Ante Ciliga, Trotskii, and State Capitalism: Theory, Tactics, and Reevaluation during the Purge Era, 1935-1939

Slavic Review ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 127-143
Author(s):  
Michael S. Fox

The Moscow Trials forced the international anti-Stalinist Left to reconsider its most fundamental truths. The old, rigid categories of capitalism and socialism were no longer certain; a new urgency accompanied the question of where the revolution had gone astray. Many of the most outspoken anti-Stalinists searching for new answers had been either adherents or sympathizers of Trotskii. For many of these former staunch supporters, Trotskii's theoretical middle ground—at the same time hostile to the Stalinist bureaucracy but defensive of the land of socialized production— was no longer tenable. One after another, they broke with Trotskii. Yet this entire movement of reevaluation in Trotskii's intellectual entourage either has not been fully explored in discussions centering on Trotskii's views or, in a certain Trotskyist tradition, has been dismissed as a simple move to the Right. One of the best ways to understand both the roots and the context of such an intellectual upheaval is to focus on the key individuals.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 126-133
Author(s):  
Vlad-Cristian SOARE ◽  

"The fundamental transformations through the Romanian state passed since the Revolution of December 1989, have also put their mark on the legal system. For this reason, there have been major changes in the content of administrative law. However, the regulation of the territorial-administrative subdivisions survived the change of political regime, due to Law 2/1968. Moreover, regulations on administrative-territorial subdivisions are also found in Law 215/2001 and in the 1991 Constitution, revised in 2003. This has led to problems of interpretation. Thus, on the one hand, we need to identify who has the right to constitute administrative-territorial subdivisions, and on the other hand, it must be seen whether the answer to the first question, leads to a possible interpretation that would be unconstitutional. At the same time, administrative-territorial subdivisions have created problems of interpretation regarding their legal capacity. Through this article, we have proposed to look at the issues mentioned above."



1997 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 54-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Houlgate

In his lectures on the philosophy of history Hegel passes this famous judgement on the French Revolution. “Anaxagoras had been the first to say that nous governs the world; but only now did humanity come to recognize that thought should rule spiritual actuality. This was thus a magnificent dawn”. What first gave rise to discontent in France, in Hegel's view, were the heavy burdens that pressed upon the people and the government's inability to procure for the Court the means of supporting its luxury and extravagance. But soon the new spirit of freedom and enlightenment began to stir in men's minds and carry them forward to revolution. “One should not, therefore, declare oneself against the assertion”, Hegel concludes, “that the Revolution received its first impulse from Philosophy” (VPW, p 924). However, Hegel points out that the legacy of the revolution is actually an ambiguous one. For, although the principles which guided the revolution were those of reason and were indeed magnificent – namely, that humanity is born to freedom and self-determination – they were held fast in their abstraction and turned “polemically”, and at times terribly, against the existing order (VPW, p 925). What ultimately triumphed in the revolution was thus not concrete reason itself, but abstract reason or understanding (VPW, p 923). In Hegel's view, the enduring legacy of such revolutionary understanding was, not so much the Terror, but the principle that “the subjective wills of the many should hold sway” (VPW, p 932). This principle, which Hegel calls the principle of “liberalism” and which we would call the principle of majority rule, has since spread from France to become one of the governing principles of modern stat. It has been used to justify granting universal suffrage, to justify depriving corporations and the nobility of the right to sit in the legislature, and in some cases to justify abolishing the monarchy. What is of crucial importance for Hegel, however, is that such measures have not rendered the state more modern and rational, but have in fact distorted the modern state.



2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (4-5) ◽  
pp. 443-469 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean L. Cohen

This article defends the principle of non-establishment against 21st-century projects of political religion, constitutional theocracy and political theology. It is divided into two parts, which will appear in two consecutive issues of Philosophy & Social Criticism, 39(4–5) and 39(6). Part 1 proceeds by constructing an ideal type of political secularism, and then discussing the innovative American model of constitutional dualism regarding religion that combined constitutional protection for the freedom of religious conscience and exercise with the principle of non-establishment. The article analyses the strengths and limits of the ‘separation– accommodation’ frame that became hegemonic in 1st amendment jurisprudence from the 1940s to the 1990s. It challenges the standard caricature of the American model as strictly separationist and privatizing. It then critically assesses two contemporary alternatives to that frame: the integrationist approach and the equal liberty approach. The first, disguised as a concern for pluralism and fairness, challenges ‘separation’ and political secularism in a subtle attack on the non-establishment principle, aimed at drastically narrowing its scope. Successes of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and politics have triggered a response by liberal egalitarians. The author addresses this response – the equal liberty model – in part 2, which will appear in Philosophy & Social Criticism 39(6), arguing that although on the right track, it fails to find a middle ground between political secularism and integration.



1876 ◽  
Vol 24 (164-170) ◽  
pp. 417-440 ◽  

The peculiar twisted appearance of the human umbilical cord has received much attention from anatomists, and has been the subject of much ingenious speculation. According to Velpeau (‘ Embryologie’) the torsion begins as early as the seventh or eighth week, whilst Burdach has not observed it earlier than the tenth. I have repeatedly seen fœtuses, apparently of the twelfth and thirteenth week, in which no appearance of twisting was observable in the cord, though one of the most perfectly twisted cords in my possession belongs to a fœtus of certainly not more than thirteen weeks’ development. Velpeau attributes the twisting simply to the rotation of the fœtus. Schroeder Van der Kolk supposes that the blood flowing in the arteries exerts a backstroke influence on the pelvis of the swimming fœtus, thus determining its revolution in one direction or the other, as the arteries are to be found to the right or left of the vein. In order to dismiss this view we have only to recollect that the umbilicus could not in any way become a fixed axis, and that the mechanical arrangement of the heart, in the non-separation of its streams, would yield but a very weak impulse until very late in pregnancy. The revolution of the fœtus is not known to occur, though its occurrence is probable. Such revolution occurs in the spawn of the frog as early as the first segmentation of the black sphere; but then it is evidently the result of the necessity there is for an equal exposure of all parts of the embryo to the action of light and heat, just as the germinal spot is always uppermost in the bird’s egg. No such necessity exists in the persistently included mammalian ovum, and the revolution of the fœtus cannot be accepted. If it did occur it is highly improbable that the revolutions could number only from four to eighteen, these being the ranges I have noticed in a large number of fully developed cords. Another objection to Schroeder’s hypothesis is that, as a matter of fact, the arteries leave the omphalic ring nearly always below the vein and symmetrically arranged in relation to it. Their passage to one or other side of it is seldom apparent till the external dermal ring has been reached. Also I have seen the first revolution of the arteries pass from right to left, after which they suddenly bent on themselves and passed up the cord in an irregularly straight course, whilst the vein maintained the normal spiral. Further, I have seen the arteries reverse their course about the middle of the cord, though the vein maintained the uniform spiral.



1966 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Tyack

Though Americans had fought for individual freedom in the Revolution, their success confronted them with the problem of balancing liberty and order in the new republic. The author cites three intellectuals of the period who argued for an indoctrination of citizens: an educational goal which clashed with the right to dissent and to make independent political and moral judgments.



2021 ◽  
pp. 281-288
Author(s):  
Alison Rice

The conclusion contends that these worldwide women writers in Paris have not sought to market themselves in ways that would entail compromising their positions and priorities, but have instead inserted their narratives into a complicated setting to allow them to draw from their strengths to make lasting impressions. Their work has far too often been overlooked in the Parisian literary landscape where it has emerged and to which it is nonetheless making a profoundly meaningful contribution, and it is time for us to recognize the revolution that these writers are a part of, each creating in inimitable style and adding their voice to a movement of novelty that comes at precisely the right time for the French literary tradition.



1985 ◽  
Vol 18 (01) ◽  
pp. 20-27
Author(s):  
Jean Bethke Elshtain

Albert Camus' ironic judge-penitent, Jean-Baptiste Clemence, remarks to his compatriot in the seedy bar, Mexico City, in a shadowy district of Amsterdam, the mist rising off the canals, the fog rolling in, cheap gin the only source of warmth, “Somebody has to have the last word. Otherwise, every reason can be answered with another one and there would never be an end to it. Power, on the other hand, settles everything. It took time, but we finally realized that. For instance, you must have noticed that our old Europe at last philosophizes in the right way. We no longer say as in simple times: ‘This is the way I think. What are your objections?’ We have become lucid. For the dialogue we have substituted the communique: ‘This is the truth,’ we say. You can discuss it as much as you want; we aren't interested. But in a few years there'll be the police who will show you we are right.”Now this is still an imperfect method of control—the enforcers are clearly identified and the coercion is too obvious. Not so in Orwell's1984. As Syme, the chilling destroyer of language proclaims: “It's a beautiful thing, the destruction of words.” Speaking to Orwell's protagonist Winston Smith, Syme continues: “Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought. In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactlyoneword, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten…. Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller. Even now, of course, there's no reason or excuse for committing thoughtcrime. It's merely a question of self-discipline, reality control. But in the end there won't be any need even for that. The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect.”



2017 ◽  
Vol 61 (0) ◽  
pp. 61-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski

From the outset, the 1905 revolution was a place of conflict of memory revealing the political and social divisions existing in the Polish society. In the interwar period (1918–1939), three “legends” were formed: the left assessed the revolution positively and highlighted the relevance of its experiences, the ruling camp emphasized the independence dimension, and the right strongly criticized the revolution. After 1989 the conflict was renewed. The objective of the right-wing communities and parties influencing the historical policy of the state is to exclude the 1905 revolution from the national tradition and remove its symbols from public space. For the left-wing representatives, who are the minority, the years 1905–1907 are an important collective experience that requires a new interpretation and commemorating.



2011 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 479-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid Sykes

This essay explores new models of the citizen–patient by attending to the post-Revolutionary blind ‘voice’. Voice, in both a literal and figurative sense, was central to the way in which members of the Hospice des Quinze-Vingts, an institution for the blind and partially sighted, interacted with those in the community. Musical voices had been used by members to collect alms and to project the particular spiritual principle of their institution since its foundation in the thirteenth century. At the time of the Revolution, the Quinze-Vingts voice was understood by some political authorities as an exemplary call of humanity. Yet many others perceived it as deeply threatening. After 1800, productive dialogue between those in political control and Quinze-Vingts blind members broke down. Authorities attempted to silence the voice of members through the control of blind musicians and institutional management. The Quinze-Vingts blind continued to reassert their voices until around 1850, providing a powerful form of resistance to political control. The blind ‘voice’ ultimately recognised the right of the citizen–patient to dialogue with their political carers.



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