How the Interplay between Financial and Nonfinancial Measures Affects Management Forecasting Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 41-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph F. Brazel ◽  
Bradley E. Lail
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Earnings Growth ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Nonfinancial Measures ◽  
External Stakeholders ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Future Management

ABSTRACT This study examines how the interplay between financial and nonfinancial measures (NFMs) affects management forecasting behavior. Building on the knowledge that NFMs are typically aligned with actual earnings and are likely incorporated into earnings forecasts, we investigate if the level of divergence between changes in NFMs and contemporaneous changes in earnings influences management forecasting behavior. We hand collect company-specific NFMs disclosed in 10-K filings and describe how a greater divergence between NFMs and earnings (i.e., NFM changes substantially outpacing earnings growth, or vice versa) is associated with greater uncertainty about the underlying business. As such, in more divergent settings, we observe that management is less likely to issue guidance. Consistent with our theory, for managers that do provide guidance in more divergent settings, management forecast errors increase. Last, we provide evidence that external stakeholders can use the level of divergence to predict future management forecasting behavior. JEL Classifications: G14; M40; M41. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.

Analysts, Taxes, and the Information Environment

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sangwan Kim ◽  
Andrew P. Schmidt ◽  
Kelly Wentland
Keyword(s):  
Accounting Information ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Complete Understanding ◽  
The Public ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Earnings Components ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the extent to which analysts incorporate tax-based earnings information into their earnings forecasts relative to other earnings information. We find that analysts' misreaction to tax-based earnings information is distinct from their misreaction to other (nontax) accounting information, on average. We then show that analysts differ in their misestimation of tax and other (nontax) earnings components only when firms have weak information environments; when firms have strong information environments, analysts' forecasts fully incorporate tax-based earnings information and exhibit no difference incorporating tax-based earnings information relative to other accounting information. Our evidence suggests that, on average, forecasting tax-based earnings information is more difficult for analysts relative to forecasting other accounting information. However, access to appropriate information and resources enables analysts to better process tax information. Overall, we contribute to the literature by providing a more complete understanding of the source of analysts' tax-related forecast errors. JEL Classifications: H25; M41; D82; G14. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources identified in the text.

Concurrent Earnings Announcements and Analysts' Information Production

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Driskill ◽  
Marcus P. Kirk ◽  
Jennifer Wu Tucker
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Announcements ◽  
Financial Analysts ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Limited Attention ◽  
Conference Calls ◽  
Stock Recommendations ◽  
Rich Information ◽  
Sample Firm ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine whether financial analysts are subject to limited attention. We find that when analysts have another firm in their coverage portfolio announcing earnings on the same day as the sample firm (a “concurrent announcement”), they are less likely to issue timely earnings forecasts for the sample firm's subsequent quarter than analysts without a concurrent announcement. Among the analysts who issue timely earnings forecasts, the thoroughness of their work decreases as their number of concurrent announcements increases. In addition, analysts are more sluggish in providing stock recommendations and less likely to ask questions in earnings conference calls as their number of concurrent announcements increases. Moreover, when analysts face concurrent announcements, they tend to allocate their limited attention to firms that already have rich information environments, leaving behind firms in need of attention. Overall, our evidence suggests that even financial analysts, who serve as information specialists, are subject to limited attention. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G17; G14. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Cost of Capital Free-Riders

2016 ◽  
Vol 91 (5) ◽  
pp. 1291-1313 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Baginski ◽  
Lisa A. Hinson
Keyword(s):  
Information Transfer ◽  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Information Loss ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Analyst Following ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACTWe document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions among firms by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004–2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously existing information transfer relations between stoppers and free-riders, and whether stoppers and free-riders are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-riders (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-riders' cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.JEL Classifications: M41.Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

Implications of Cost Behavior for Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 57-80 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mustafa Ciftci ◽  
Raj Mashruwala ◽  
Dan Weiss
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Earnings Forecast ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Clear Pattern ◽  
Earnings Prediction ◽  
Cost Behavior ◽  
Cost Variability ◽  
Available Information ◽  
Cost Stickiness ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT Recent work in management accounting offers several novel insights into firms' cost behavior. This study explores whether financial analysts appropriately incorporate information on two types of cost behavior in predicting earnings—cost variability and cost stickiness. Since analysts' utilization of information is not directly observable, we model the process of earnings prediction to generate empirically testable hypotheses. The results indicate that analysts “converge to the average” in recognizing both cost variability and cost stickiness, resulting in substantial and systematic earnings forecast errors. Particularly, we find a clear pattern—inappropriate incorporation of available information on cost behavior in earnings forecasts leads to larger errors in unfavorable scenarios than in favorable ones. Overall, enhancing analysts' awareness of the expense side is likely to improve their earnings forecasts, mainly when sales turn to the worse. JEL Classifications: M41; M46; G12.

Tax-Motivated Loss Shifting

2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 1657-1682 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle M. Erickson ◽  
Shane M. Heitzman ◽  
X. Frank Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Analyst Forecast ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Corporate Reporting ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
Tax Loss ◽  
Do So

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the implications of tax loss carryback incentives for corporate reporting decisions and capital market behavior. During the 1981 through 2010 sample period, we find that firms increase losses in order to claim a cash refund of recent tax payments before the option to do so expires, and we estimate that firms with tax refund-based incentives accelerate about $64.7 billion in losses. Tax-motivated loss shifting is reflected in both recurring and nonrecurring items and is more evident for financially constrained firms. Analysts do not generally incorporate tax-motivated loss shifting into their earnings forecasts, resulting in more negative analyst forecast errors for firms with tax-based incentives than for firms without. Holding earnings surprises constant, however, investors react less negatively to losses reported by firms with tax loss carryback incentives. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

scholarly journals The Role of Analysts in Intra-Industry Information Transfer

2013 ◽  
Vol 88 (4) ◽  
pp. 1265-1287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilles Hilary ◽  
Rui Shen
Keyword(s):  
Information Transfer ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Forecast Revisions ◽  
Management Forecast

ABSTRACT When a firm issues a management forecast, analysts who have observed more forecasts from this firm since covering it (i.e., have more MF-Experience) subsequently improve their own accuracy more and provide timelier earnings forecasts for other (non-issuing) firms in the same industry. We also find that, subsequent to a management forecast, investors are more responsive to forecast revisions for non-issuing firms made by analysts with more MF-Experience. Further tests suggest that our results are not explained by endogeneity in firm coverage. Data Availability: Data are commercially available.

Benefits of management disclosure precision on analysts’ forecasts

2014 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 371-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Ho Chi ◽  
David A. Ziebart
Keyword(s):  
Forecast Accuracy ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Forecast Errors ◽  
Management Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Earnings Guidance ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Management Forecast ◽  
Forecast Precision ◽  
The Impact

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of management’s choice of forecast precision on the subsequent dispersion and accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of 3,584 yearly management earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and 10,287 quarterly management EPS forecasts made during the period of 2002-2007 and collected from the First Call database, the authors controlled for factors previously found to impact analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion and investigate the link between management forecast precision and attributes of the analysts’ forecasts. Findings – Results provide empirical evidence that managements’ disclosure precision has a statistically significant impact on both the dispersion and the accuracy of subsequent analysts’ forecasts. It was found that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is negatively related to the management forecast precision. In other words, a precise management forecast is associated with a smaller dispersion in the subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Evidence consistent with accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts being positively associated with the precision in the management forecast was also found. When the present analysis focuses on range forecasts provided by management, it was found that lower precision (a larger range) is associated with a larger dispersion among analysts and larger forecast errors. Practical implications – Evidence suggests a consistency in inferences across both annual and quarterly earnings forecasts by management. Accordingly, recent calls to eliminate earnings guidance through short-term quarterly management forecasts may have failed to consider the linkage between the attributes (precision) of those forecasts and the dispersion and accuracy in subsequent analysts’ forecasts. Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on both management earnings forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecasts. The results assist in policy deliberations related to calls to eliminate short-term management earnings guidance.

scholarly journals Heaping of Executive Compensation

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-201 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bjorn N. Jorgensen ◽  
Paige H. Patrick ◽  
Naomi S. Soderstrom
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Discrete Data ◽  
Cognitive Effort ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Public ◽  
External Stakeholders ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We investigate whether compensation grants are subject to “heaping,” the tendency of less informed individuals to provide round values when reporting estimates of discrete data. We document that an unexpectedly large number of CEOs receive round compensation (i.e., evenly divisible by 100,000 and/or 10,000). We investigate whether, consistent with heaping, the frequency of round compensation varies with proxies for boards of directors' effort in setting compensation. We find that round compensation is more common when boards have characteristics suggesting they provide weak oversight of compensation and thus face more uncertainty in estimating compensation. We also find less frequent round compensation when boards face stronger pressure from external stakeholders, encouraging boards to expend additional cognitive effort in setting compensation. Further, consistent with weak oversight of compensation, round compensation tends to be higher than non-round compensation. However, we do not find a consistent association between this higher, round compensation and future firm performance. JEL Classifications: G30; G41; M40; M46. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Interim Reporting Frequency and the Mispricing of Accruals

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
Shou-Min Tsao ◽  
Hsueh-Tien Lu ◽  
Edmund C. Keung
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Regulatory Changes ◽  
Sample Composition ◽  
Reporting Frequency ◽  
Over Time ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Accrual Mispricing

SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between mandatory financial reporting frequency and the accrual anomaly. Based on regulatory changes in reporting frequency requirements in Taiwan, we divide our sample period into three reporting regimes: a semiannual reporting regime from 1982 to 1985, a quarterly reporting regime from 1986 to 1987, and a monthly reporting regime (both quarterly financial reports and monthly revenue disclosure) from 1988 to 1993. We find that although both switches (from the semiannual reporting regime to the quarterly reporting regime and from the quarterly reporting regime to the monthly reporting regime) hasten the dissemination of the information contained in annual accruals into stock prices and reduce annual accrual mispricing, the switch to monthly reporting has a lesser effect. Our results are robust to controlling for risk factors, transaction costs, and potential changes in accrual, cash flow persistence, and sample composition over time. These results imply that more frequent reporting is one possible mechanism to reduce accrual mispricing. JEL Classifications: G14; L51; M41; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Tax-Advantaged Trust Use Among IPO Executives: Determinants and Implications for Valuation and Future Performance

2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (3) ◽  
pp. 145-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Dambra ◽  
Matthew Gustafson ◽  
Phillip J. Quinn
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Estate Taxes ◽  
Price Appreciation ◽  
One Year ◽  
Jel Classifications

ABSTRACT We examine the prevalence and determinants of CEOs' use of tax-advantaged trusts prior to their firm's IPO. Twenty-three percent of CEOs use tax-advantaged pre-IPO trusts, and share transfers into tax-advantaged trusts are positively associated with CEO equity wealth, estate taxes, and dynastic preferences. We project that pre-IPO trust use increases CEOs' dynastic wealth by approximately $830,000, on average. We next examine a simple model's prediction that trust use will be positively related to IPO-period stock price appreciation. We find that trust use is associated with 12 percent higher one-year post-IPO returns, but is not significantly related to the IPO's valuation, filing price revision, or underpricing. This evidence is consistent with CEOs' personal finance decisions prior to the IPO containing value-relevant information that is not immediately incorporated into market prices. JEL Classifications: D14; G12; G32; M21; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

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