Restoring the Tower of Babel: How Foreign Firms Communicate with U.S. Investors

2014 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 1453-1485 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell J. Lundholm ◽  
Rafael Rogo ◽  
Jenny Li Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Home Country ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Numerical Data ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Press Releases ◽  
Tower Of Babel ◽  
Earnings Press Releases ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT: We examine the readability of text and the use of numbers in the annual filings and earnings press releases of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges. We find that foreign firms generally write clearer text and present relatively more numerical data than their U.S. firm counterparts. More importantly, we find that the readability of the text and use of numbers increases as the foreign firms get geographically further from the U.S. It also increases as the foreign firm's home country has greater differences in accounting standards or investor protection laws relative to the U.S. Further corroborating our results, we also find that these communication efforts are partially successful. Within a country, firms that produce relatively more readable disclosures attract relatively more U.S. institutional ownership. Collectively, our results suggest that foreign firms are responding to a perceived reluctance on the part of U.S. investors to own them and attempt to lower the investors' information disadvantage or psychological distance by providing clearer and more concrete disclosures.

Lobbying of the IASB: An Empirical Investigation

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Bowe Hansen
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Empirical Investigation ◽  
Home Country ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Recent Change ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Board Members ◽  
International Accounting Standards ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence on how the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) generates accounting standards in the presence of lobbyists with differing preferences. I develop hypotheses regarding the associations between attributes of lobbyists and their lobbying activity, and their lobbying success. I find that lobbying success is positively related to the ability of the lobbyist to provide information to the IASB; however, this success is dependent on the credibility of the lobbyist. I also find evidence that lobbying success is associated with the impact that the lobbyists have on the viability of the IASB, measured by their financial contributions and the size of the capital market in their home country. However, this association is not present when I look only at cases where lobbyists disagree with IASB proposal drafts. This evidence is useful in evaluating the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent considerations regarding the adoption of IFRS by the U.S., as well as the recent change in the structure of the IASB that requires a defined geographic mix of board members by the year 2012. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the paper.

scholarly journals Accounting Standards, Reporting Incentives, and Earnings Management

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Song ◽  
Jennifer L. Bannister
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Management Behavior ◽  
Reporting Behavior ◽  
Domestic Firms ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Reporting Incentives ◽  
The U.S

In this study, we examine which factor, firms’ accounting standards or firms’ reporting incentives, has a greater impact on firms’ earnings management behavior. To answer this question, we utilize unique hand-collected data that consists of foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. using U.S. GAAP. This interesting setting allows us to control for differing accounting standards and external monitoring from the SEC between foreign firms and their U.S. domestic counterparts. Therefore, if there is any observed difference in the level of firms’ earnings management, that difference can be mainly attributed to firms’ reporting incentives rather than firms’ accounting standards. Our findings suggest that cross-listed foreign firms using U.S. GAAP exhibit more accruals-based and real activities earnings management relative to domestic firms. The results suggest that accounting standards, regulations, and enforcement is not enough to eliminate opportunistic reporting behavior. Firm incentives will still impact the magnitude of earnings management. This finding is particularly important given the hot debate regarding whether the U.S should adopt IFRS or not. No matter what accounting standards firms choose, U.S GAAP or IFRS, firms’ earnings quality can still vary with differing reporting incentives.

Capital Gains Taxes, Pricing Spreads, and Arbitrage: Evidence from Cross-Listed Firms in the U.S.

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1321-1361 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Blouin ◽  
Luzi Hail ◽  
Michelle H. Yetman
Keyword(s):  
Home Country ◽  
Capital Gains ◽  
Foreign Firms ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Capital Gains Tax ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Capital Gains Taxes ◽  
Lock In ◽  
The U.S

ABSTRACT: We examine how shareholder-level taxes affect the contemporaneous pricing of foreign firms' U.S. cross-listed and underlying home-country securities surrounding the 1997 reduction in U.S. capital gains tax rates. Consistent with tax capitalization, we find that the performance of cross-listed shares is negatively related to dividend yield, suggesting an abnormal price increase for shares with greater anticipated taxable capital gains. Due to barriers to cross-border arbitrage, underlying home-country securities, on average, do not react during the event, creating a temporary tax-induced pricing spread. When costs of arbitrage are low, the pricing disparity quickly dissipates and home-country shares closely mirror the pricing of their cross-listed counterparts. In further tests, we are unable to document lock-in behavior, which predicates a decrease in prices attributable to a surge in volume for shares with greater accrued taxable capital gains. Overall, our findings suggest that an exogenous shock to the U.S. tax regime reverberates in international asset prices, thereby affecting foreign firms' costs of capital.

Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the U.S. Worth More?

CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 54-55
Author(s):  
William H. Sackley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Firms ◽  
The U.S

THE END OF BETTERMENT ACCOUNTING: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC, PROFESSIONAL, AND REGULATORY FACTORS THAT FOSTERED STANDARDS CONVERGENCE IN THE U.S. RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 1955–1983

2007 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan R. Heier ◽  
A. Lee Gurley
Keyword(s):  
21St Century ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Interstate Commerce Commission ◽  
Early 21St Century ◽  
Railroad Industry ◽  
Tax Legislation ◽  
Industry Standards ◽  
Securities Industry ◽  
Arthur Andersen ◽  
The U.S

On January 26, 1983, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) announced that it would require all railroads under its regulatory jurisdiction to change from Retirement-Replacement-Betterment (RRB) accounting, to a more theoretically sound depreciation accounting for matching revenues and expenses. The change was needed because RRB did not allow for the recapture of track investment, leaving the railroads with limited capital to replace aging track lines. Over the previous three decades, it had become painfully obvious to everyone that the industry's economic woes were the result of archaic accounting procedures that lacked harmony with the rest of American accounting standards, but the ICC was reluctant to change until new tax legislation in the early 1980s forced the issue. The decision was a culmination of a debate that started in the mid-1950s when Arthur Andersen, with the help of the securities industry, began an effort to harmonize railroad and industry standards using arguments that mirror those supporting the international accounting harmonization efforts of the early 21st century.

U.S.-Listed Foreign Companies' Choice of a U.S.-Based versus Home Country-Based Big N Principal Auditor and the Effect on Audit Fees and Earnings Quality

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 631-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharad C. Asthana ◽  
K. K. Raman ◽  
Hongkang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Home Country ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Foreign Companies ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Just Price ◽  
Reporting Environment ◽  
The U.S

SYNOPSIS We examine why U.S.-listed foreign companies choose to have a U.S.-based (rather than home country-based) Big N firm as their principal auditor for SEC reporting purposes and the effects of that choice for audit fees and earnings quality. We find that the likelihood of the Big N principal auditor being U.S.-based is decreasing in client size and the level of investor protection in the home country, and increasing in the proportion of income earned outside the home country. We also find compelling evidence that U.S.-based Big N auditors are associated with higher-quality earnings (albeit for a higher fee), despite two factors—the greater distance between the U.S.-based (vis-à-vis home country-based) Big N auditor and the client, and the likelihood that much of the audit work is done outside the U.S.—which potentially could lower the earnings quality of the U.S.-listed foreign client when the Big N principal auditor is U.S.-based. Overall, our study suggests that the higher fees associated with a U.S.-based Big N principal auditor is not just price protection; rather, U.S.-based Big N principal auditors are also improving the financial reporting environment by reporting higher-quality audited earnings for their U.S.-listed foreign clients. JEL Classifications: L11; L15; M42.

Why Not Allow FASB and IASB Standards to Compete in the U.S.?

2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald A. Dye ◽  
Shyam Sunder
Keyword(s):  
Network Externalities ◽  
Accounting Standards ◽  
Standard Setting ◽  
Regulatory Competition ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
The Status ◽  
Informative Signals ◽  
The U.S

This paper discusses arguments for and against introducing competition into the accounting standard-setting process in the U.S. by allowing individual corporations to issue financial reports prepared in accordance with either FASB or IASB rules. The paper examines several arguments supporting the status quo, including (1) the FASB's experience and world leadership in making accounting rules; (2) the increased risk of a “race to the bottom” under regulatory competition; (3) the inability of most users of financial reports to understand the complex technical issues underlying accounting standards; (4) the possibility that IASB's standards will be diluted to gain international acceptance, allowing additional opportunities for earnings management; (5) the risks of the IASB being deadlocked or captured by interests hostile to business; (6) the costs of experimentation in standard setting; and (7) economies from network externalities. Arguments examined on the other side include how competition will (1) help meet the needs of globalized businesses; (2) increase the likelihood that the accounting standards will be efficient; (3) help protect standard setters from undue pressure from interest groups; (4) allow different standards to develop for different corporate clienteles; (5) allow corporations to send more informative signals by their choice of accounting standards; (6) protect corporations against capture of regulatory body by narrow interests; and (7) not affect network externalities at national or global scales.

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