Scientific Progress: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science.

Noûs ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 418
Author(s):  
Michale Ruse ◽  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Philosophical Essay

Scientific Progress: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science

Physics Today ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 32 (8) ◽  
pp. 55-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
N. Rescher ◽  
Alex C. Michalos
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Philosophical Essay

Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science.

1979 ◽  
Vol 89 (353) ◽  
pp. 194
Author(s):  
Marie Jahoda ◽  
Nicholas Rescher
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Philosophical Essay

Toward a Formal Interpretation of Kant's Analogies of Experience

2007 ◽  
Vol 28 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 107-120
Author(s):  
Johan Blok
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Euclidean Geometry ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
Pure Form ◽  
Logical Positivism ◽  
Theory Of Relativity ◽  
Transcendental Logic ◽  
Non Euclidean Geometry

Very often, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein's theory of relativity are seen as the decisive defeat of Kant's theoretical philosophy. Scientific progress seems to render Kant's philosophy obsolete. This view became dominant during the first decades of the twentieth century, when the movement of logical positivism arose. Despite extensive criticism of basic tenets of this movement later in the twentieth century, its view of Kant's philosophy is still common. Although it is not my intention to defend Kant infinitely, I think that this view is rather unsatisfactory and even misleading.Let us consider the first factor: non-Euclidean geometry. If one reads the first Critique carefully, it becomes clear that the claims of transcendental logic do not imply Euclidean geometry. Kant's notion of space, as explained in the aesthetics chapter, is rather limited: it does neither entail nor presuppose a specific form of geometry (Cf. B37-B57). None of his statements about the form of space is specific enough to imply or support Euclidean geometry. Although Kant uses several examples, Euclidean geometry does not play any systematic role; only the pure form of space is at issue in the aesthetics chapter. In my view, the same holds in the case of Newton's physics: it is neither presupposed nor entailed by Kant's transcendental logic. The justification of Newton's physics requires further specialisation and application of the transcendental framework to empirical concepts like matter and motion. Kant took this step in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.

scholarly journals The significance of the idea of impetus for the development of natural science

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 103-109
Author(s):  
Julita Slipkauskaitė ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Great Difficulty ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Late Medieval ◽  
Projectile Motion ◽  
Late Medieval Period ◽  
Natural Philosophers ◽  
Medieval Universities

In the discourse around theories explaining scientific progress, natural philosophy of the Late Medieval Period is seen as playing the role of apologetics. For philosophers of science, with their repudiation of metaphysics, the task of providing a rational reconstruction of how scientific progress has occurred is nigh on impossible. Even explanations such as the Popperian and the Kuhnian strain under great difficulty and provide only partly satisfactory results. In his “Logik der Forschung” (1934) Karl Raimund Popper argues that metaphysics plays an accidental part in the emergence of new scientific ideas. Correspondingly, in “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962), by carrying out theoretical interpretations and classification of empirical facts without their metaphysical premises, Thomas Kuhn comes to the conclusion that natural science was formed under the influence of erroneous interpretations of Aristotelian natural philosophy presented by medieval natural philosophers. These are some of the reasons why medievalists are still made to defend late medieval natural philosophy from shallow convictions that at medieval universities nothing of any significance to contemporary science and philosophy took place at all. Seeking to render a fragment of a coherent reconstruction of the development of natural philosophy, I will investigate one idea of late medieval philosophy – the explanation of motion (impetus). The main statement of the paper holds that the ideas of late medieval natural philosophy have a decisive significance for the development of modern natural science instead of accidental or negative one. In the paper, following Aristotelian philosophical approach, premises of Jean Buridan’s theory of impetus will be exposed. Then, debates over the explanation of projectile motion are going to be presented, and finally, the necessary significance of this metaphysical idea on the modifications of natural philosophy is going to be ascertained.

scholarly journals “at forstaaeliggjøre og tyde Naturens Runer”

2013 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-149
Author(s):  
René Rosfort
Keyword(s):  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Science And Religion ◽  
Historical Sketch

Kierkegaard’s attitude to natural science is equivocal. Whilethe published works deal with the open criticism of Hegel and his Danishfollowers, in his journals and notebooks we find a more clandestine,albeit no less intense, critique of the scientific endeavours of his day. Thebiting sarcasm that characterises this critique has often led to the viewthat Kierkegaard, as a Christian thinker of subjectivity, naturally hasto be stubbornly against scientific progress. On a closer look, though,we fi nd a more complex view hidden underneath the noisy surface ofKierkegaard’s vigorous rhetoric. The point of this article is to articulatethis more complex view against the backdrop of a historical sketch ofthe relationship between science and religion at the time of Kierkegaard,and through an interpretation of the Kierkegaard’s statements inhis journals and notebooks.

scholarly journals Psychology’s Potential for Reconciliation with Spiritual and Religious Traditions

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Walsh-Bowers
Keyword(s):  
Social Workers ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Human Science ◽  
Religion And Spirituality ◽  
Critical Education ◽  
Religious Traditions ◽  
Spirituality And Religion ◽  
History Of ◽  
Ecological Metaphor

In exploring psychology’s relationship with spirituality and religion, I argue that natural-science psychologists have tended to repress their discipline’s spiritual and religious heritage. History of psychology textbooks sharply distinguish “objective” psychology from “subjective” philosophy, theology, religion, and spirituality, while glossing over historical anomalies such as natural-science psychologists’ ambivalent stance regarding psychoanalysis. Psychologists’ scientism (“worship” of the experimental model, technology, scientific progress, and materialist conceptions of the soul) militates against resolving persistent, disciplinary tensions between objectivity and subjectivity. Rather than emulating psychology, social workers should turn to their own traditions and develop a human-science orientation for their profession. When theorizing, they could connect empowerment and the ecological metaphor with these concepts’ spiritual base. When researching, social workers could foster more active roles for their participants and could write their research articles in more personalized, inter-subjective, and contextualized ways. When educating, they could incorporate critical education in process and content.

Replications can cause distorted belief in scientific progress

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Scientific Progress ◽  
The Public ◽  
Psychological Science

AbstractIf we want psychological science to have a meaningful real-world impact, it has to be trusted by the public. Scientific progress is noisy; accordingly, replications sometimes fail even for true findings. We need to communicate the acceptability of uncertainty to the public and our peers, to prevent psychology from being perceived as having nothing to say about reality.

Scientific progress is like doing a puzzle, not building a wall

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexa M. Tullett ◽  
Simine Vazire
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Progress ◽  
Original Research ◽  
Jigsaw Puzzle ◽  
Replication Research

AbstractWe contest the “building a wall” analogy of scientific progress. We argue that this analogy unfairly privileges original research (which is perceived as laying bricks and, therefore, constructive) over replication research (which is perceived as testing and removing bricks and, therefore, destructive). We propose an alternative analogy for scientific progress: solving a jigsaw puzzle.

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