The Effect of Auditors' Use of a Reciprocity-Based Strategy on Auditor-Client Negotiations

2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (1) ◽  
pp. 241-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria H. Sanchez ◽  
Christopher P. Agoglia ◽  
Richard C. Hatfield

Auditors face the challenging tasks of attesting that the financial statements are free from material misstatement while simultaneously fostering a functional working relationship with the client. As the financial statements may be considered, in part, a product of negotiations between the auditor and client management (Antle and Nalebuff 1991), the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor may be useful in effectively fulfilling both tasks. To investigate the effect of auditor strategy on the resolution of proposed audit adjustments in a post Sarbanes-Oxley environment, we conduct experiments that examine both the client and auditor sides of the negotiation. We investigate a strategy of “concession” that draws upon the societal rule of reciprocation, which makes the waiving of inconsequential audit differences transparent. Specifically, with a concession approach, the auditor brings to the attention of the client all the audit differences (both significant and inconsequential) discovered during the audit and, subsequently, waives the inconsequential items. In contrast, a strategy of “no-concession” of inconsequential items (in which the auditor discloses to the client only the significant audit differences that must be booked) renders the client unaware of the waived inconsequential differences. Results from the client experiments indicate that, relative to a no-concession approach, participants representing client management (controllers/CFOs) are more willing to post significant income-decreasing adjustments (both objective and subjective) when exposed to a concession approach in the course of negotiating the final contents of the audited financial statements. A concession approach also results in greater client satisfaction and retention. Consistent with these findings, results from the auditor experiment suggest that auditors also perceive that altering their approach toward greater disclosure of waived inconsequential audit differences can improve client satisfaction and retention.

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey A. Gramling ◽  
Vassilios Karapanos

Auditor independence is an important underpinning of the federal securities laws. These laws require that registrants' financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) be audited by independent public accountants. The focus on independence for public company auditors was increased in light of the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to strengthen auditor independence. These instructional resources provide background information on the current SEC auditor independence rules. After becoming familiar with these rules, you will have the opportunity to complete several case scenarios that address: (1) hypothetical settings that may represent violations of the SEC independence rules, (2) possible actions that an audit committee might take when it determines that the SEC independence rules may have been violated, and (3) possible alternatives to the current SEC independence rules that could achieve the desired public policy goals of objective audits and investor confidence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 93 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gold ◽  
Melina Heilmann

Recent years have witnessed a change in the auditor reporting model. One of these developments is the auditor’s issuance of so-called Key Audit Matters in the auditor’s report, where they disclose “those matters that, in the auditor’s professional judgment, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements of the current period”. In this paper, we review the emerging body of academic research which examines the effects of KAM disclosures in the auditor’s report. We investigate research that has examined the effect of KAM disclosures on (1) investor behavior and market reaction, (2) auditor responses, (3) auditor liability, and (4) client management responses. The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of the existing literature and to summarize the preliminary findings and implications of 22 studies.


Author(s):  
John E. McEnroe

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-pagination: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">Over fifteen years ago, Martens and McEnroe (1992) conducted a behavioral study involving earnings management through the use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Their findings indicated that auditors issued unqualified audit opinions on those financial statements and perceived little risk to litigation as a result. A decade later they conducted a similar study (Martens and McEnroe 2002) with the expectation that increased attention to earnings management by then chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Arthur Levitt, would reduce auditors’ perceptions that the letter of GAAP is in itself an aegis or “safe harbor” against litigation. Although the authors found that auditors had become more conservative, they still issued unqualified opinions on financial statements in which transactions were reported in their form rather than their substance. Given the accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom, among others, and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, especially with its officers’ certification requirements, it was posited that auditors would exhibit a much more conservative approach than in either of the two previous studies. The results indicate that although auditors are more conservative than in the 1992 study, they still allow clients to engage in earnings management practices through the use of GAAP by issuing unqualified audit opinions on their financial statements. <strong style="mso-bidi-font-weight: normal;"></strong></span></span></p>


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wikil Kwak ◽  
Yong Shi ◽  
Gang Kou

Our study proposes several current data mining methods to predict bankruptcy after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) using 2007-2008 U.S. data. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was introduced to improve the quality of financial reporting and minimize corporate fraud in the U.S. Because of this SOX implementation, a companys financial statements are assumed to provide higher quality financial information for investors and other stakeholders. The results of our data mining approaches in our bankruptcy prediction study show that Bayesian Net method performs the best (85% overall prediction rate with 94% in AUC), followed by J48 (85% with 82% AUC), Decision Table (83.52%), and Decision Tree (82%) methods using financial and other data from the 10-K report and Compustat. These results are better than previous bankruptcy prediction studies before the SOX implementation using most current data mining approaches.


Author(s):  
Yousef Jahmani ◽  
William A. Dowling

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;"><span style="font-size: x-small;">The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was signed into law in July 2002, with the express purpose of restoring public confidence in corporate financial statements. Prior to the enactment of Sox, investors suffered significant losses due to corporate failures brought on by financial malfeasance.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span></span><strong></strong></span></p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 137-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Yi Lu ◽  
Hai Wu ◽  
Yangxin Yu

SUMMARY This study examines whether auditors regard market pressure on client management as contributing to audit risk. The literature suggests that when management jobs are threatened by negative market reaction to poor mergers and acquisitions investment, managers are more likely to misstate financial statements in the post-investment period due to pressure on their job security (Bens, Goodman, and Neamtiu 2012). We find that firms under such investment-related pressure experience larger increases in audit fees and audit lags in the post-investment period. Our findings suggest that auditors perceive market pressure on client management as a risk factor, as recommended by Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99.


2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan I. Blankley ◽  
David N. Hurtt ◽  
Jason E. MacGregor

SUMMARY We investigate the relationship between audit fees and subsequent financial statement restatements in the years following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). After controlling for internal control quality, we find that abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with the likelihood that financial statements are subsequently restated. This result conflicts with prior work that finds that audit fees are positively associated with future restatements. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the notion that restatements reflect low audit effort or underestimated audit risk in the periods leading up to the restatement year.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Moody Jennings ◽  
Kurt J. Pany ◽  
Philip M. J. Reckers

The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation mandated modest threshold levels of corporate board independence and expertise, as well as audit partner (not firm) rotation. One objective was to create an environment supportive of enhanced actual and perceived auditor independence. This study examines whether perceptions of auditor independence and auditor liability are incrementally influenced by further strengthening corporate governance and by rotating audit firms. Our experimental study addresses these questions by analyzing responses of 49 judges attending a continuing education course at the National Judicial College. The experiment manipulates corporate governance at two levels (minimally compliant with current corporate governance requirements versus strong) and auditor rotation at two levels (partner rotation versus audit firm rotation). We find that strengthening corporate governance (beyond minimal SOX levels) and rotating audit firms (compared to partner rotation) lead to enhanced auditor independence perceptions. We also find that judges consider auditors less likely to be liable for fraudulently misstated financial statements when firm rotation is involved in a minimally compliant corporate governance environment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document