Was Dodd-Frank Justified in Exempting Small Firms from Section 404b Compliance?

2012 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony D. Holder ◽  
Khondkar E. Karim ◽  
Ashok Robin

SYNOPSIS: In recognition of the high cost of compliance with its Section 404b—Auditor Certification of Internal Controls—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided temporary exemption to small firms (called non-accelerated filers, typically with market capitalization of less than $75 million). This temporary exemption was later made permanent by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010). Our study estimates the opportunity cost of this exemption, that is, the reporting quality gains that would have been achieved by non-accelerated filers if exemption were not granted. We do so by using a “difference in differences approach”: We compare the effect of SOX on the reporting quality of accelerated filers with the effect of SOX on non-accelerated filers (identifying the two groups using market capitalization thresholds). We measure reporting quality principally by using earnings management and accrual quality measures. We detect a significant deterioration in reporting quality for non-accelerated filers but not for accelerated filers. The result is invariant to whether we compare non-accelerated filers with all accelerated filers or only with small accelerated filers. Our findings suggest a significant opportunity cost for the exemption. Although the consideration of the cost of Section 404b compliance is outside the scope of our study, our result concerning the opportunity cost suggests that it may have been premature to grant permanent exemption to the non-accelerated filers. This result is especially important considering current discussions to grant Section 404b exemption to even larger firms (up to a market capitalization of $500 million).

Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

In response to several corporate scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) implemented substantive corporate governance mandates that were adopted as federal law. It focused on restoring financial disclosure transparency and revitalizing investor confidence in the financial markets’ integrity. A few years thereafter, the 2008 financial crisis precipitated the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank Act). This Act aimed at forestalling another financial crisis through enhanced corporate governance regulation and placing meaningful restraints on undue risk-taking conduct. The chapter focuses on several key provisions of the SOX and the Dodd-Frank Acts, as well as SEC rules and regulations promulgated thereunder. Among these provisions as covered in this chapter are: CEO and CFO certifications, audit committees, executive clawback provisions, director independence, nominating and corporate governance committees, codes of ethics, corporate governance disclosures, say-on-pay and golden parachute provisions, loans to insiders, and equitable relief.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 19
Author(s):  
Dahli Gray ◽  
Clemense Ehoff Jr.

The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd Frank Act of 2010 are reviewed relative to the results of exploring selected fraud cases discovered in the years 2010 through 2013. These cases reflect that fraud continues to be discovered despite legislated efforts regarding financial fraud. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 responded to continued emergence of financial fraud cases in the years after the legislation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. Assuming that implementation of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 would take some time to decrease financial fraud, such cases discovered in the first seven years after the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 were not included in this study. The conclusion and recommendation are that both additional legislation and better enforcement of existing legislation are needed.


2013 ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
V. Kulakova

We study the reform of financial regulation initiated by the Dodd—Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Major factors impeding Obama’s financial and economic policy are explored, including institutional difficulties, party warfare, lobbyism, and systemic inconsistencies of international financial regulation. We also examine challenges that are being faced by economic and political sciences due to the changes in financial regulation and also assess the level of radicality of the financial reform.


2017 ◽  
Vol 92 (6) ◽  
pp. 187-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seil Kim ◽  
April Klein

ABSTRACT In December 1999, the SEC instituted a new listing standard for NYSE and NASDAQ firms. Listed firms were now required to maintain fully independent audit committees with at least three members. In July 2002, the U.S. Congress legislated these standards through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Our research question is whether all investors benefited from the 1999 new rule. Using both an event study and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find no evidence of higher market value or better financial reporting quality resulting from this rule.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin W Hoffman ◽  
John L. Campbell ◽  
Jason L. Smith

We investigate the stock market's reaction to events leading up to the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) and Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) 2007 regulatory changes that reduced the scope of and documentation requirements for assessments of firms' internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR), as required by Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The stated goal of these regulations was to reduce firms' and auditors' compliance costs with mandatory ICFR assessments, while maintaining the effectiveness of these assessments. We examine abnormal returns surrounding key dates leading to the passage of these regulations and offer two main findings. First, investors reacted negatively on key event dates, suggesting that investors viewed the regulations as likely to reduce financial reporting quality rather than to drive firm and audit efficiencies. Second, this negative market reaction is larger when ICFR effectiveness should matter most - when firms are more complex, have higher litigation risk, and greater fraud risk. In additional analysis, we find that restatements increase in the post-regulation time period, consistent with investors' concerns that the effect of the legislation would be a reduction in ICFR effectiveness. Overall, our results may imply that investors prefer stronger government regulation when it comes to the assessments of a firm's internal controls over financial reporting.


Author(s):  
Laura Anselmi ◽  
Yiu-Shing Lau ◽  
Matt Sutton ◽  
Anna Everton ◽  
Rob Shaw ◽  
...  

AbstractRisk-adjustment models are used to predict the cost of care for patients based on their observable characteristics, and to derive efficient and equitable budgets based on weighted capitation. Markers based on past care contacts can improve model fit, but their coefficients may be affected by provider variations in diagnostic, treatment and reporting quality. This is problematic when distinguishing need and supply influences on costs is required.We examine the extent of this bias in the national formula for mental health care using administrative records for 43.7 million adults registered with 7746 GP practices in England in 2015. We also illustrate a method to control for provider effects.A linear regression containing a rich set of individual, GP practice and area characteristics, and fixed effects for local health organisations, had goodness-of-fit equal to R2 = 0.007 at person level and R2 = 0.720 at GP practice level. The addition of past care markers changed substantially the coefficients on the other variables and increased the goodness-of-fit to R2 = 0.275 at person level and R2 = 0.815 at GP practice level. The further inclusion of provider effects affected the coefficients on GP practice and area variables and on local health organisation fixed effects, increasing goodness-of-fit at GP practice level to R2 = 0.848.With adequate supply controls, it is possible to estimate coefficients on past care markers that are stable and unbiased. Nonetheless, inconsistent reporting may affect need predictions and penalise populations served by underreporting providers.


2015 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anoosheh Rostamkalaei ◽  
Mark Freel
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 204-230 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fatima Alali ◽  
Randal Elder ◽  
Jian Zhou

We investigate Big 4 pricing over the period of 2000 to 2010. We classify the data into five periods: 2000-2001 as the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period, 2002-2003 as the SOX period, 2004-2006 as the Auditing Standard 2 (AS2) period, 2007 as the AS5 period, and 2008-2010 as the Great Recession period. The shocks to the audit market associated with these changes in auditing regulations and the economic environment have differential impacts on large clients and small clients. The percentage of small clients using Big 4 auditors dropped significantly over these shocks, whereas the percentage of large clients using Big 4 auditors experienced a large drop only from the SOX period to the AS2 period. We find that Big 4 pricing increased significantly from the pre-SOX period to the SOX period and continued to increase significantly in the AS2 period. Big 4 pricing experienced a significant decline in the AS5 period and declined insignificantly in the Great Recession period. Big 4 small firm pricing decreased significantly in the AS2 period compared with the SOX period and in the Great Recession period compared with the AS5 period. We find that the Big 4 pricing for small clients is contingent on the nature of competition. The Big 4 charged small firms higher prices in the SOX period, AS5 period, and Great Recession period when competition was lower. Our paper provides a unique contribution as a comprehensive analysis of Big 4 pricing and Big 4 small firm pricing.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 1522
Author(s):  
Ricardo F. Díaz ◽  
Blanca Sanchez-Robles

Increases in the cost of research, specialization and reductions in public expenditure in health are changing the economic environment for the pharmaceutical industry. Gains in productivity and efficiency are increasingly important in order for firms to succeed in this environment. We analyze empirically the performance of efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry over the period 2010–2018. We work with microdata from a large sample of European firms of different characteristics regarding size, main activity, country of origin and other idiosyncratic features. We compute efficiency scores for the firms in the sample on a yearly basis by means of non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) techniques. Basic results show a moderate average level of efficiency for the firms which encompass the sample. Efficiency is higher for companies which engage in manufacturing and distribution than for firms focusing on research and development (R&D) activities. Large firms display higher levels of efficiency than medium-size and small firms. Our estimates point to a decreasing pattern of average efficiency over the years 2010–2018. Furthermore, we explore the potential correlation of efficiency with particular aspects of the firms’ performance. Profit margins and financial solvency are positively correlated with efficiency, whereas employee costs display a negative correlation. Institutional aspects of the countries of origin also influence efficiency levels.


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