Extradition statute—constitutional law—separation of powers—injunction against U.S. Government— class action: Lobue v. Christopher. 893 F.Supp. 65.

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-105
Author(s):  
Judith Hippler Bello ◽  
Jacques Semmelman

U.S. District Court, D.C., August 31, 1995; modified September 15, 1995.This action involved a constitutional challenge to the 147-year-old extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. §3184, on die ground that it violates the separation of powers. Plaintiffs were two individuals who had been found extraditable to Canada, pursuant to the extradition treaty between die United States and Canada, by a U.S. magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois. They brought an action in the District of Columbia against the Secretary of State, the Department of State, and the United States for a judgment declaring the extradition statute unconstitutional, and an injunction against their extradition. Plaintiffs also sought certification of a class consisting of persons who are or will be under threat of extradition from the United States pursuant to the statute, and an injunction against any such extradition. The court held (per Lamberth, J.) that (1) the extradition statute violates the separation of powers and is therefore unconstitutional; (2) the United States is enjoined from taking any further act toward the surrender of the plaintiffs to Canada; and (3) the proposed class is certified, and the United States is enjoined from surrendering anyone under the statute.

1994 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-336
Author(s):  
Marian Nash

By two circular notes, both dated December 22, 1993, the Secretary of State informed the Chiefs of Mission at Washington,,first, of recently enacted congressional legislation related to nonpayment of parking fines or penalties owed to the District of Columbia, and second, of a new policy with respect to payment of parking tickets, effective January 1, 1994, that the Department of State had initiated in response to congressional concerns about the problem and in cooperation with the District of Columbia.


1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (4) ◽  
pp. 828-830
Author(s):  
Edward M. Leigh

Plaintiff Zedan, an American citizen, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for breach of a contract guaranteeing wages and profits. While performance under the contract occurred in Saudi Arabia, plaintiff alleged that the jurisdictional requirements under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1982)) (FSIA) were satisfied by a recruitment call in California from a representative of the royal overseer of a private Saudi company. The district court granted the Saudi motion to dismiss. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (per Silberman, J.) unanimously affirmed and held: (1) that the telephone call did not have the requisite substantiality of contact with the United States; (2) that it was not sufficient to form the basis of a cause of action; and (3) that the alleged breach did not have sufficient direct effect in the United States to satisfy the exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.


1911 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 414-432
Author(s):  
Gaillard Hunt

Having considered in former numbers of this Journal the sometime and occasional duties of the Department, including among them certain contingent duties which it has never been called upon to perform, we may now advance to a consideration of its habitual functions.The organic act of the Department prescribed that the Secretary of State should keep “ the seal of the United States.” It is the mark of the supreme authority of the United States, and before the government went into operation under the Constitution, was in the custody of the Secretary of Congress, being used to verify all important acts, whether executive or legislative; but the debate on executive departments in the first constitutional congress indicated that Congress did not contemplate keeping the seal any longer, and thought it would necessarily pass to the custody of the Executive. The President did, in fact, take it under his control as soon as he assumed office and before legal provision had been made for it.


Author(s):  
Goldsworthy Jeffrey

Much of the controversy surrounding constitutional interpretation concerns two issues. The first is a version of a conundrum that has perplexed lawyers for millennia: should the interpretation of a law he governed mainly by its ‘letter’, or by its ‘spirit’? The second issue is the extent to which the meaning of a constitution can, and should, be determined by the original intentions, purposes, or understandings of its founders. This issue pits so-called ‘non-originalists’ against ‘originalists’. This book explores the constitutions of six countries — Australia, Canada, Germany, India, South Africa, and the United States — and how they have been interpreted by their highest courts. It examines whether the courts' interpretive practices have changed over time, the apparent reasons for any changes, and whether the courts apply the same interpretive principles to different areas of constitutional law, such as federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. The book then reflects on the institutional, political, social, and cultural contexts that might help to explain differences between the practices of these courts.


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