Levels of Explanation for Ideas of Impurity:

2021 ◽  
pp. 51-78
Author(s):  
David J. Lobina

The study of cognitive phenomena is best approached in an orderly manner. It must begin with an analysis of the function in intension at the heart of any cognitive domain (its knowledge base), then proceed to the manner in which such knowledge is put into use in real-time processing, concluding with a domain’s neural underpinnings, its development in ontogeny, etc. Such an approach to the study of cognition involves the adoption of different levels of explanation/description, as prescribed by David Marr and many others, each level requiring its own methodology and supplying its own data to be accounted for. The study of recursion in cognition is badly in need of a systematic and well-ordered approach, and this chapter lays out the blueprint to be followed in the book by focusing on a strict separation between how this notion applies in linguistic knowledge and how it manifests itself in language processing.


Author(s):  
Bradford Skow

This book aims to answer the following questions: what is the difference between a cause and a background condition? What is it to manifest a disposition? Can dispositions be extrinsic? What is the most basic kind of causation? And, what might a structural explanation be? Each chapter takes up a subset of these questions; the chapters are written to be readable independently. The answers defended rely on three ideas. Two of those ideas use a distinction from the study of lexical aspect, namely the distinction between stative verbs and non-stative verbs. The first idea is that events go with non-stative verbs, in the sense that “If S, then an event occurred in virtue of the fact that S” is true when the main verb in the clause going in for “S” is non-stative. The second is that acting, doing something, goes with non-stative verbs, in the sense that “In Ving X did something” is true iff V is a non-stative verb. The third idea is about levels of explanation: “(A because B) because C” does not entail “A because C.”


Perception ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 24 (11) ◽  
pp. 1333-1364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lothar Spillmann ◽  
Birgitta Dresp

The study of illusory brightness and contour phenomena has become an important tool in modern brain research. Gestalt, cognitive, neural, and computational approaches are reviewed and their explanatory powers are discussed in the light of empirical data. Two well-known phenomena of illusory form are dealt with, the Ehrenstein illusion and the Kanizsa triangle. It is argued that the gap between the different levels of explanation, bottom—up versus top—down, creates scientific barriers which have all too often engendered unnecessary debate about who is right and who is wrong. In this review of the literature we favour an integrative approach to the question of how illusory form is derived from stimulus configurations which provide the visual system with seemingly incomplete information. The processes that can explain the emergence of these phenomena range from local feature detection to global strategies of perceptual organisation. These processes may be similar to those that help us restore partially occluded objects in everyday vision. To understand better the Ehrenstein and Kanizsa illusions, it is proposed that different levels of analysis and explanation are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Theories of illusory contour and form perception must, therefore, take into account the underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and their possible interactions with cognitive and attentional processes.


1998 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Max Coltheart ◽  
Robyn Langdon

e-Neuroforum ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. A11-A18
Author(s):  
Sabine Windmann ◽  
Grit Hein

Abstract Altruism is a puzzling phenomenon, especially for Biology and Economics. Why do individuals reduce their chances to provide some of the resources they own to others? The answer to this question can be sought at ultimate or proximate levels of explanation. The Social Neurosciences attempt to specify the brain mechanisms that drive humans to act altruistically, in assuming that overtly identical behaviours can be driven by different motives. The research has shown that activations and functional connectivities of the Anterior Insula and the Temporoparietal Junction play specific roles in empathetic versus strategic forms of altruism, whereas the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, among other regions, is involved in norm-oriented punitive forms of altruism. Future research studies could focus on the processing of ambiguity and conflict in pursuit of altruistic intentions.


Author(s):  
Lee Cronk ◽  
Beth L. Leech

This chapter examines the concept of adaptation and how it is applied (and sometimes misapplied) to cooperation. It starts with George C. Williams's idea that adaptation is a “special and onerous concept that should be used only where it is really necessary,” which he articulated in Adaptation and Natural Selection. It then considers different levels of explanation that help clarify the notion of adaptation, fortuitous benefits and by-product mutualism in relation to adaptation, and the link between adaptation and natural, artificial, social, and sexual selection. It also explores how phylogeny constrains natural selection, the ways that adaptations solve specific problems found in specific environments, and how adaptation influences judgment. Finally, it analyzes the role of culture and language in adaptation and evolutionary explanations of morality.


2017 ◽  
pp. 176-213
Author(s):  
Bartosz Stopel

Black Boxes ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 23-48
Author(s):  
Marco J. Nathan

This chapter outlines the development of the reductionism vs. antireductionism debate, which has set the stage for philosophical analyses of science since the early decades of the twentieth century. The point of departure is the rise and fall of the classical model of reduction, epitomized by the work of Ernest Nagel. Next is the subsequent forging of the “antireductionist consensus” and the “reductionist anti-consensus.” The chapter concludes by arguing how modest reductionism and sophisticated antireductionism substantially overlap, making the dispute more terminological than it is often appreciated. Even more problematically, friends and foes of reductionism share an overly restrictive characterization of the interface between levels of explanation. Thus, it is time for philosophy to move away from these intertwining strands, which fail to capture the productive interplay between knowledge and ignorance in science, and to develop new categories for charting the nature and advancement of science.


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