Canada and the Law of Nations: A Selection of Cases in International Law, Affecting Canada or Canadians, Decided by Canadian Courts, by Certain of the Higher Courts in the United States and Great Britain and by International Tribunals

1940 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 461
Author(s):  
John Willis ◽  
N. MacKenzie ◽  
L. H. Laing
1977 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 270-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henry J. Bourguignon

In an article published in this Journal in 1932, Professor Edwin Dickinson pointed out that the Supreme Court, in the first thirty years of its existence, dealt with 82 cases which raised questions of international law. The Court and counsel before it repeatedly cited the familiar writers on the law of nations: Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and Vattel. As Dickinson pointed out, “It is an ancient doctrine of the Anglo-American common law that the law of nations is incorporated in and in some sense forms part of the national law.” Largely through decisions based on the principles expressed by the classical writers, the law of nations was early incorporated as part of the law of the United States.


1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alpheus Henry Snow

It is a truism that the science of law proper – the science dealing with the United States or the law of Great Britain, one finds the whole science based on the fact of the existence of a political society known as the United States or Great Britain, which formulates, applies and enforces the law which governs these nations in their internal relations. When one enters upon the study of what is called international law, one finds himself expected to accept as a fundamental proposition that there is no political society which formulates, applies and enforces the law which he is told governs all nations in their external relations, and that this law is formulated, applied and enforced among or between the nations. This difference in fundamentals leads to corresponding differences in the derivative notions. Practitioners of law proper take little or no interest in what is called international law. From their point of view, that which is called international law is only a collection of the rules of a highly interesting game, success in which depends largely upon “face ” and personality; nor can it be denied that there is much to justify this opinion. Students of law reflect the attitude of mind of the practitioner, and the great majority of students end their legal education when they finish the courses in national domestic law, giving no consideration to the law which governs the actions and relations of the nations.


Author(s):  
Amanda L. Tyler

During the American Revolution, the treatment of the American “rebels” fighting for independence posed a series of difficult questions about the reach and framework of British law. The centerpiece of the legal calculus governing the detention of prisoners during the war—both in Great Britain and in the United States—remained the English Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. The war also confirmed the Act’s limitations on two scores. First, well before Americans declared independence, the British government had denied the Act’s application in the colonies, thereby taking the position that its geographic sweep did not follow British rule wherever it went. Second, during the war, Parliament suspended the Act’s application to Americans held on English soil. With independence, however, Parliament permitted the suspension to lapse and treated the American rebels as prisoners of war whose rights would be governed by the law of nations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document