scholarly journals Ethical Principles on the Freedom of Speech and Expression in the Developed and Developing Countries

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Alim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is an essential part of the Bill of Rights. The amendment prohibits making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, obstructing the free exercise of religion, infringing on the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering peoples assembling rights in a peaceful manner or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental remedy of grievances. The guarantees of this Bill of Rights were subject to the limitation imposed by the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court and other courts. The United States and India are the largest democratic country and almost have similar free speech provisions in their Constitutions. This Article is intended to present the free speech provisions of the American and Indian Constitution as a basic fundamental right of human being. It is also to be examined that what is the role of Supreme Court in interpreting the freedom of speech and expression provisions. The study also tries to incorporate the comparison between the looms of both countries as far as freedom of speech is disturbed.

2021 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-256
Author(s):  
Karolina Palka

This article is about the limits of the right to free speech. The first section provides a brief introduction to this topic, primarily in the context of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The second section describes the case of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which was fundamental to the topic of this paper because the United States Supreme Court created the so-called "fighting words" doctrine based on it. In the next two sections, two court cases are presented that perfectly demonstrate the limits of the right to free speech in the United States: Snyder v. Phelps and Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America. The fifth part shows the right to freedom of speech in the context of Polish civil, criminal, and constitutional law, as well as acts of international law binding on Poland. The last part is a short summary.


2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-223
Author(s):  
Mary Margaret Roark

The First Amendment protects one of our most precious rights as citizens of the United States—the freedom of speech. Such protection has withstood the test of time, even safeguarding speech that much of the population would find distasteful. There is one form of speech which cannot be protected: the true threat. However, the definition of what constitutes a "true threat" has expanded since its inception. In the new era of communication—where most users post first and edit later—the First Amendment protection we once possessed has been eroded as more and more speech is considered proscribable as a "true threat." In order to adequately protect both the public at large and our individual right to free speech, courts should analyze a speaker’s subjective intent before labeling speech a "true threat." Though many courts have adopted an objective, reasonable listener test, the U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity, in deciding Elonis v. United States, to take a monumental step in protecting the First Amendment right to free speech. By holding that the speaker’s subjective intent to threaten is necessary for a true threat conviction, the Court will restore the broad protection afforded by the First Amendment and repair years of erosion caused by an objective approach.


Author(s):  
Maryam Ahranjani

The very first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of speech. While the Supreme Court held in 1969 that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,” since then the Court has limited students' freedom of speech, stopping short of considering the boundaries of off-campus, online speech. Lower court holdings vary, meaning that a student engaging in certain online speech may not be punished at all in one state but would face harsh criminal punishments in another. The lack of a uniform standard leads to dangerously inconsistent punishments and poses the ultimate threat to constitutional knowledge and citizenship exercise: chilling of speech. Recent interest in technology-related cases and the presence of a new justice may reverse the Court's prior unwillingness to address this issue. In the meantime, this chapter argues that school districts should erect a virtual schoolhouse gate by implementing a uniform standard.


2010 ◽  
Vol 132 (06) ◽  
pp. 47-47
Author(s):  
Kirk Teska

This article demonstrates through several examples of misplaced technology and clash between intellectual property laws and freedom of speech. The first example stated in the article is that of an Apple engineer leaving his prototype next-generation iPhone in a bar and it ended up at gizmodo.com—a website devoted to technology. The folks at Gizmodo tore into the iPhone, confirmed its authenticity, and then put photographs of the phone along with a list of its new features on the gizmodo.com site. Apple, rather than suing, at least so far, simply asked for the prototype phone back and Gizmodo complied. Could Apple sue Gizmodo or would First Amendment protect Gizmodo, only depending upon certain different factors and to an extent on the particular court hearing the case. The ultimate authority on the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court, generally loathes limiting free speech for any reason.


Author(s):  
Sergey Polischuk

The article examines the main political events that took place in the United States from the controversial election results to the tragic events on Capitol Hill for Trump supporters, which led to human casualties, finally untied the hands of the Democrats and allowed them to bury all the democratic values that America has taught the whole world since the adoption of the US Constitution and the Bill of Rights by the founding fathers of the state.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-103
Author(s):  
Juhani Rudanko

This article focuses on face-threatening attacks on the Madison Administration during the War of 1812. The discussion is framed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, with the language of the Amendment protecting freedom of speech, and also by the Sedition Act of 1798, which, if it had been made permanent, would have seriously curtailed freedom of speech. The War of 1812 was intensely unpopular among members of the Federalist Party, and their newspapers did not shy away from criticising it. This article investigates writings published in the Boston Gazette and the Connecticut Mirror during the war. It is shown that the criticism took different forms, ranging from accusing President Madison of “untruths” to painting a picture of what was claimed to be the unmitigated hopelessness of his position, both nationally and internationally, and that the criticism also included harsh personal attacks on his character and motives. It is suggested that some of the attacks may be characterised as exhibiting aggravated impoliteness. The article also considers President Madison’s attitude in the face of the attacks.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julien M. Armstrong

Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 26 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. Of all of the freedoms enshrined in the Bill of Rights, perhaps none inspire the level of interest and debate among both scholars and laypersons as the freedom of speech. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America guarantees that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,” and it has long been held that “speech” encompasses not merely spoken words butany conduct which is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 214-217
Author(s):  
Charles Marowitz

On 13 October 2012, Lenny Bruce, had he not accidentally overdosed on narcotics (or committed suicide – the jury is still out on that one), would be eighty-seven years old. It is, of course, a thoroughly incredible notion – like an octogenarian Mozart, a super annuated Janis Joplin, or James Dean signing up for a senior citizen pension. Poètes maudits, doomed rock icons, and self-destructive superstars are supposed to die young. Their myth demands it, and we wouldn't have it any other way.Bruce at forty-one, perched on a toilet bowl with a spike in his right arm and his last typed words (‘conspiracy to interfere with the Fourth Amendment const—’) in the barrel of his still humming electric typewriter, died characteristically. He was always associated with toilet humour and throughout the last decade of his life ex hausted himself trying to demonstrate that the United States Constitution protected the free speech for which one court after another mercilessly prosecuted him. (The Fourth Amendment, incidentally, protects citizens from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ and, along with the state's First Amendment violations, was as much responsible for his downfall as the cocaine and morphine.)


2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Reed ◽  
Ilmi Granoff

AbstractIn Medellín v. Texas, a Texas death penalty case, the United States Supreme Court decided that it could not enforce what it acknowledged to be an international legal obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice. The Supreme Court's judgment in Medellín has put our understanding of the domestic treatment of US treaty law in a state of flux. Under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, treaties are the supreme law of the land: binding, equivalent to federal statutes and enforceable by judges. After Medellín, treaties may not necessarily be enforceable federal law, depending on whether they are self-executing without additional legislation. The Supreme Court's decision depends upon the dramatic expansion of a narrow but necessary exception to the Supremacy Clause provided in an 1829 Supreme Court precedent. The consequence of that expansion is to put the US historical approach to treaty-making in question. This article provides (a) a brief overview of treaty law in the United States, including the law before Medellín regarding the domestic effect of treaty law, (b) an overview of Medellín, (c) a critique of the Court's reasoning in Medellín and (d) a discussion of its consequences.


AmeriQuests ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Percy DeWitt

David M. O’Brien’s Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, Unprotected Expression, and the Supreme Court serves as a significant contribution to the field of First Amendment Law by offering an overview of crucial issues and, moreover, by emphasizing the outlook for the future of free speech. O’Brien’s credentials position him favorably for the task; he was a judicial fellow and research associate with the Supreme Court, he has written numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court, and he is currently the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. Considering the daunting task of compiling a succinct account and analysis of the history of free speech in the United States, Professor O’Brien does well to allow readers to better understand the complexities of free speech policy in the United States.


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