILC. The author notes the evolution of the relationship between the ICJ and the ILC through three different time periods, and presents the findings on how, when and why the ICJ relies on the ILC draft articles. In addition, the author gives examples in which the ICJ rejected the reliance on the ILC’s work, mainly due to the divergent interpretation on the specific area of international law. The ICJ, by relying on the ILC draft articles that in turn refer to the jurisprudence of the ICJ or PCIJ, is not only generating norms of customary international law, but is also reaffirming the importance of its (and PCIJ’s) jurisprudence for the future of international law. Although ICJ decisions are binding only between the parties to the dispute (Art.59 ICJ Statute), the clarification of whether a norm is customary or not, affects the international community of States. Noting the present reluctance of States to adopt treaties, and- hence their potentially decreasing role in international law-making, this research offers an insight into an alternative venue of international law-making. As the international community, and the ILC itself, is regaining interest in the sources of international law, this paper aims to identify the mechanisms of international law-making, the understanding of which will contribute to international law’s needed predictability and a more uniform and reliable interpretation of international law.


2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 164-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sara McLaughlin Mitchell ◽  
Emilia Justyna Powell

This paper explores the relationship between domestic legal systems and the design of commitments to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Empirical analyses demonstrate that civil law states are more willing to recognize the compulsory and compromissory jurisdiction of the World Court than common law or Islamic law states. Common law states place the highest number of reservations on their optional clause declarations, with the majority of those restrictions relating to specific areas of international law. Civil law states typically embed compromissory clauses in multilateral treaties, while common and Islamic law states prefer recognition of the ICJ's jurisdiction through bilateral treaties.


1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 643-677 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vera Gowlland-Debbas

The relationship between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council may be approached from the perspective of the United Nations Charter and the way it delimits competences between two principal UN organs and regulates the exercise of their concurrent powers. The Court, however, has a dual, ambivalent role. It is not only the principal judicial organ of the United Nations under Article 92 of the Charter; it is also an autonomous adjudicative body with the function, under Article 38 of its Statute, of applying international law to such disputes between states as are brought before it. Viewed in the light of Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, the relationship between the judicial and political organs raises some fundamental questions of general international law that go beyond UN constitutional issues.


2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 810-819 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas

This is the first time in its history, to the best of my knowledge, that the International Court of Justice has established violations of the two human rights treaties at issue, together, namely, at universal level, the 1966 UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, at regional level, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, both in the framework of the universality of human rights.This is the opening paragraph of Judge Cançado Trindade's Separate Opinion in the Diallo case. The ICJ's judgment is a remarkable decision contributing to the widening and deepening of international law and has consequences for several fundamental questions, including the role of the ICJ and international law in making human rights effective, erga omnes and jus cogens rules, customary law, evidence, and several substantive rules. In bringing the transformation of international law one step further, the Diallo judgment develops the ICJ as ‘the principal judicial organ of the United Nations’1 at the top of an open international law system. To achieve this, the Court had to overcome a series of jurisdictional and procedural hurdles.2 All the permanent judges of the ICJ agreed that Congo had violated the prohibition on arbitrary detention and expulsion and that the violations gave rise to a right of compensation. The ICJ's use of sources from other international and regional bodies as sources of authority, indicates solutions to fragmentation problems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 509-560
Author(s):  
Momchil Milanov

Abstract Although Sir Hersch Lauterpacht never dealt with security exceptions during his time at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), his entire body of work formed the intellectual premise for the approach of the Court towards security exceptions and the way in which the ICJ manoeuvers in the larger debate on the relationship between law, politics and the proper discharge of the judicial function. The Lauterpachtian approach is understood as a particular attitude towards the judicial function in which the Court serves as an instrument for the protection of peace, as a guardian of the coherence and unity of the international legal system and as a driving force for the development of international law. However, in some other important elements of its reasoning, the Court seems to remain more Lauterpachtian in spirit than in letter. Despite these inconsistencies, the Court arguably exerted significant (albeit somehow uneven) influence over World Trade Organization panels and investment tribunals.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document