Cardinal collapsing and ordinal definability

1978 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 635-642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petr Štěpánek
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Complete Boolean Algebra ◽  
Ground Model ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Generic Extensions ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

We shall describe Boolean extensions of models of set theory with the axiom of choice in which cardinals are collapsed by mappings definable from parameters in the ground model. In particular, starting from the constructible universe, we get Boolean extensions in which constructible cardinals are collapsed by ordinal definable sets.Let be a transitive model of set theory with the axiom of choice. Definability of sets in the generic extensions of is closely related to the automorphisms of the corresponding Boolean algebra. In particular, if G is an -generic ultrafilter on a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, then every set in [G] is definable from parameters in . Hence if B is a complete Boolean algebra containing a set of forcing conditions to collapse some cardinals in , it suffices to construct a rigid complete Boolean algebra C, in which B is completely embedded. If G is as above, then [G] satisfies “every set is -definable” and the inner model [G ∩ B] contains the collapsing mapping determined by B. To complete the result, it is necessary to give some conditions under which every cardinal from [G ∩ B] remains a cardinal in [G].The absolutness is granted for every cardinal at least as large as the saturation of C. To keep the upper cardinals absolute, it often suffices to construct C with the same saturation as B. It was shown in [6] that this is always possible, namely, that every Boolean algebra can be completely embedded in a rigid complete Boolean algebra with the same saturation.

Zorn's lemma and complete Boolean algebras in intuitionistic type theories

1997 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 1265-1279 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Bell
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Extension Theorem ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Boolean Algebras ◽  
Complete Boolean Algebra ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Excluded Middle

AbstractWe analyze Zorn's Lemma and some of its consequences for Boolean algebras in a constructive setting. We show that Zorn's Lemma is persistent in the sense that, if it holds in the underlying set theory, in a properly stated form it continues to hold in all intuitionistic type theories of a certain natural kind. (Observe that the axiom of choice cannot be persistent in this sense since it implies the law of excluded middle.) We also establish the persistence of some familiar results in the theory of (complete) Boolean algebras—notably, the proposition that every complete Boolean algebra is an absolute subretract. This (almost) resolves a question of Banaschewski and Bhutani as to whether the Sikorski extension theorem for Boolean algebras is persistent.

On generic extensions without the axiom of choice

1983 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. P. Monro
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Generic Extension ◽  
Transitive Model ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Generic Extensions

AbstractLet ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let M be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends M to another model M[G] of ZF (a “generic extension”). If the axiom of choice holds in M it also holds in M[G], that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive an application to Boolean toposes.

scholarly journals How to have more things by forgetting how to count them

2020 ◽  
Vol 476 (2239) ◽  
pp. 20190782
Author(s):  
Asaf Karagila ◽  
Philipp Schlicht
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Ground Model ◽  
Finite Sets ◽  
Real Numbers ◽  
Extremally Disconnected ◽  
Finite Set ◽  
Combinatorial Condition ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice

Cohen’s first model is a model of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory in which there is a Dedekind-finite set of real numbers, and it is perhaps the most famous model where the Axiom of Choice fails. We force over this model to add a function from this Dedekind-finite set to some infinite ordinal κ . In the case that we force the function to be injective, it turns out that the resulting model is the same as adding κ Cohen reals to the ground model, and that we have just added an enumeration of the canonical Dedekind-finite set. In the case where the function is merely surjective it turns out that we do not add any reals, sets of ordinals, or collapse any Dedekind-finite sets. This motivates the question if there is any combinatorial condition on a Dedekind-finite set A which characterises when a forcing will preserve its Dedekind-finiteness or not add new sets of ordinals. We answer this question in the case of ‘Adding a Cohen subset’ by presenting a varied list of conditions each equivalent to the preservation of Dedekind-finiteness. For example, 2 A is extremally disconnected, or [ A ] < ω is Dedekind-finite.

scholarly journals Power Kripke–Platek set theory and the axiom of choice

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 447-457
Author(s):  
Michael Rathjen
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Selection Mechanism ◽  
Ordinal Analysis ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Power Set ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Set Operation

Abstract While power Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, shares many properties with ordinary Kripke–Platek set theory, ${\textbf{KP}}$, in several ways it behaves quite differently from ${\textbf{KP}}$. This is perhaps most strikingly demonstrated by a result, due to Mathias, to the effect that adding the axiom of constructibility to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ gives rise to a much stronger theory, whereas in the case of ${\textbf{KP}}$, the constructible hierarchy provides an inner model, so that ${\textbf{KP}}$ and ${\textbf{KP}}+V=L$ have the same strength. This paper will be concerned with the relationship between ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ and ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ plus the axiom of choice or even the global axiom of choice, $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$. Since $L$ is the standard vehicle to furnish a model in which this axiom holds, the usual argument for demonstrating that the addition of ${\textbf{AC}}$ or $\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ to ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ does not increase proof-theoretic strength does not apply in any obvious way. Among other tools, the paper uses techniques from ordinal analysis to show that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ has the same strength as ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$, thereby answering a question of Mathias. Moreover, it is shown that ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ is conservative over ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})$ for $\varPi ^1_4$ statements of analysis. The method of ordinal analysis for theories with power set was developed in an earlier paper. The technique allows one to compute witnessing information from infinitary proofs, providing bounds for the transfinite iterations of the power set operation that are provable in a theory. As the theory ${\textbf{KP}}({\mathcal{P}})+\textbf{AC}_{\tiny {global}}$ provides a very useful tool for defining models and realizability models of other theories that are hard to construct without access to a uniform selection mechanism, it is desirable to determine its exact proof-theoretic strength. This knowledge can for instance be used to determine the strength of Feferman’s operational set theory with power set operation as well as constructive Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice.

scholarly journals REALIZING REALIZABILITY RESULTS WITH CLASSICAL CONSTRUCTIONS

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-445
Author(s):  
ASAF KARAGILA
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
New Method ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

AbstractJ. L. Krivine developed a new method based on realizability to construct models of set theory where the axiom of choice fails. We attempt to recreate his results in classical settings, i.e., symmetric extensions. We also provide a new condition for preserving well ordered, and other particular type of choice, in the general settings of symmetric extensions.

HODL(ℝ) is a Core Model Below Θ

1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Steel
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Transitive Closure ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
Definable Sets ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Do So

In this paper we shall answer some questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), the universe of all sets constructible from the reals. In order to do so, we shall assume ADL(ℝ), the hypothesis that all 2-person games of perfect information on ω whose payoff set is in L(ℝ) are determined. This is by now standard practice. ZFC itself decides few questions in the set theory of L(ℝ), and for reasons we cannot discuss here, ZFC + ADL(ℝ) yields the most interesting “completion” of the ZFC-theory of L(ℝ).ADL(ℝ) implies that L(ℝ) satisfies “every wellordered set of reals is countable”, so that the axiom of choice fails in L(ℝ). Nevertheless, there is a natural inner model of L(ℝ), namely HODL(ℝ), which satisfies ZFC. (HOD is the class of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets, that is, the class of all sets x such that every member of the transitive closure of x is definable over the universe from ordinal parameters (i.e., “OD”). The superscript “L(ℝ)” indicates, here and below, that the notion in question is to be interpreted in L(R).) HODL(ℝ) is reasonably close to the full L(ℝ), in ways we shall make precise in § 1. The most important of the questions we shall answer concern HODL(ℝ): what is its first order theory, and in particular, does it satisfy GCH?These questions first drew attention in the 70's and early 80's. (See [4, p. 223]; also [12, p. 573] for variants involving finer notions of definability.)

Inner models for set theory—Part I

1951 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 161-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. C. Shepherdson
Keyword(s):  
Set Theory ◽  
Continuum Hypothesis ◽  
Large Family ◽  
Axiom System ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Axiomatic System ◽  
Additional Hypothesis ◽  
Inner Models ◽  
Inner Model ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice

One of the standard ways of proving the consistency of additional hypotheses with the basic axioms of an axiom system is by the construction of what may be described as ‘inner models.’ By starting with a domain of individuals assumed to satisfy the basic axioms an inner model is constructed whose domain of individuals is a certain subset of the original individual domain. If such an inner model can be constructed which satisfies not only the basic axioms but also the particular additional hypothesis under consideration, then this affords a proof that if the basic axiom system is consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to this system the new hypothesis. This method has been applied to axiom systems for set theory by many authors, including v. Neumann (4), Mostowski (5), and more recently Gödel (1), who has shown by this method that if the basic axioms of a certain axiomatic system of set theory are consistent then so is the system obtained by adding to these axioms a strong form of the axiom of choice and the generalised continuum hypothesis. Having been shown in this striking way the power of this method it is natural to inquire whether it has any limitations or whether by the construction of a sufficiently ingenious inner model one might hope to decide other outstanding consistency questions, such as the consistency of the negations of the axiom of choice and continuum hypothesis. In this and two following papers we prove some general theorems concerning inner models for a certain axiomatic system of set theory which lead to the result that as far as a fairly large family of inner models are concerned this method of proving consistency has been exhausted, that no essentially new consistency results can be obtained by the use of this kind of model.

A Boolean ultrapower which is not an ultrapower

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 245-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernd Koppelberg ◽  
Sabine Koppelberg
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Natural Generalization ◽  
Negative Answer ◽  
Complete Boolean Algebra ◽  
Image Position ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

Several people have independently been studying Boolean ultrapowers recently; see for example [2], [3], [4], [6]. Boolean ultrapowers are a quite natural generalization of the well-known usual ultrapowers, but it seemed to be unknown whether every Boolean ultrapower is isomorphic to an ultrapower. We give a negative answer to that question. We further show that a Boolean ultrapower by an ℵ1-regular ultrafilter need not be ℵ2-universal, i.e. that Theorem 4.3.12 of [1] does not hold for Boolean ultrapowers.Let B be a complete Boolean algebra (we identify the algebra with its underlying set), whose operations are denoted by +, ·, −, 0, 1, Σ, Π Let be a structure for some language ℒ. For those who are familiar with Boolean-valued models of set theory, the B-valued model may be described by its underlying setandif R is an n-place relation in ℒ or equality, its interpretation in , u1 … un Є M(B).

Zermelo and Set Theory

2004 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akihiro Kanamori
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Subsequent Development ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Mathematical Work ◽  
Infinitary Logic ◽  
Bernstein Theorem ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Models Of Set Theory

Ernst Friedrich Ferdinand Zermelo (1871–1953) transformed the set theory of Cantor and Dedekind in the first decade of the 20th century by incorporating the Axiom of Choice and providing a simple and workable axiomatization setting out generative set-existence principles. Zermelo thereby tempered the ontological thrust of early set theory, initiated the delineation of what is to be regarded as set-theoretic, drawing out the combinatorial aspects from the logical, and established the basic conceptual framework for the development of modern set theory. Two decades later Zermelo promoted a distinctive cumulative hierarchy view of models of set theory and championed the use of infinitary logic, anticipating broad modern developments. In this paper Zermelo's published mathematical work in set theory is described and analyzed in its historical context, with the hindsight afforded by the awareness of what has endured in the subsequent development of set theory. Elaborating formulations and results are provided, and special emphasis is placed on the to and fro surrounding the Schröder-Bernstein Theorem and the correspondence and comparative approaches of Zermelo and Gödel. Much can be and has been written about philosophical and biographical issues and about the reception of the Axiom of Choice, and we will refer and defer to others, staying the course through the decidedly mathematical themes and details.

Term models for weak set theories with a universal set

1987 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 374-387 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. E. Forster
Keyword(s):  
Boolean Algebra ◽  
Set Theory ◽  
Axiom Of Choice ◽  
The Other ◽  
Free Variables ◽  
Image Position ◽  
The Axiom Of Choice ◽  
Axiomatic Systems ◽  
The Universe

We shall be concerned here with weak axiomatic systems of set theory with a universal set. The language in which they are expressed is that of set theory—two primitive predicates, = and ϵ, and no function symbols (though some function symbols will be introduced by definitional abbreviation). All the theories will have stratified axioms only, and they will all have Ext (extensionality: (∀x)(∀y)(x = y· ↔ ·(∀z)(z ϵ x ↔ z ϵ y))). In fact, in addition to extensionality, they have only axioms saying that the universe is closed under certain set-theoretic operations, viz. all of the formand these will always include singleton, i.e., ι′x exists if x does (the iota notation for singleton, due to Russell and Whitehead, is used here to avoid confusion with {x: Φ}, set abstraction), and also x ∪ y, x ∩ y and − x (the complement of x). The system with these axioms is called NF2 in the literature (see [F]). The other axioms we consider will be those giving ⋃x, ⋂x, {y: y ⊆x} and {y: x ⊆ y}. We will frequently have occasion to bear in mind that 〈 V, ⊆ 〉 is a Boolean algebra in any theory extending NF2. There is no use of the axiom of choice at any point in this paper. Since the systems with which we will be concerned exhibit this feature of having, in addition to extensionality, only axioms stating that V is closed under certain operations, we will be very interested in terms of the theories in question. A T-term, for T such a theory, is a thing (with no free variables) built up from V or ∧ by means of the T-operations, which are of course the operations that the axioms of T say the universe is closed under.

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