SALTy Citizens: Which State and Local Taxes Contribute to State-to-State Migration?

2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000
Author(s):  
Amy M. Hageman ◽  
Sean W.G. Robb ◽  
Jason Schwebke

State and local governments depend heavily on revenue generated from state and local taxes (SALTs). Migration between states occurs for many non-tax reasons, but prior research suggests tax-related factors may play an important role. Even so, the specific SALTs motivating state-to-state migration remain unclear given mixed and inconclusive results of prior studies. This study examines state and local tax variables individually and then jointly, and controls for important economic and non-economic factors to determine which SALTs matter to residents when making relocation decisions. Using data collected from multiple sources for 2008 to 2015, results indicate overall state and local tax burden, individual income taxes, select sales taxes, and property taxes are all significantly and negatively associated with taxpayer migration. Further, select sales taxes and property taxes seem to be most significantly associated with migration. We also provide some intuition related to the economic impact associated with net migration.

1985 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 447-465
Author(s):  
EDWARD M. GRAMLICH

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory S. Burge ◽  
Cynthia L. Rogers

Abstract Currently, sales taxes are imposed at both the state and local levels in 37 US states. In these environments, vertical tax competition occurs as governments share a common sales tax base, and local jurisdictions have autonomy over sales tax rates. As cash-strapped states look to sales taxes for additional revenues, local governments may worry about potentially adverse revenue impacts, as consumers react to combined tax rate increases. This study examines state-municipal and county-municipal fiscal spillovers using an empirical approach that accounts for endogenous tax policy leadership and voter tax fatigue. Employing comprehensive longitudinal data from Oklahoma, we find that state tax hikes significantly crowd out future rate increases for the large group of jurisdictions that are designated as followers. Leader jurisdictions are not found to display crowd-out tendencies, a result that is consistent with recent work suggesting that leaders may be less influenced by vertical fiscal externalities than other jurisdictions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 699-716 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS CARNES ◽  
ERIC R. HANSEN

If politicians in the United States were paid better, would more middle- and working-class people become politicians? Reformers often argue that the low salaries paid in state and local governments make holding office economically infeasible for lower-income citizens and contribute to the enduring numerical under-representation of the working class in our political institutions. Of course, raising politicians’ salaries could also make political office more attractive to affluent professionals, increasing competition for office and ultimately discouraging lower-income citizens from running and winning. In this article, we test these hypotheses using data on the salaries and economic backgrounds of state legislators. Contrary to the notion that paying politicians more promotes economic diversity, we find that the descriptive representation of the working class is the same or worse in states that pay legislators higher salaries. These findings have important implications for research on descriptive representation, political compensation, and political inequality.


1986 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Sarah F. Liebschutz ◽  
Irene Lurie

Author(s):  
Ajay Srikanth ◽  
Michael Atzbi ◽  
Bruce D. Baker ◽  
Mark Weber

In the United States, the vast majority of funding for K–12 education is provided through state and local governments to school districts. Throughout history, school districts have remained highly segregated both by income/wealth and by race, leading to reduced levels of funding available for higher need districts compared to wealthier districts. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze funding disparities within states and to determine differences between states with respect to funding equity. First, the chapter begins with a discussion of the sources of revenue for education at the state and local levels. Second, it explains the purpose and design of state aid formulas to reduce funding disparities between districts. Third, using data from the School Finance Indicators Database, the chapter calculates funding effort and progressivity indices for each state. Fourth, it provides case studies on two states with more progressive and less progressive funding, New Jersey and Illinois. Finally, the chapter concludes with policy recommendations on how states can improve their school finance systems to provide adequate levels of funding for higher need districts.


2020 ◽  
pp. 089124242097375
Author(s):  
Sohani Fatehin ◽  
David L. Sjoquist

Economists have devoted much attention to understanding the effects of state–local fiscal policies, particularly taxes, on the growth of state-level employment. However, no one has investigated whether the effects differ by wage level. Using a state-level panel data set, the authors investigate the link between state–local taxes and the growth of employment for three wage-level categories. The authors find relatively consistent evidence supporting the proposition that the response of employment growth to changes in taxes differs by wage level.


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