The Effect of Relative Performance Information on Performance and Effort Allocation in a Multi-Task Environment

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 553-575 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Lynn Hannan ◽  
Gregory P. McPhee ◽  
Andrew H. Newman ◽  
Ivo D. Tafkov

ABSTRACT This study investigates how relative performance information (RPI) affects employee performance and allocation of effort across tasks in a multi-task environment. Based on behavioral theories, we predict that the social comparison process inherent in RPI induces both a motivation effect that results in increased effort as well as an effort distortion effect that results in the distortion of effort allocations across tasks away from the firm-preferred allocations. We also predict that both effects are magnified when the RPI is public compared to private. We argue that although the motivation effect will generally benefit performance, the effort distortion effect may be detrimental to performance. We design an experiment that isolates these two effects. Consistent with our predictions, we find that RPI induces both motivation and effort distortion effects and that both effects are magnified when the RPI is public rather than private. Although the motivation effect increases performance, we demonstrate that the effort distortion effect can decrease performance. By isolating the motivation and effort distortion effects, our study provides insights into the costs and benefits of RPI in a multi-task environment. As such, it informs accountants regarding the design of information systems and when tasks should be aggregated or disaggregated across employees. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 327-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo D. Tafkov

ABSTRACT: This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of relative performance information (private or public) on performance. Using theory from psychology, I predict and find that relative performance information positively affects performance under the two compensation contracts and that this positive effect is greater under an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-wage contract. I also predict and find that, although both public and private relative performance information have a positive effect on performance, the effect is greater when relative performance information is public. Data Availability: Data are available from the author on request.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Muhammad Syam Kusufi ◽  
Frida Fanani Rohma ◽  
Erfan Muhammad

AbstractThe quality of human resources is one of primary keys to the success of company. Indicators of high-quality human resources can be reflected in improvements in employee performance. Stream of research has examined various efforts to encourage employee performance improvement, one of which is through the optimization of incentive schemes. This study investigates the effect of the tournament scheme horizon and the publication frequency of relative performance information on performance. This study uses an experimental method with a 3 x 2 factorial design between subjects. The horizontal scheme is manipulated into 3 (Hybrid vs. Repeated vs. Grand), while the frequency of publication of relative performance information is manipulated to 2 (high vs. low). The results of this study indicate that the tournament scheme horizon as a basis for monetary incentives is quite effective in driving performance improvement. In contrast, the publication frequency of relative performance information as an effort to compare social conditions and not as a basis for monetary incentives is not strong enough to trigger performance improvements. As a rational economic man, the attempt to pursue incentives can prove to be a trigger for efforts to drive performance improvements that are greater than the pursuit of non-monetary incentives.Keywords: Employee performance; Monetary; Non-monetary; Publication frequency of relative performance information; Tournament Abstrak Kualitas sumber daya manusia merupakan salah satu kunci utama suksesnya perusahaan. Indikator dari tingginya kualitas sumber daya manusia dapat tercermin dari peningkatan kinerja karyawan. Perkembangan penelitian telah mengkaji beragam upaya untuk mendorong peningkatan kinerja karyawan salah satunya melalui optimalisasi skema insentif. Penelitian ini menginvestigasi pengaruh horizon skema turnamen dan frekuensi publikasi informasi kinerja relatif terhadap kinerja. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode eksperimen dengan desain faktorial 3 x 2 antar-subjek. Horizon skema turmanen dimanipulasi menjadi 3 (Hibrida vs. Berganda vs. Tunggal) sementara frekuensi publikasi informasi kinerja relatif dimanipulasi menjadi 2 (tinggi vs. rendah). Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa horizon skema turnamen sebagai dasar insentif moneter cukup efektif mendorong peningkatkan kinerja. Sementara frekuensi publikasi informasi kinerja relatif sebagai upaya perbadingan kondisi secara sosial dan tidak sebagai dasar pemberian insentif moneter, tidak cukup kuat memicu peningkatan kinerja. Sebagai manusia ekonomi yang rasional upaya untuk mengejar insentif terbukti dapat menjadi pemicu usaha untuk mendorong peningkatan kinerja yang lebih besar daripada upaya pengejaran insentif non-moneter.Kata kunci: Informasi kinerja relative; Kinerja karyawan; Moneter; Non-moneter; Turnamen


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-158
Author(s):  
D. Kip Holderness ◽  
Kari Joseph Olsen ◽  
Todd A. Thornock

ABSTRACT Technological advancements have greatly improved the ability to provide relative performance information (RPI), including information systems capable of providing feedback on demand. We use an experiment to examine the effect of RPI feedback frequency on task performance when RPI is assigned by managers and when RPI is solicited by employees. When RPI is assigned to employees, we hypothesize and find a non-linear relationship between RPI frequency and performance such that an increase in frequency first increases and then decreases performance. In contrast, we hypothesize and find that when RPI is chosen by employees, the negative effect of highly frequent RPI on performance is not only mitigated, but reversed, due to individuals placing greater weight on chosen feedback than assigned feedback. We also find that when individuals choose to view RPI feedback, strategic effort (i.e., expending short-term resources for long-term benefits) mediates the relation between viewing RPI and subsequent performance. JEL Classifications: M10; M40; M41. Data Availability: Data available upon request.


2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 83-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric W. Chan

ABSTRACT I examine the effects of providing workers with relative performance information (RPI) on employers' promotion decisions and the impact of those decisions on worker performance. In my experimental setting, the job after promotion requires higher-level abilities than the current job. I find that workers increase their effort to improve their current job performance after a promotion opportunity is announced because they expect this to increase their chances of promotion, even though the new task requires higher-level abilities. Moreover, because employers anticipate that workers who have RPI will react negatively if they see that the best current job performer is not promoted, employers promote the best current job performer, rather than the worker best suited for the next job, more often when workers have RPI than when they do not. Consistent with the Peter Principle, I find that when workers have RPI, the promoted worker's performance is lower after promotion because the promoted worker lacks the ability to perform the new job well. Finally, in a supplemental experiment, I find that providing workers with feedback on their abilities to perform the next job, in addition to current job RPI, improves the effective sorting of workers, but it comes at the cost of reduced promotion-based incentives. My results suggest that, notwithstanding the benefits documented in previous studies, RPI also imposes potential costs that firms should take into account when deciding whether to provide workers with RPI. JEL Classifications: M41; M51; M52. Data Availability: Contact the author.


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