The End of the Road for the Prince? Sixty Years after the Czechoslovak Confiscation of Liechtenstein Property

2006 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-458
Author(s):  
BART DELMARTINO

In 1945 Czechoslovakia confiscated Liechtenstein property as reparation for the damage done by Nazi Germany. Private claims failed before the courts of Czechoslovakia, and international law did not provide Liechtenstein with a means of action against Czechoslovakia. When the property was on loan in Germany, a private case for recovery was declared inadmissible by the German courts, in line with Germany's international obligations. The European Court of Human Rights accepted these decisions. Liechtenstein, on the other hand, considered them to violate its sovereignty. In 2005, the International Court of Justice decided that it lacked temporal jurisdiction to rule on the issue.

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 445-471 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Thomas Worster

During litigation on the international plane, states sometimes will issue assurances either to the other litigant or to the international court directly. This article explores how those assurances interact with applications for provisional measures. The practice of courts varies with regard to how to react to these assurances, though the usual approach is that assurances issued to another state or individual are generally non-binding, while assurances issued to the court directly are binding. At the same time, litigants can apply to the court for provisional measures to prevent actions that would disturb the dispute. When the assurances are considered non-binding, they are treated as questions of fact and can be assessed for credibility and reliability, as a part of the provisional measures analysis. But when the assurances are considered binding, they are treated as questions of law, and the undertaken legal obligation disposes of the request for a provisional measures order. This article will examine the practices of the International Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights on this issue, identifying where their practices diverge and converge, and recommending that the dual nature of assurances, as both factual and legal, be considered in assessing their value.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 757-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts

The demise of custom as a source of international law has been widely forecasted. This is because both the nature and the relative importance of custom’s constituent elements are contentious. At the same time, custom has become an increasingly significant source of law in important areas such as human rights obligations. Codification conventions, academic commentary, and the case law of the International Court of Justice (the Court) have also contributed to a contemporary resurrection of custom. These developments have resulted in two apparently opposing approaches, which I term “traditional custom” and “modern custom.” The renaissance of custom requires the articulation of a coherent theory that can accommodate its classic foundations and contemporary developments. This article seeks to provide an enriched theoretical account of custom that incorporates both the traditional and the modern approaches rather than advocating one approach over the other.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 79-82
Author(s):  
Maria Flores

I first became involved with international law while I was at university. After graduating, I decided to teach public international law. As an undergraduate, I particularly enjoyed this branch of study. I was attracted to it because it helped me to understand the problems, challenges, and breakthroughs in the field of international relations on a global scale. Therefore, after facing a competitive entry process, I joined the international law department of the Universidad de la República. It was a small department, but the university had produced some well-known scholars like Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, who became a judge at the International Court of Justice, and Hector Gross Espiell, who served as a judge at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 378-403
Author(s):  
Gaiane Nuridzhanian

The events taking place in Crimea since early 2014 have given rise to a number of international disputes currently pending before international courts and tribunals. Ukraine instituted inter-State proceedings against Russia before the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights and an unclos Annex vii Tribunal. Seven investor-State cases have been commenced against Russia. The Prosecutor of the icc is conducting preliminary examination into the crimes allegedly committed in Crimea in 2014 and afterwards. Foreign courts have also had to deal with cases related to the annexation of Crimea. This article provides an overview of cases pending before international courts and tribunals in relation to events in Crimea. The focus is on the questions related to jurisdiction of the international courts and tribunals seized in Crimea-related cases. The study explores the limits of the jurisdiction of international courts to adjudicate disputes concerning the interpretation and application of a treaty arising in connection with a larger dispute regarding the use of force, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. The article also discusses novel and debated jurisdiction-related matters that arise in cases brought in relation to events in Crimea. A brief description of cases heard in foreign courts is provided as well.


2013 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 753-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mads Andenas ◽  
Thomas Weatherall

This case1 marks the first pronouncement by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare) in international law. It is the second contentious case in which the ICJ has held the defendant country in breach of its obligations under a human rights convention. The ICJ both added to the corpus of norms it has formally recognized as peremptory norms (jus cogens) and also reinforced the principle that former heads of state are subject to universal jurisdiction for grave violations of international law.


Author(s):  
Nico Schrijver

This chapter focuses on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force in international relations. After discussing pre-Charter attempts to restrict states’ freedom to resort to warfare, it examines the emergence of a normative doctrine on a bellum justum. It considers the history of Article 2(4) and the other articles of the Charter that touch on the use of force and outlines exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, including the so-called Uniting for Peace procedure. It examines the interpretation of Article 2(4) in the practice of the General Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice), together with its inclusion in a number of multilateral treaties. Finally, it assesses the question whether the use of force after 1945 conforms to the object and purpose of Article 2(4), as well as the legal status of the prohibition to use force in contemporary international law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-414
Author(s):  
Miles Jackson

Abstract It is widely believed that international law imposes no general prohibition on instigation – no general prohibition on states inducing, inciting or procuring other states to breach their international obligations. The absence of a prohibition on instigation stands in contrast to the now entrenched prohibition on the provision of assistance to another state that facilitates an internationally wrongful act. In this article, I argue that the orthodox position on instigation is incorrect. I argue that a prohibition on instigation is founded on a general principle of law, as envisaged in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and that it would be appropriate to transpose that general principle to the international legal system. To sustain this argument, I first construct a representative set of domestic jurisdictions for comparative analysis. Second, through a brief comparative survey, I assess whether in each of these domestic jurisdictions it is wrongful, in one way or another, for an actor to instigate another to commit an act that it would be wrongful for it to do itself. And, third, I argue that the transposition of this principle from domestic law to international law is conceptually and normatively appropriate.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 738-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandy Ghandhi

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 27-66
Author(s):  
Szymon Zaręba

The aim of the article is to compare the way in which the issue of responsibility for violations related to the acts of unrecognized authorities claiming to be States is treated by the European Court of Human Rights and other international courts, particularly the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The article considers in detail the relations between jurisdiction and responsibility, responsibility of parent States (including the concept of “positive obligations”) and responsibility of States which provide assistance to unrecognized regimes (with emphasis put on the concept of “effective control”). The results of the study indicate that the jurisprudence of the European Court differs in several important aspects from decisions of other international courts. These differences, while undoubtedly enhancing the protection of human rights in Europe, contribute to the process of fragmentation of the law of international responsibility.


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-348 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe

The article reviews (i) the qualifications of judges of, and (ii) the distribution of seats in, the ICJ. (i) Since 1966 there has been only one judge elected who merely satisfied the requirement relating to highest national judicial office. It is clear that with the increase in the supply of competent public international ‘jurists’ from the developing countries and because of the increasingly complicated and specialized nature of international law national judicial office has become irrelevant and insufficient as a qualification. Recognized competence as a public international jurist should be the only valid criterion. On the other hand, the latter concept has been given an unwarranted and undesirable extension by the UN, especially in connection with candidates from developing countries. (ii) While, in keeping with Article 9 of the Statute, there is some agreed regional distribution of seats among the non-permanent members of the Security Council, equity seems to be disregarded, particularly among the non-Western European states, by rotation among states being ignored. This is not in keeping with the Statute.


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