Strong Corporate Governance and Audit Firm Rotation: Effects on Judges' Independence Perceptions and Litigation Judgments

2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marianne Moody Jennings ◽  
Kurt J. Pany ◽  
Philip M. J. Reckers
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Auditor Liability ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Audit Firms

The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation mandated modest threshold levels of corporate board independence and expertise, as well as audit partner (not firm) rotation. One objective was to create an environment supportive of enhanced actual and perceived auditor independence. This study examines whether perceptions of auditor independence and auditor liability are incrementally influenced by further strengthening corporate governance and by rotating audit firms. Our experimental study addresses these questions by analyzing responses of 49 judges attending a continuing education course at the National Judicial College. The experiment manipulates corporate governance at two levels (minimally compliant with current corporate governance requirements versus strong) and auditor rotation at two levels (partner rotation versus audit firm rotation). We find that strengthening corporate governance (beyond minimal SOX levels) and rotating audit firms (compared to partner rotation) lead to enhanced auditor independence perceptions. We also find that judges consider auditors less likely to be liable for fraudulently misstated financial statements when firm rotation is involved in a minimally compliant corporate governance environment.

Enriching AIS Courses With SOX Compliance Activities

2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joann Segovia ◽  
Carol M. Jessup ◽  
Marsha Weber ◽  
Sheri Erickson
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Accounting Profession ◽  
Investor Confidence ◽  
Reporting Requirements ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Significant Change

A very significant change to the accounting profession occurred in 2002 when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted. This legislation had a significant impact on corporations and their audit firms. The objective was to improve corporate governance and its quality of financial reporting to improve investor confidence. This paper provides instructors with a background on SOX and suggests readings and activities that reflect the requirements of SOX as it relates to the AIS environment and the analysis of internal controls. These activities can strengthen students' understandings of how corporations respond to the various reporting requirements of this Act.

scholarly journals INFLUENCE OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TOWARD ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM IN INDONESIA

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-29
Author(s):  
Dovi Septiari ◽  
Wirdani Atika Sari
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Internal Control System

Accounting conservatism is the precautionary principle to the profit recognition and one of the corporate governance to reduce the ability of the manager in manipulate and exaggerating the financial statements. Corporate governance is a internal control system which has its business objectives through securing company’s assets. This research is aiming to see the correlation among auditor independence and good corporate governance in accounting conservatism. Characteristics of good corporate governance in this are managerial ownership, profitability, company size and leverage. This research uses two measurements of conservatism non operating accrual and market to book ratio. This research as carried out at manufacture company in the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2010-2014. Sample selection do by purposive sampling method and obtained 49 companies in criteria accordingly. This research used data analysis and multiple liniear regression program eviews 9. The result showed that the effect of auditor independence is not significant in accounting conservatism in indonesia. Good corporate governance influential only the size of the company and ownership. The measurement of non operating accrual and market to book ratio show different results. Further research is expected to use another proxy for other variables to measure accounting conservatism.

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Auditor-Client Realignments

2012 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cory A. Cassell ◽  
Gary A. Giroux ◽  
Linda A. Myers ◽  
Thomas C. Omer
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Portfolio Decisions ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Governance Index

SUMMARY Events leading up to the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the public's focus on corporate governance and increased regulatory scrutiny of corporate governance mechanisms. These events also contributed to a massive restructuring in the audit market that resulted in the transfer of a large number of clients from Big N to non-Big N audit firms. We extend prior research examining the determinants of auditor-client realignments by investigating the effect of corporate governance on downward (i.e., from Big N to non-Big N auditors) switching activity. We develop a corporate governance index comprised of governance characteristics that we expect auditors to find more desirable in their clients (specifically, board and audit committee independence, diligence, and expertise). The results suggest that Big N auditors consider client corporate governance mechanisms when making client portfolio decisions. Specifically, downward auditor-client realignments are more likely for clients that score lower on our corporate governance index. However, the influence of audit committee-related corporate governance components on downward auditor-client realignments decreased post-SOX. The reduced effect of audit committee-related corporate governance components is consistent with what would be expected if the audit committee-related rules imposed by SOX reduced the variation in audit committee quality across clients. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Client Importance, Nonaudit Services, and Abnormal Accruals

2003 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 931-955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyeesoo Chung ◽  
Sanjay Kallapur
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Theory Development ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Big 5 ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Jones Model ◽  
Nonaudit Services ◽  
Abnormal Accruals

The economic theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981b) suggests that auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are related to client importance. Using ratios of client fees and of nonaudit fees divided by the audit firm's U.S. revenues or a surrogate for the audit-practice-office revenues as measures of client importance, we investigate their association with Jones-model abnormal accruals. In a sample of 1,871 clients of Big 5 audit firms we do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and any of the client importance measures. Our theory development also suggests that auditor incentives to compromise independence should increase with the extent of client opportunities and incentives to manage earnings, and decrease with the strength of corporate governance and auditor expertise. We also do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and client importance in subsets of the samples partitioned by proxies for these factors.

Auditor Independence: A Focus on the SEC Independence Rules

2008 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 247-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey A. Gramling ◽  
Vassilios Karapanos
Keyword(s):  
Audit Committee ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Background Information ◽  
Instructional Resources ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Securities Laws

Auditor independence is an important underpinning of the federal securities laws. These laws require that registrants' financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) be audited by independent public accountants. The focus on independence for public company auditors was increased in light of the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to strengthen auditor independence. These instructional resources provide background information on the current SEC auditor independence rules. After becoming familiar with these rules, you will have the opportunity to complete several case scenarios that address: (1) hypothetical settings that may represent violations of the SEC independence rules, (2) possible actions that an audit committee might take when it determines that the SEC independence rules may have been violated, and (3) possible alternatives to the current SEC independence rules that could achieve the desired public policy goals of objective audits and investor confidence.

Motivations for Classification Shifting: A Systematic Review

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Nisreen Mohammed Almaleeh
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Review ◽  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Special Items ◽  
Governance Environment ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Earnings Benchmarks

The purpose of the current paper is to highlight the motivations that may encourage managements of firms to shift core expenses to special items in order to inflate core or operating earnings i.e. to practice classification shifting, which would have an effect on the decisions of financial statements' users. This was done through conducting a systematic review on the available literature about classification shifting. The most obvious findings to emerge from this study is that management may engage in classification shifting for the reason that it is less costly than other earnings management methods, the firm being in current or potential state of financial distress, the desire of the management of the firm to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, the ownership structure of the firm having some characteristics that encourage management to engage in such a practice, the firm performing in a weak corporate governance environment, or due to the fact that classification shifting is tough to be detected by external monitors compared to other earnings management methods.

Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting

2004 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph V. Carcello ◽  
Albert L. Nagy
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Fraudulent Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Auditor Tenure ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Client Relationship ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation ◽  
The U.S

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) required the U.S. Comptroller General to study the potential effects of requiring mandatory audit firm rotation. The General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes in its recently released study of mandatory audit firm rotation that “mandatory audit firm rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence” (GAO 2003, Highlights). However, the GAO also suggests that mandatory audit firm rotation could be necessary if the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's requirements do not lead to improved audit quality (GAO 2003, 5). We examine the relation between audit firm tenure and fraudulent financial reporting. Comparing firms cited for fraudulent reporting from 1990 through 2001 with both a matched set of non-fraud firms and with the available population of non-fraud firms, we find that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. We fail to find any evidence that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely given long auditor tenure. Our results are consistent with the argument that mandatory audit firm rotation could have adverse effects on audit quality.

Auditor Rotation: The PCAOB Considers a New Direction

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. C15-C20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pamela B. Roush ◽  
Bryan K. Church ◽  
J. Gregory Jenkins ◽  
Susan A. McCracken ◽  
Jonathan D. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
Active Participation ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
The Public ◽  
Auditor Rotation ◽  
Public Company ◽  
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation

SUMMARY The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently undertook an exploration of the need for mandatory audit firm rotation with its issuance of the Concept Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation (PCAOB 2011a). The accumulation of evidence from PCAOB inspections of audit engagements over the last eight years has led the Board to consider additional steps to protect auditors' independence. We provide a brief synopsis of these matters based primarily on remarks by the PCAOB's chairman, James R. Doty (PCAOB 2011b, 2011c). In addition, we include relevant observations from prior academic studies and end with a call for the active participation of stakeholders in this important debate.

scholarly journals Audit Fees and Financial Performance of Deposit Taking Saccos in North RIFT, Kenya

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 15-27
Author(s):  
Dorris Serem ◽  
Dr. Rashid Fwamba ◽  
Dr. Alala Benedict
Keyword(s):  
Financial Performance ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Firm Experience ◽  
The Impact

The collapse of Deposit-Taking SACCOS and financial institutions in Kenya has caught the attention of the public and supervisory agencies to query the quality of audit. SACCO Societies Regulatory Authority on its inspection report indicated that SACCOs have been implicated in maladministration, scams and fraudulent dealings that led to their eventual collapse. SASRA also revoked licenses and rejected audited financial statements of some Deposit Taking SACCOs between 2013 to 2017.These financial scandals have been traced to poor audit quality. The study aimed to test the impact of audit quality on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The study sought to establish the influence of audit fees on financial performance; determine the influence of audit firm tenure on financial performance; establish the influence of auditor independence on financial performance and to determine the influence of audit firm experience on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. This study was based on Agency theory, Role theory and the Concept of audit expectation gap, and Stakeholders’ theory. This research adopted descriptive cross-sectional research design. The target population for the study was 266 staff of all the 16 registered Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The sample size was 48 respondents comprising of chief executive officers, finance officers and internal auditors of the Deposit-Taking SACCOs selected using purposive sampling method. Primary and secondary data was used. Questionnaires collected primary data while audited annual financial statements of SACCOs provided secondary data. Inferential and descriptive statistics was used in analyzing data through SPSS version 25. It emerged that audit fees, audit firm tenure and audit firm experience have a significant positive influence on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. Auditor independence had an insignificant positive influence on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in North Rift Region, Kenya. The study concluded that audit quality has a positive noteworthy impact on financial performance of Deposit-Taking SACCOs in Kenya. The study recommends that regulatory authorities should formulate strict rules on audit fee charges and oversee the implementation of the same. Also, SASRA should ensure DT-SACCOs implement auditor rotation in compliance with auditing regulations and standards. DT-SACCOs to consider auditor’s professional competence and experience before initiating any audit engagement. Finally, DT-SACCOs and auditors should reinforce the professional code of ethics in regard to auditor independence in terms of familiarity between auditor and the client that may lead audit work into jeopardy.

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