The Influence of Tax and Nontax Costs on Book-Tax Reporting Differences: Public and Private Firms

2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lillian F. Mills ◽  
Kaye J. Newberry

We provide archival evidence on firms' book-tax reporting differences using tax return data on public and private manufacturing firms. Prior research suggests that managers should report conforming book income to minimize tax-related costs. However, reporting conformity can also impose nontax costs. We find evidence that public firms have generally higher financial-reporting costs that result in larger book-tax differences. In addition, we find that higher debt levels impose greater nontax costs on firms that are privately held or more financially distressed. Finally, our tests of differences among public firms suggest that nontax costs associated with bonus plan thresholds and book income patterns affect their book-tax reporting. Our tests extend prior studies that focus on whether firms engage in specific conforming transactions. From a tax policy perspective, our results suggest that book-tax differences may be a less useful indicator of private firms' aggressive tax positions because they have fewer incentives to report nonconforming book income.

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Po-Hsuan Hsu ◽  
Kai Li

We compare innovation strategies of public and private firms based on a large sample over the period 1997–2008. We find that public firms’ patents rely more on existing knowledge, are more exploitative, and are less likely in new technology classes, while private firms’ patents are broader in scope and more exploratory. We investigate whether these strategies are due to differences in firm information environments, CEO risk preferences, firm life cycles, corporate acquisition policies, or investment horizons between these two groups of firms. Our evidence suggests that the shorter investment horizon associated with public equity markets is a key explanatory factor.


2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 583-611 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huasheng Gao ◽  
Jarrad Harford ◽  
Kai Li

We compare chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in public and large private firms. Public firms have higher turnover rates and exhibit greater turnover–performance sensitivity (TPS) than private firms. When we control for pre-turnover performance, performance improvements are greater for private firms than for public firms. We investigate whether these differences are due to differences in quality of accounting information, the CEO candidate pool, CEO power, board structure, ownership structure, investor horizon, or certain unobservable differences between public and private firms. One factor contributing to public firms’ higher turnover rates and greater TPS appears to be investor myopia.


2015 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 1387 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keehwan Kim ◽  
Ohjin Kwon

<p class="s0">This study examines the investment efficiency of private and public firms in Korea. Prior studies suggest that the investment efficiency of firms can change according to the companies' agency problem caused by the existence of information asymmetry. Moreover, they argue that there is less information asymmetry in private firms than in public firms, because the major investors of private firms have access to the internal information of the companies. We extend these studies by comparing the investment efficiency of private and public firms using an extended audited financial dataset of Korean firms. Our results show that the investment efficiency of private firms is higher than that of public firms, because the agency problem of the former is lower than that of the latter. Additionally, private firms invest more efficiently in R&amp;D and capital expenditures than public firms. Further, when we use alternative exogenous firm-specific proxies to measure the likelihood of over or under-investment, the results are substantially consistent with the main results. Finally, we re-test our hypotheses by including financial reporting quality proxies as control variables in the main regression model. These investigations further support our main results. Our study contributes to emerging literature on the difference between private and public firms by showing that the investment efficiency of the former is different from that of the latter. In addition, this study provides additional evidence on the agency problem that affects firms' investment decisions.</p>


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Khalid Al-Amri ◽  
Saif Al Shidi ◽  
Munther Al Busaidi ◽  
Serkan Akguc

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of real earnings management by private and public firms in a unique institutional setting, which is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The paper also compares the level of real earnings management between public and private firms in the GCC area. Design/methodology/approach The GCC area is a unique setting to investigate the use of real earnings management because of the low enforcement of reporting standards and supervisory rules, lack of sophisticated financial analysis, specialized media tools and high concentration of capital ownership. The authors use different models of real earnings management proposed by Roychowdhury, 2006, cash flow management, productions cost management and discretionary expenses management to examine the use of real earnings management. Findings The paper documents evidence consistent with private and public firms using real earnings management to influence their earnings figures. The paper also shows that the level of real earnings management is higher for private firms compared to public firms when cash flow management and discretionary expenses management models are used. The production cost model results show evidence consistent with public firms only engaging in real earnings management through production cost reduction. Research limitations/implications The results of this study might not be applicable to other emerging markets. Practical implications The findings of this study should promote a general understanding of firms’ behavior in unique environment such as GCC countries. Regulators in the GCC region should be aware that real earnings management techniques have been used by firms and that extra caution is required when auditing or analyzing the financial information of private and public firms in the GCC market. Originality/value This paper contributes to the literature in many aspects. First, it provides additional evidence on the use of earnings management in unique market contexts outside the USA and Europe. The GCC markets share many common characteristics that make them interesting settings to be investigated. Second, this paper adds more evidence on the use of earnings management between public and private firms. In this regard, the paper adds additional evidence in the discussions proposed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Givoly et al. (2010) who use two competing perspectives to investigate earnings quality in public and private firms: the demand hypothesis and the opportunistic behavior hypothesis.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (8) ◽  
pp. 2530-2554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert Sheen

I compare the U.S. capacity expansion decisions of public and private producers of 7 commodity chemicals from 1989 to 2006. I find that private firms invest differently than public firms. Private firms are more likely than public firms to increase capacity prior to a positive demand shock (an increase in price and quantity) and less likely to increase capacity before a negative demand shock. Potential mechanisms include public firm overextrapolation of past demand shocks and agency problems arising from greater separation between ownership and control.


2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Esteban Lafuente ◽  
Miguel A. García-Cestona

PurposeThis paper investigates how past performance changes, prior CEO replacements and changes in the chairperson impact CEO turnover in public and large private businesses.Design/methodology/approachWe analyze 1,679 CEO replacements documented in a sample of 1,493 Spanish public and private firms during 1998–2004 by computing dynamic binary choice models that control for endogeneity in CEO turnovers.FindingsThe results reveal that different performance horizons (short- and long-term) explain the dissimilar rate of CEO turnover between public and private firms. Private firms exercise monitoring patience and path dependency characterizes the evaluation of CEOs, while public companies' short-termism leads to higher CEO turnover rates as a reaction to poor short-term economic results, and alternative controls—ownership and changes in the chairperson—improve the monitoring of management.Originality/valueOur results show the importance of controlling for path dependency to examine more accurately top executives' performance. The findings confirm that exposure to market controls affects the functioning of internal controls in evaluating CEOs and shows a short-term performance horizon that could be behind the recent moves of public firms going private or restraining shareholders' power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian D. Allee ◽  
Brad A. Badertscher ◽  
Teri Lombardi Yohn

ABSTRACT We investigate the association between public versus private ownership and future changes in profitability. Managers have long debated the implications of public and private corporate ownership; however, little empirical research has provided insight into the issue. We find robust evidence that public firms are associated with significantly lower future changes in operating profitability compared to private firms matched on current profitability, size, growth, and industry. We also find that the differential future changes in profitability of public and private firms manifests in both future changes in profit margins and changes in asset turnovers. Additionally, we find evidence consistent with an association between short-termism, competition, and agency costs and the lower future changes in profitability for public versus private firms. The results provide insight for managers and investors into the differential future changes in profitability of public versus private firms and into the factors that drive the differential profitability. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.


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