Generalized Stackelberg Game-theoretic Approach for Jointed Energy and Reserve Coordination of Electric Vehicles

Author(s):  
Tianyang Zhao ◽  
Xuewei Pan ◽  
Lei Li ◽  
Fei Zhao ◽  
Can Wang
2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 2232-2244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shibo Chen ◽  
Zhenwei Guo ◽  
Zaiyue Yang ◽  
Yunjian Xu ◽  
Roger S. Cheng

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (17) ◽  
pp. 7174
Author(s):  
Xiaoxiao Chang ◽  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Qian Wang ◽  
Yongguang Zhong

This paper mainly aims at investigating the governments’ take-back policy of penalty or subsidy that motivates eco-design or remanufacturing. For this purpose, we consider a two-stage Stackelberg game between a government and a manufacturer. The government first decides to impose a take-back penalty or offer a take-back subsidy, and then the manufacturer selects to remanufacture or invest in eco-design as a response to the take-back policy. Upon analyzing and comparing game equilibrium, we find that the government prefers to offer a subsidy policy for eco-design and to impose a penalty policy for remanufacturing. The manufacturer will decide on investing in eco-design when the monetary value of the environmental impact of landfill and eco-design coefficient is medium. However, if the eco-design coefficient is high, the manufacturer practices remanufacturing instead of eco-design whether penalized and subsidized. The present study provides a set of guidelines in practical managerial recommendations for governments and manufacturers.


Author(s):  
Prashant Bansode ◽  
Aniket Deshpande ◽  
Sushant Bahadure ◽  
Pratik Bajaria ◽  
Faruk Kazi ◽  
...  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document